Creativity and Pax Mundi

Edited by
Mourad Wahba

Foreword by the Director General of UNESCO
Federico Mayor

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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Conference Papers

FOREWORD

MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF UNESCO
Federico Mayor

On behalf of UNESCO, I welcome the opportunity to address a message to this international gathering, assembled to debate a topic of the highest importance for our common future.

The invention of nuclear weapons - Jaspers once said placed humanity for the first time in possession of its own death. During fifty years of Cold War confrontation, the United Nations system played a key role in averting the irreparable. But while the apocalypse never happened, the culture of violence has endured and in recent times has erupted in new and pernicious forms as wars between states have tended to be replaced by conflicts within national boundaries. These conflicts - as diverse as the forms assumed by the denial or assertion of human freedom but often fueled by the ideology of ethno-nationalism or religious extremism - are posing complex humanitarian and security problems at the close of the twentieth century.

Addressing the challenges - and opportunities - of the post-Cold-War era, will require a new commitment by the international community to the establishment of peace with justice. UNESCO believes that peace-building must be rooted in universal education, of the kind that it is promoting with its UN partners through its worldwide Education for ALL campaign. Education is the key to eliminating the causes of conflict, by promoting the knowledge and skills necessary for self-reliant development and by fostering the attitudes of tolerance and solidarity on which peace is predictated. The sleep of reason, said Goya, creates monsters. Only through education can we hope to move from the logic of force to the force or reason, from an age-old culture of war to culture of peace.

"The art of creation is older that the art of killing", wrote the poet André Voznesesnky. Is this not precisely the function of education - to nurture a primordial creativity at the confluence of freedom and responsibility, to awaken the creative potential in very human being, to contribute to the creative diversity that is the hallmark of humanity and the condition of our living together in peace? UNESCO, which commends and supports you initiative, awaits with interest your reflections on the relationship between creativity and pax mundi.

PREFACE

"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defense of peace must be constructed." (UNESCO constitution).

The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophes." (Albert Einstein)

The two above statements mean that human reason can be shaped either for peace or for war. Hence, the purpose of this conference is to tackle the issue of world peace, or PAX MUNDI, in relation to a very vital issue, namely, creativity being the distinctly human potential capable of shaping and directing people's minds towards peace of the world.

As long as human reason can be shaped either for peace or for war, and as long as reason works through logic, so, the first question to be raised is:

What is the logic of peace?

Up till now, we have three kinds of logic:

First, formal logic, which depends on the principle of noncontradiction, that is, either true or false but not both. This kind of logic could be called logic of "the absolute truth."

Second, dialectical logic, which depends on the principle of contradiction, or on thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

Third, symbolic logic, which is a reformation of formal logic using symbols instead of articulated language.

We could add a fourth kind of logic that is, logic of creativity. which is based upon problematics, or a certain kind of contradiction that needs a creative solution which cannot be perceived in advance .

Accordingly, we have to raise the following question:

What kind of logic could be used when tackling the issue of PAX MUNDI.

So long as every age has its own logic, it could be argued that the appropriate logic for the purpose of this conference is the fourth kind of logic.

If peace is based on a certain logic, then it is a matter of education, since eduction is concerned with the formulation of human reason, that is, with the **how to think.**

Hence, one could argue for an education which promotes creativity which could promote peace. The logical relation between the promotion of creativity in education and the promotion of peace, lies in the fact that creativity is against dogmatism, and dogmatism is against tolerance and for the formulation of the enemy image necessary for war. Contemporary paradigms of dogmatism leading to war are Fascism, Nazism, Racism, and Fundamentalism.

In tackling the civilisational roots of peace, one could start by questioning Freud's question, "Is civilisation neurotic?", or by arguing with Spengler's theory of civilisation as closed systems, or by returning to Marx to discuss his notion of class struggle being the mover of civilisation, or by looking into Nietzsche's philosophy of the will to power.

Most of these arguments, or all of them, could lead to a very vital issue when we tackle creativity in relation to world peace, namely, the issue of the mass-man and creativity. It has been observed that the Fascist and Nazist regimes have relied heavily on the mass-man in waging war. This has been due to the fact that the mass-man is liable to dogmatic thinking. Hence, one should ask how could the mass-man be educated in order to be nondogmatic or rather, anti-dogmatic.

PAX MUNDI, or peace of the world, necessitates consciousness of the unity of the world. Consciousness of the unity of the world has a basic requirement, namely, unity of knowledge. Unity of knowledge surpasses interdiscplinarity and multidisciplinarity.

OPENING ADDRESSES

MESSAGE FROM HIS EXCELLENCY, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Amr Moussa
deputising for His Excellency
Ambassador Sayed Abou-Zeid

السيدات والساده ،

أود فى البداية أن أعبر عن مشاعر السعادة والاعتزاز بإلقاء كلمتى أمام هذه النخبة من حكماء عالمنا المعاصر ، وأن أتوجه لكم بالتهنئة لعقد مثل هذا المؤتمر الهام والذى يأتى فى وقته الصحيح داعيا الى دعم فكرة السلام ونبذ المواجهة والحروب ، واستخدام أسمى ما وهب الله الانسان وهو العقل لوضع الأفكار المبدعة الكفيلة بتوجيه البشرية الى وجهاتها الصائبة .

السيدات والساده ،

ينعقد هذا المؤتمر فى ظل ظروف دولية دقيقة ، وتتسم بحالة عامة من القلق السياسى والاقتصادى والاجتماعى ، فقد خفتت الأمال التى بعثت - بإنتهاء الحرب الباردة - فى عصر جديد يسوده التعاون والوفاق ، ونواجه ظواهر متناقضة تتزامن فيها عوامل التكامل والاندماج مع نوازع الفرقة والتفتت ، وتتوازى ثورة التكنولوجيا والاتصالات مع الصراعات القومية والعداوات

العرقية وتتداخل فى عالمنا هذا الاقتصاديات البازغة المتطورة مع مشاكل التنمية ، فمازالت بعض الشعوب لم تنل قسطها من العدالة وأخرى مازالت تعانى من نقص أساسيات الحياة كالغذاء ٠

لايعنى هذا أن مجتمعنا الدولى قد وقف مكتوف الأيدى ، فقد أرست مسيرته نظما ومبادىء وأحكام كفيلة لوطبقت بروح من الموضوعية والعدالة ان توفر للانسانية ما تبتغيه ٠ إن حجر الزاوية فيما يتعلق بمستقبل المجتمع الدولى يتشكل على اساس أولويات السلم كركيزة لأحكام ميثاق الأمم المتحدة يعضده نظام فعال للأمن الجماعى والتنمية بمفهومها الشامل فى المجالين الاقتصادى والاجتماعى ، والمساواة فى السيادة بين الدول واحترام حقوق الشعوب ٠ ولقد نجح المجتمع الدولى خلال السنوات الأخيرة فى تركيز الاهتمام بقضايا الانسان من خلال سلسلة من المؤتمرات الدولية عقدت على التوالى حول البيئة ، وحقوق الانسان ، والسكان ، والتنمية الاجتماعية ، والمرأة، والمستوطنات البشرية والغذاء ٠ ولهذا فإننا نواصل دعمنا لمنظمة الأمم المتحدة بإعتبار ما يجب أن تكون كضمير لمجتمعنا الدولى فى حاضره ومستقبله ٠

السيدات والساده ،

لقد أثبتت الأحداث إيمان مصر الراسخ بالسلام والذى جعلته فى مقدمة أهدافها الاستراتيجية ، وكانت لقيادتها فضل اتخاذ الخطوة الأولى للوصول الى اتفاق سلام بين مصر واسرائيل لتنتهى بذلك عقود المواجهات الدامية • وسعت من ذلك الحين الدعوة الى التوصل الى مصالحة تاريخية فى المنطقة تتيح لشعوبها التفرغ للبناء والتنمية ، وشاركت بكل اخلاص وصدق فى كل جهد يصل بمنطقة الشرق الأوسط الى السلام الشامل والدائم والعادل •

ودعت جميع الأطراف الى الالتزام بصيغة الأرض فى مقابل السلام والتى ارتضاها الجميع فى مدريد ، والتنفيذ الأمين لما تم التوقيع عليه من اتفاقات ، واستكمال الأطراف المعنية لمفاوضاتها بروح بناءة بغية الوصول الى الهدف الأسمى والذى يأتى لصالح جميع الأطراف •

وليس هذا هو الوقت الذى ينكث أحد الأطراف بعهوده ، أو أن يتحمل المسئولية التاريخية لايقاف مسيرة السلام • لقد انطلقت هذه المسيرة النبيلة ولن يستطيع أحد مهما كان شأنه أن يوقفها •

السيدات والسادة ،

أن السلام هو أمل البشرية فى حياة مستقرة هادئة من أجل اطلاق الطاقات الخلاقة والابداعية لدى البشر من خلال التواصل الفكرى والعطاء المتبادل لخير الانسانية . وأن غاية البشرية هى تحقيق المثل التى طالما حلم بها الفلاسفة وهى قيم الحق والخير والجمال والتى تنبع من المعرفة البشرية المتجدده والفكر المستنير .

وغنى عن القول أمامكم أن قضية السلام قد إحتلت أهمية بالغة بين الفلاسفة عبر القرون الذين خرجوا بأفكار تتصل بفلسفة السلام منذ أرسطو وحتى الوقت الحاضر مرورا بكانت وهيجل وخاصة فلاسفة القرن الثامن والتاسع عشر الذين أطلق عليهم فلاسفة السلام لما قدموه من اسهامات فكرية كانت هداية للبشرية ورادعا لضمير دعاة الحرب والعنف فى أكثر من حقبه.

وإنى اذ أتوجه اليكم اليوم وأنتم تحملون مشاعل هؤلاء الفلاسفة العظام من تواصل فكرى وحضارى ، فإن أمامنا مهام جسيمه علينا أن نتشارك للقيام بها فى سبيل ارساء المفهوم الشامل للسلام من بينها :

أولا دعم مسيرة السلام فى منطقة الشرق الأوسط ، انطلاقا من أن السلام هو أساس الاستقرار والتنمية والرفاهية لجميع شعوب المنطقة خاصة وأن مسيرة السلام تواجه عقبات حقيقية فى الفترة الحالية الأمر الذى يحتاج تضافر جهودكم البناءة لتحقيق هذا الهدف .

ثانيـا العمل على انشاء منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل فى الشرق الأوسط ، ومن هنا كان حـرص مصر على تحقيق هذا الهدف وطرح الرئيس مبارك مبادرته عـام ١٩٨٥ لاخلاء المنطقة من أسلحة الدار الشامل .

ثالثـا تطوير النظام الاقتصادى العالمى بما يحقق العدالة بين كافة الشعوب .

رابعا توظيف العلم والتكنولوجيا ووسائل الحياة الحديثة لرفاهية الانسان وليـس فى زيادة معاناته .

خامسا تشجيع الحوار البناء بين الثقافات والحضارات والدفع الى المزيد من التمـاذج لا التضارب والتناحر .

سادسا تسخير العمل السياسى لخدمـة البشر بالقدر الذى يقوم بـه فـى ضبط حركـة الشعوب وعلاقة الانسان مع الدولة .

سابعا العمل على اجتثاث الجذور الفكرية للعنف بالمواجهات العقليـة وحيث لايصح الحياد مع الارهاب ، الفردى والجماعى .

السيدات والسـاده ،

إن مصر مهد الحضارة والتاريخ وصانعة السلام تتطلع الى لقاءكم هذا لتعزيـز الحوار الفكرى البنـاء الذى يمثل الركيزة الأساسية لتوثيـق العلاقـات والروابط بين الدول والشعوب .

وفى الختام فإننى أتوجه بالتحية والتقدير الى السيد رئيس المؤتمـر والسادة المنظمين واعلام الفكر والثقافة المشاركة فيه واثقا فـى أن أطروحـات ومناقشـات السادة المشاركين سوف تثرى وتدعم مفهوم السلام العالمى وهو الهدف الذى نسعى جميعا من أجل إنجازه .

MESSAGE FROM DIRECTOR, CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT FUND , MINISTRY OF CULTURE

Mr. Samir Gharib

السيدات والسادة :

أبدأ أولا بالترحيب بالضيوف المشاركين في مؤتمر الإبداع وسلام العالم المنعقد على أرض مصر . تلك المساحة من العالم التي شهدت أول حضارة عرفتها البشرية . وكانت هذه الحضارة نموذجا راقيا على إبداع الفكر والحس الانساني . وأعطت لنا المثال الأول على العلاقة بين الإبداع والسلام .

وأبدأ ثانيا بشكر الجمعية الدولية لابن رشد والتنوير ، والجمعية الفلسفية الأفروآسيوية ، والقائمين عليها ، على مبادرتهم الطيبة للدعوة الى عقد هذا المؤتمر وتنظيمه في القاهرة.

وهنا ، أجد من الواجب أن أوجه شكرا خاصا إلى استاذي الجليل الدكتور مراد وهبة ، رئيس المؤتمر ، وإلى الاستاذة الدكتورة منى ابوسنة سكرتير عام المؤتمر ، ليس فقط على جهودهما الكبيرة من أجل أن تجمعنا معا حول هذا الموضوع الحيوى والهام ، ولكن و قبل ذلك على دورهما التنويري المستمر منذ سنوات طويلة في مجالي الثقافة والتعليم الجامعي في مصر . هادفان مع غيرهما من مناضلي ثورات وحركات

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* كاتب وناقد فني .

* مدير صندوق التنمية الثقافية بوزارة الثقافة المصرية . والمستشار الفني لوزير الثقافة

تحرير الانسان وتقدمه الي تطوير مجتمعنا العالمي وتقدمه ، وبخاصة في هذه المنطقة البائسة من العالم .

وأود أن أرحب بكم جميعا أيها الحضور الأفاضل ليس بأسمى فقط ، ولكن أيضا باسم وزارة الثقافة المصرية ، وبأسم وزير الثقافة الفنان فاروق حسني .

وبعد ، فإنني لا أجد نفسي مؤهلا أمامكم وأنتم كوكبة من مفكري الأرض الكبار ، الآتين من ثقافات وحضارات متنوعة وثرية ، لاأجد نفسى مؤهلا للحديث طويلا في أمور أنتم أعلم بها مني . ولا أحب لنفسي في ذات الوقت أن أكرر كلاما محفوظا ينشر ويذاع في كل يوم ، فأصيب نفسى وأصيبكم بالملل أو أضيع وقتكم الثمين .

ولكن.. ربما يكون من المناسب لي هنا أن أوجه عناية سيادتكم إلى أنكم تعقدون مؤتمركم هذا ، تحت عنوانه المؤثر ، في منطقة هي أحوج ماتكون الى تاكيد الارتباط الأساسي بين الإبداع والسلام . وهي أحوج ماتكون الى تحقيق طرفي هذه المعادلة الخالدة ، وأن تحقيق هذه المعادلة على أرض الواقع لايتأتي فقط بالحديث الكثير عنها ، وإنما يجب أن نناضل جميعا- وعلى أرض الواقع - لتحقيقها . وأنتم أهل الفكر والعقل والفلسفة قادة هذا النضال ومرشدوه .

نحن أحوج مانكون الى من يوضح لنا صوت العقل وطريقه في هذا العالم ، الذي يجمح به هوس غير معقول ، وغير مفهوم ، ليدخلنا طاحونة

تفنى الحياة وتقتل تطلعاتنا وأحلامنا وأحلام أطفالنا الجميلة .

إن الواقع مخيف ، والمستقبل محاط بنذر تشاؤم لانحبه ، ولانرضاه .

ففيما يعرف بالعالم الثالث الذي ننتمي اليه هنا ، نجده مصابا بثلاثة أوبئة مدمرة : الصراعات المسلحة بين دول الجوار على حدود كاذبة . والصراعات المسلحة من جماعات وفئات في المجتمع الواحد بسبب أفكار غبية غيبية متخلفة ، وصراعات محض شخصية على سلطة أو مال أو نفوذ.

فتتعطل مسيرة التنمية والتقدم في هذه المجتمعات بسبب ضيق الوقت ، وهذه هي المهزلة ، ضيق الوقت المخصص للهدوء والسلام اللازمين : فمتى وكيف يبذغ الإبداع ؟ متى وكيف؟

وللأسف فإن المدُمرين والمدُمَرين في كل هذه الصراعات أغلبيتهم العظمي من الطاقة الحيوية للمجتمعات وهم الشباب ..

وفي نفس الوقت ، فإن مايعرف بالعالم الأول ليس في حال حقيقية أفضل من حال العالم الثالث إلاظاهريا فقط .. إذ تحت جلد مجتمعات الدول المتقدمة علميا وتكنولوجيا تكمن ڤيروسات مدمرة أيضا: تظهر أعراضها في تزايد حركات الإرهاب والعنف المحلية ، وفي الخطر المحدق بعينيه دائما فينا بأسلحته الذرية ، التي نشر مؤخرا أنها وصلت الى جماعات المافيا في الولايات المتحدة الامريكية . كما تكمن هذه الڤيروسات

في نفس ايجابيات الحضارة الغربية التكنولوجية ، والخطر المحتمل من إساءة استخدام منجزات علوم الوراثة والمعلوماتية والفضاء . فمن يضمن لنا دائما الاستخدام الأفضل والأمثل لتطبيقات هذه العلوم لصالح البشرية؟ من ؟

وفي العالمين كما في باقي دول العالم . يرتبط الأبداع بالحرية ، ولاحرية بدون سلام . فيجب إذن أن يتوقف كبت حرية الانسان فيما لايضر بحقوق الآخرين . ويجب أن تخلع أنظمة الحكم في دول كثيرة من العالم المتقدم والنامي ومابينهما ، أقنعة ديمقراطية زائفة ، فإما أن تبدو على حقيقتها أمام شعوبها ، وإما أن تقتلعها حركات التطور والتقدم في تلك الشعوب . ولتقلع هذه الأنظمة عن الحديث الممجوج عن حقوق الانسان. ولتعطينا المثل والقدوة على ممارستة على أرض الواقع .

إذ يجب أن يحصل كل شعب على حقه في حياة حرة كريمة ، بلاسيطرة قمعية مادية أو فكرية عليه . وأشير هنا بوضوح الي الشعب الفلسطيني. فلايمكن أن نتجاهل مأساة الملايين من هذا الشعب ونحن نتحدث عن الإبداع والسلام .

السيدات والسادة :

حاولت أن أتجنب ما قد حذرت منه في البداية ، ولكن يبدو أن سهولة

الكلام قد جرتني الى بعض منه . فالكلام أيا كانت بلاغته سهل ، وتحقيق حرف منه في الواقع أكثر صعوبة من تأليف بطون الكتب .

فدعونا نواصل الحلم بعالم ثري الإبداع فقير الشقاء ، ولنعمل من أجل تحقيق هذا الحلم الجميل ، حتى لو كنا مثل سيزيف المقدر له دوما أن يبدأ من جديد.

ولنلتق دائما على خير ، وفقكم الله .

والسلام عليكم ،،،

OPENING ADDRESS THE DIRECTOR GEOTHE INSTITUTE
Dr. Hurbert Hohl,

As the representative of the co-organizer (Goethe Institute, Cairo/Alexandria), and as the co-sponsor of the Second Special International Conference on "Creativity and Pax Mundi", I had neither the intention to present a paper not the sigh to even write a working paper. The reason is that, traditionally, it is deemed neither appropriate nor becoming for the sponsor to deliver a paper since his main obligation is to remain in the background. The same reason I had declined from even considering to present a working paper.

However, the more I became involved in the planning the conference, the more I became concerned with grasping its central theme. The more I indulged in discussions with the conference organizers, Prof. Mourad Wahba and Prof. Mona Abousenna, the more I undertook to renew my reading of Kant, Averroes, E. Block, Habernas, Huntingon, Toffler, B. Tibi, H. Beck among others.

The ideas which were triggered by my newly read and revised readings and which had bearings on the conference theme, will be elaborated later in my paper. These ideas are introduced through my own philosophical background (scholastic ties, philosophy, Kant, Hussel, Hudgger, Max Muller which comprise they are also influenced by my 30 year work for Goethe Institute which revolves round the dialogue between cultures with the aim of ensuring peace as the main objective. That is, the ideas expressed here are the product of practical philosophy and futuristic cultural policy.

I would like to add that although my thoughts on the conference theme will be published in German which makes the wide readers rather limited, I was thinking to expand the area of readership by offering this English translation to the conference participants.

It is my belief that the global perpetual peace will never be realized. However, I'm also aware that one way to peace can lead us to conflicts, chaos, and global catastrophes, if we do not strife with all our efforts to bring about peace.

This formulation raises a paradox from the start of this conference. From Kant's perspective, the paradox could be solved though the categorical, humanist imperative of the future, and which I wish to formulate as follows:

"We know from experience that the global peace is unattainable, but we grasp with out responsible reason the fact that the present way to peace which could lead to conflicts and catastrophe though thoughtless if we do not, each individual and all together exert all our efforts in search for peace depended on each individual.

There is an often quoted, mostly out of context, abridged sentence by Heraclitus which runs as follows: "ho polemos pater pantoon." The lexical translation would be: "a war is the father of everyone." However, I would like to change this literal translation into the following: "Otherness/difference is the origin of life." The metaphor of "war" stands for otherness and difference as being the main constituent of life (being) and as the foundation (ground) of the possibility of individuality.

The humanist, categorical imperative of the future, (needless to say that I am not talking about postmodernism) leads the way to a possible survival of the "I" and of the society and does not by any means postulate an empty vision or a sweat dream of philosophers.\

Kant begins his philosophical treatise "On Perpetual peace as follows:

"A Dutch innkeeper once put this satirical inscription (The Perpetual Peace) on his signboard, along with the picture of a graveyard. We shall not trouble to ask whether it applies to men in general or particularly to heads of state (who can never have enough of war), or only to the philosophers who blessfully dream of perpetual peace. Having this citation from Kant in front of our eyes and in our ears, will unmistakefully point to the reason behind the choice of the conference them: "Creativity and Pax Mundi,' meaningful and namely to underline the relationship between philosophy, religion, society and State.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE EGYPTIAN NATIONAL COMMISSIN FOR UNESCO
Mr. Fawzi Abdel Zaher

It gives me pleasure to be present among this group of eminent personalities who have been gathered on the occasion of the Second Special International Conference of Ibn Rushd and Enlightenment International Association.

The subject selected for discussion represetns an utmost priority among other topics facing teh problems and urgent issues of our age.

The conflicts confronted by our societies at teh end of this century adn on the threshold of the 21st century require fresh thinking, awareness adn focus on specific targets to enable us to deal actively with them.

The appreciation of diversity, the ability to live and let others live have always been moral virtues. They are the foundations of democracy and human rights. How do we achieve Paix Mundi within this world with the problems of poverty, ignorance, illness and racial prejudices adn injustice. It needs cooperation and launching new ideas for reconcilation and reconstruction. This should be the outcome of your meeting to achieve internal peace and security of our Societes which is reflected on the world peace.

It is worthy mentioning that Unesco always launches special programmes and initiations to enhance dialogue among cultures, for instance:

1. Declaring the Decade of Cultural Development which ends on 1998.

2. Publishing the general history of world continents.

3. The exchange of cultural values between the East and the West.

4. Launching the programme of peace culture which is a means and an end to establish peace in the minds of men.

5. The project of Unesco Clubs and the Associated schools with the aim of desseminating knowledge on Unesco's aims and objective especially human rights, international understanding and world peace.

Many people know that tomorrow's problems will be increasingly global, but we are in need of ethics especially ethics of technology, ethics of information and bio-ethics. In fact the world is a global village. We are all part of the solution. Laws are necessary for establishg peace but they are not sufficient. Greater emphasis should be placed on education and culture to teach about tolerence, human rights and justice.

At the end of my speech, I wish all the best and success to your meeting.

Thank you

ADDRESS BY CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN

Prof. Mourad Wahba

It is a great pleasure and honour to me, on behalf of the International Association of Averroes & Enlightenment to greet the eminent philosophers and thinkers who came from different continents to present their ideas about two major concepts included in the theme of the conference, that is, Creativity and Pax Mundi.

Now, let me tell you how this theme has been formulated. We have been used to organize international conferences since 1978. We stressed the concepts of culture, civilization, dogmatism, mass-man and enlightenment and we found out that new concepts have emerged that do not fit in the traditional concepts and in particular after the end of the cold war and the space conquest.

This means that we have to adopt peace but not in the negative sense, that is, of negating war, but in a positive sense, that is, the responsibility of mankind and not of a certain country or a certain dogma. Thus creativity is a must. In this sense, the two conceptsare interconnected, creativity and Pax Mundi.

Here, two questions have been raised: Why Pax Mundi in Latin and what is the role of the conjunction "and"?

As for the first question, the reason is embedded in Santayan's book entitled "The life of Reason" where the author is in favour of Pax Romana on pretense that if peace is to be preserved Caesars' imperialist peace must prevail. But Pax Romana did not work because the Roman Empire came to an end for its tyranny.

And now, thanks to the computer revolution, space conquest and internet we are-in-the-world. Consequently, if peace must prevail it should be within the world and not within a part of it.

As for the second question we have to see whether there is a certain kind of causality, that is, whether Pax Mundi is the condition for creativity or creativity is the cause of Pax Mundi.

To conclude, I have to extend my gratitude to the minister of foreign affairs Amr Mousa, the minister of culture, the Artist Farouk Hosni, the director of UNESCO Frederico Mayor who decided to have this conference under the auspices of UNESCO, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation and the director of Goethe Institute headed by Dr. Hubert Hole.

ABOUT POLITICAL MANIPULATION

Ivan Ivekovitch

Certain weighty terms belonging to the jargon of politics are misleading and questionable. One of them is "fundamentalism", today usually associated with Islam. In the political discourse of a number of Western officials and scholars "Islamic Fundamentalism" has a definite negative, retrograde connotation. In fact, reading a high circulation of Western press, one has to conclude that another dangerous spectre is roaming the world--the spectre of Islamic Fundamentalism. Described as a primitive and inherently aggressive ideology of Muslim fanatics, characterised by a culture of violence and led by anti-Western ayatollahs and clerics, it is accused of world-wide terrorist activities and presented as the best candidate to replace the buried spectre of Communism. The arch-enemy is dead, but there is a threatening one at hand that was waiting in reserve to be discovered by self-appointed academic vigilantes. Are we witnessing the creation of a new myth for mass consumption? Is the Western scientific community going to succumb to another ideologically biased paradigm? Could the identification of a new and dangerous enemy save the main body of Cold War political science?

In the short article that follows I will try to show how people are manipulated, not only by others but also by political ideologies which they consider as their own.

Ideology and Legitimacy

Existing comparative studies of political ideologies are most of time reduced to binary black and white equations explaining the "other" according to "our" ideological criteria. They produce deformed images of reality. Another procedure consists of expert analysis of ideology **per se** (for example "fundamentalism" is

explained by Islam itself), resulting most of the time in tautologies. The intermediary ground where all ideologies converge is the human society, where a permanent "ideological bazaar" is established since the daybreak of civilisation.

I am speaking of course of **political ideologies**, which serve to explain, justify and motivate political action, and are presented as a more or less coherent system of concepts, assertions and beliefs that rationalise behavioural patterns. It is another elusive term used both in every day's language and social sciences which may be defined in different ways. Marx for example viewed ideology as a system of "false ideas", as a statement of class position and justification of class role and rule, existing in the "superstructure" and reflecting in a distorted manner the more fundamental "material base" (*Marx, 1989: 39). Karl Mannheim (*1980), formulating his "sociology of knowledge", distinguished "ideology", supporting a social status quo, from "utopia", challenging this status quo and proposing an alternative social project. For Lewis Feuer (*1975), ideology has three ingredients: an invariant mythical structure, an alternating set of philosophical tenets, and a historically determined "chosen group". For the Elitist writers ideology is primarily a means of political and social manipulations, used synonymously with such terms as "myth" or "derivation" (*Pareto, 1963; Michels, 1955). For Social Psychology and Psycho-Pathology, ideology is primarily a means of managing personal strain and anxiety (*Freud, 1961). The term ideology itself has been put to an extensive "ideological" use. For our exercise it will be enough if we agree about a more neutral definition, stating that "ideology is a pattern of beliefs and concepts (both factual and normative) which purport to explain complex social phenomena with a view to directing and simplifying socio-political choices facing individuals and groups" (*Gould, 1964: 315). Using such a working definition, we may speak about different individual or collective ideologies linked to interest groups, classes, formal and informal associations, political parties or religious movements, countries or nations, or even to a specific generation, century or

age. We may as well speak of a dominant ideology imposed on a given group or entire society, and of an ideology of the oppressed.

Political ideology, is related to the concept of legitimacy of political authority. Any authority, government or opposition, democratic or dictatorial, traditional or modernising, status quo or revolutionary, spiritual or secular, wants to be accepted, and tries to legitimise itself. It attempts to explain how a specific socio-political system has come into being and describes the ideal political system. The process of legitimation may be conceived and implemented in different ways and our own understanding of this process may vary, but all political subjects use arguments, statements of principles, programs, legal texts, promises, myths and slogans, which are presented in a more or less organised and apparently rational form. These rationalising explanations constitute ideology, which among else (but not alone) legitimise political power or/and political pretensions of governments, elites and counter-elites, interests groups, social classes and individual politicians.

Totalist Ideology and Totalitarianism

All ideologies contain totalist tendencies, but these are fully developed only by totalitarian movements. As Hannah Arendt asserted, the real nature of all ideologies is revealed only in the role that the ideology plays in the apparatus of totalitarian domination. As she affirmed, all ideologies contain three potentially totalitarian traits: (1) the claim to total explanation of the past, to the total knowledge of the present, and to the reliable prediction of the future; (2) by creating its own ideal models ideological thinking becomes emancipated from reality; (3) ideological thinking orders facts into absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality (*Arendt, 1951: 168-169). Often in situations of crisis, isolated and alienated individuals willingly submit to such a

totalitarian logic which becomes a self-coercive force. I will try to show later how such a mechanism of self-manipulation operates.

In the 1920s Italian Fascists coined the term of "totalitarianism" in order to describe their state. Since then the concept has undergone numerous vicissitudes and has been applied to states, political systems, parties, programs and ideologies. Today it has, of course, a negative connotation and is considered as the main enemy of freedom and democracy. Friedrich and Brzezinski (*1956), distinguished traditional authoritarianism, which lacks modern means of communication and control, and modern bureaucratic organisation, from totalitarian systems which have been established in modern and highly industrial German and Soviet societies under Hitler and Stalin. According to their classical definition, the distinguishing traits of totalitarianism are: (1) a "totalist" ideology;(2)a single mass party, committed to this ideology and typically led by one man, the dictator; (3) a system of terrorist police employing modern techniques; (4) a monopolistic control of mass communications; (5) a similar monopoly over all means of armed combat; (6) a central control and direction of the entire economy, including all group and corporate activities.

However, I think that an amended concept of totalitarianism may be still useful, but applied to all "totalist" ideological projects and not to Nazi-Fascism or Stalinism only. The expanded group would include all holistic projects for the radical re-arrangement of society "from above". The ideology of contemporary Islamist groups would fit perfectly. Furthermore, I would put in the same category the "missionary" type of liberal-democracy, a project which is presently imposed both "from above" and from outside with different "structural-adjustment programs", financed by international monetary institutions and upheld by U.S. power. For that reason a distinction is necessary between totalitarian ideology, "totalist" and totalitarian political system. The two may come together or stay apart as well, or different criscross linkages may be established, both on the national and the international level. Such a totalist ideology may accommodate not

only with a traditional autocracy, but also with a modern pluralist system. The Pharaonic ideology of Ancient Egypt was totalist but the theocratic system was not totalitarian. On the other hand, totalist nationalist ideologies in the former Yugoslav space are upheld by quasi-democratic regimes. A totalist ideology does not need a modern party, or a terrorist police, or the control of the economy, or even a clearly formulated political program. It is sufficient if such an ideology has a broad social support, a mass basis, autonomous sources of revenue, its own network of communications and an efficient organisational structure, which may be provided by the state, but not necessarily so. Such is the case of opposition Islamist movements, guided by their totalist ideology, challenging actually the state in Algeria, Tunisia or Egypt. Another possibility is that a small totalitarian regime relies on the support of a major outside force, which may be a liberal-democracy itself.

Fundamentalists of all the Countries - Unite!

Now, few remarks about religious "fundamentalism" and "integrism", which are not, I repeat, the trade mark of any specific religion. Religious "integrism" is usually associated with Catholicism, and "fundamentalism" with religions which refer to some founding scriptures, whether in order to reassert their infallibility, or to return to the origins of the divine revelation. Thus for Jewish fundamentalists the founding scripture is the Torah, and for Islamic fundamentalists it is the Quran. By analogy, it is possible to speak of Hindu integrism and of Sikh fundamentalism, because the Sikhs have their Holly Book.

The translation of the Bible into common language understood by everybody and not only by a cast of privileged Latin-speakers, and multiplied by the newly invented printing press, became the reference for the European Reformation movement asking for the return to the fundamentals of Christianity such as stated in the Holy Book. To avoid such a possibility of free and

individual interpretation of holy texts, and to protect their religious/political monopoly (and material privileges), the Pharaonic priests have invented their secret script--the **Hieratic** as opposed to the more accessible **Demotic**, and the distinction appeared between the official state-enforced religion, and the parallel non-official and popular beliefs. The same dichotomy is reproduced in all great religions, and trying to find adequate terms and definitions, it is important to distinguish the two levels, relevant also for today's political manipulations with religions. In Sufi Islam, there is the **hikma**, the spiritual truth which should not be imparted to the general public and about which the blessed one (the Mystic) keeps silent. It is the secret of the divine knowledge, in contrast to the sciences of the law (shari'a) which are supposed to be common knowledge. The language of the reference-Scripture is as important for contemporary "fundamentalists" as it used to be in Pharaonic times, with the difference that today's literacy is massive and not the privilege of a restricted theocracy, and the fact that audio and video tapes of original texts and their authoritative interpretations became accessible to everybody. The best example is given by the Quran, understandable until recently only to those educated in classical Arabic, whose translation into colloquial Arabic or non-Arabic languages was considered a blasphemy only fifty or sixty years ago. That is why Sunni Islam, which officially has no priesthood, has a cast of clerics whose role is to interpret the Holy scripts not directly accessible to commoners. Precisely, among the Iranian Twelvers, who do not speak or understand Arabic, the role of the priesthood is also to translate from Arabic to Persian. The educational and mass-media revolutions have solved in the meantime part of the problem, but had for side-effect, for example in Egypt or Algeria, that the monopoly of the state-monitored Islamic hierarchy was undermined by the eruption of an informal Islam propagated by a new and often better educated generation of "fundamentalist" preachers. When I say "better educated", I do not imply that they are more enlightened. Most of them are in fact

linguists, hieratic readers if I may say so, knowledgeable in classical Arabic only.

The Political Use and Abuse of Religion

Contemporary critics of Islamist fundamentalism, trying to prove the rigidity and retrograde character of the Muslim religion, often emphasise that the Quran, in contrast to the Scriptures of other religions, represents to its believers the literal and integral transcription of God's Message, and that therefore nothing may be added, by-passed or modified. Their conclusion is that a Scripture codified centuries ago cannot provide answers to contemporary problems. On the other side, Islamic theologians attempt to demonstrate the contrary: that the Quran has an advance answer for everything. I do not consider myself as an expert reader of Holy Books, but I do understand Gallup reports. In one of them, I found out that 80% of the contemporary Americans think that the Bible represents God's Message, and 37% of them believe that it is a literal transcription of His words (* Gallup, 1982).

Whether the preference is given to the term "fundamentalism" or "integrism", we have to have in mind that it is most of the time a political label one attaches to one's opponent, used not only to name but also to discredit, denounce and stigmatise. Such a political qualification has little to do with religion itself . On the other hand, "purism" and "essentialism" are terms which have not such a negative connotation, and were used by certain religious sects and movements to define their own doctrine. The same goes for "revivalism" or religious "renewal".

"Traditionalism" is also a problematic term although it may be applied to any religion. "While Catholic integrists today choose to call themselves traditionalist, the bulk of the tradition they draw on goes back to some aspects of Catholicism of the recent past, which they endow with the virtue of immutability". On the other hand, "the traditionalist reaction within Protestantism stresses the specificity of the Reformation which remains, for today's Catholic

integrism just as much as for yesterday's, at the origin of disorder and corruption of the 'modern world'". Finally, "in Judaism and Islam, the so called integrist movements clash with the traditionalists whom they regard as unacceptably backward-looking" (* Ladriere, 1985: 337-347).

For more than three thousand years of human history the monopoly of political power was justified with the privileged relations princes and kings have established with the Divine. Pharaohs were presenting themselves as Living Gods, and foreign usurpers, such as Alexander the Macedonian, had to invent oracles to justify their conquests. Religions were always used either to legitimise the existing state-power or to challenge it.

It is only with the separation of state and church that the secular state came into existence in Europe and that the process of secularisation of religion was initiated. With its civil and military apparatus, with ministries and general staffs, bureaucracy, mass conscription, spread of literacy and later obligatory primary education, communications and transport, the state became the most important vehicle of what is called "modernisation" (another problematic term). New mercantile relations, scientific discoveries and technological improvements, the growth of industries, new class differentiation and the economic power of the bourgeoisie, were challenging the feudal order supported by official church hierarchies. It was a long, painful and uneven process, initiated in England in the 16th century, enhanced by the American and French Revolutions, Napoleonic wars, German and Italian unification, the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from Europe and the decomposition of Austro-Hungary, a process which later spread to other continents. The Papal State itself was integrated into Italy only in 1871, but the Vatican is still internationally recognised as a state. Curiously enough, the English constitutional monarch, remained nominal head of the Anglican Church, a legitimation formula which now seems more than obsolete. In fact, state coercion as well as revolutionary terror in the secularised European society cannot be justified any more with religion, but by

new ideologies which emerged during the 19th century - nationalism, liberalism, democracy, anarchism, communism, fascism and so on.

The Rejection of Modernity

Contemporary political integrism/fundamentalism, whether Islamist, Christian or Jewish is unanimously rejecting "modernity". For European "integrists", it basically means the rejection of their own secular state, while for Islamist "fundamentalists" it has a wider meaning: they reject not only the secular state which is viewed as a Western import, but also the West in general, which they declare responsible for the imposition of such a blasphemous state (it should not be forgotten that more or less two third of humanity use the terms "West" and "modernity" as synonymous). The modern state whether liberal democratic or real-socialist is an enemy because it promotes materialistic values which allegedly corrupt society. Greedy capitalism and atheist communism, with their institutions and organisation of politics, with state-controlled public services, educational systems and interference in economic life, destroy religion as the fundamental element structuring society. The materialist view reducing man to a consumer of utilities and a producer of goods serves to legitimise a selfish, anonymous and egoistic society. Worse of all, the modern state transformed religion into a private matter. Characteristically, Pope John Paul II in many of his public statements equally condemns unbridled and individualistic capitalism, "almost as savage" in certain countries as it was at the end of the 19th century, and Communist totalitarianism which "devastated the human spirit, private initiative and personal responsibility" in citizens (* John Paul II, 1993: 2).

The problem seems **via facti** diluted with the relative consolidation of the liberal democratic state in Western Europe, although relics of the past survive and integrist Christian groups

subsist. Different Christian Democratic parties still play important political roles and the Vatican is still an ideological super-power. I remember that I was rather puzzled when I heard U.S. President George Bush praise the "Judeo-Christian values" of the American society, unaware of the fact that the original values to which he was referring were imported to Europe and later to America from the Semitic world, from the Middle East, where a third Semitic religion was also born. Two of the three oriental religions were in the meantime "Westernized", while the course of history, in fact the weakness of Arab and later Ottoman armies, decided that Islam will remain "oriental". Puritanism, an off-shot of the Anglican Church,. introduced to America the biblical vision of a New Jerusalem, which became its symbol, and which continues to mould the image many Americans have of themselves as a sort of Chosen People (*Bercovitch, 1975). This religious myth was practically integrated into the American national discourse, and became the source of legitimation for the so called "Moral Majority", in the name of which an "American way of life" is propagated, emphasising American "moral obligations" towards the international community. Its favourite export-commodity is the missionary type of liberal democracy advocating free trade and private economic initiative. The unaware reader of certain speeches of Ronald Reagan, may well come to the conclusion that they were pronounced by an Evangelical preacher, not by a secular and democratically elected U.S. President.

In former Communist countries of Eastern Europe, witnessing actually a general revival of Orthodoxy, and Catholicism, a militant wave of new integrism is frontally attacking the legacy of the "atheist past"--the educational system, liberal abortion laws and emancipation of women. In Poland for example, the very principle of separation of State and Church is challenged. Party leaders and popularly elected heads of state engaged a race for the favours of different religious hierarchies, claiming, as in the Middle Age, privileged relations with God. The churches which played more or less important roles in the

downfall of Communism, in certain cases associated themselves with exclusive nationalist projects. Christian parties proliferated, formed governments and entered into government coalitions. Aggressive clericalism became a major political force in new pluralist systems, reviving out-dated concepts of the authoritarian state which are competing with more or less democratic, or crypto-Communist models. In Balkan and Transcaucasian ethnic conflicts, religious banners were taken out from museums to justify massacres of civilians and policies of ethnic cleansing. Different elites and counter-elites, including former members of the atheist communist **nomenklatura**, are once again politically manipulating religion.

Nothing new under heaven, so why should such a political phenomenon by-pass the Muslim world where the economic and social crisis is even deeper, all secular projects have so far failed and the liberal-democratic system never took roots? When I am saying that, I recognise the dangers of the growing tide of political extremism which is using Islamic "fundamentalism" as its ideology. I am aware, that in the Middle East and North Africa, religion serves once again as a force legitimising terror. Islam is manipulated both by the Islamists (nothing serves them better than to be considered as "Islamic" par excellence!) and by the crypto-secular states. It is a tide which started to roll with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and which is actually thundering in the Middle East, the Arab World and Central Asia. What is less known in the West is the fact that it is not a single and co-ordinated political movement, even in individual countries, although different legal and illegal groups and parties, sheiks and emirs refer to the same Scriptures, use same slogans and have similar claims. It is true that these extremist groups are frontally anti-secular, anti-liberal and anti-Western, but they are far of being united in their political strategy and tactics. In the Arab world, some of them accepted the rules of representative democracy, others are divided into legal, semi-legal and illegal groups, while in the majority of Arab countries they are forced underground by

state-repression. They are also not unanimous in methods of political struggle they use. Often, it does not depend on them, but on the attitude of the state, as in the Algerian case, where the Islamic Front of Salvation (FIS) was brutally crushed on the eve of its electoral victory. In Egypt, the movement is split between the "legalists" acting publicly, although no "religious party" is permitted, and different underground terrorist groups. In Sudan, the National Islamic Front infiltrated and took-over the military regime from within. The Iranian theocratic regime, established in a Shi'a country, is something completely different, and its model is not attractive to Sunni Arabs. In spite of that, Ayatollah Khomeini and more cautiously Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani were trying to export their "Islamic revolution".

The confusion about Islamist Fundamentalism is aggravate with the fact that some regimes, especially the pro-Western petrol-monarchies in the Arabian peninsula, are equally "fundamentalists", but pro-Western. As their radical counterpart, they refer to the same Scriptures, although the behaviour of individual members of different ruling oligarchies is definitely more self-indulgent and pragmatic. The so-called "moderate" political discourse, associated with outdated patron-client loyalties and clan structures, is often more conservative and retrograde than the political language used by "radical" Islam. Official "integrism" (which is not restricted to the peninsula), and here I think the term fits perfectly, and parallel opposition "fundamentalism" are competing for the souls of the masses, which are manipulated by both for different reasons. For different reasons also, the Saudis and Iranians, the first with Wahabbism, and the second with **fatavi** (fatwa, legal opinion/order) of their **velayat-e faqih** (the Guardian of Jurisprudent), are waging a merciless mutual ideological war. In spite of that, all tendencies mixed, they may be found engaged in same political projects, as it was the case in the Afghan war, where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) were monitoring the huge anti-

Communist operation under the banner of Islam. It was the most successful political manipulation with Islam ever organised. Once the Najibullah regime was overthrown, the Pakistanis were accused of harbouring international terrorism. Certain segments of the famous "Islamic Legion", accused of terrorist acts around the world, obviously went out of control. For more details see the interesting Washington Post report on the matter (*Moore and Anderson, 1993). Similar story with fundamentalist sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, who found refuge in the U.S. from where he was issuing **fatavi** against Communism in Afghanistan, mobilising Arab volunteers and financial support. Later on, and I am quoting the semi-official Egyptian **Al Ahram Weekly**, "Sheikh Omar used the protection and freedom afforded to him by the US authorities to become a source of agitation, incitement and provocation against Egypt. As terrorist operations mounted, it began to look as if there was a carefully planned American media effort going on to turn the sheikh into a politico-religious leader, and enable him, from his little mosque in New Jersey, what some people imagined to be the Islamic Revolution in Egypt" (*Salama, 1993). When it was discovered that some of his followers were involved in the World Centre bombing and were planning to blow up bridges and tunnels in New York, he was imprisoned on the charge of illegal immigration and later sentenced because of his involvement into the plot. Manipulation with the manipulators.

For the Use of Ijtihad

Now coming back to Islamic Scriptures, I want to emphasise that there is nothing obscurantist and retrograde in the **Quran** and the **hadiths** themselves. It depends on their reading and interpretation, and who is doing that. As any ideology they can be used (manipulated) for the worst or the best. Both examples are part of the social and political history of the Muslim world. The idea of social reform or tajdid, literary renovation, is deeply rooted in Islamic tradition. From the outset, social reform was associated

with legal reform, and the mantle of **mujaddid** (reformer) was vested sometimes on rulers, but more often on jurists. I would add that the concepts **ijtihad** (process of reasoning used by those with knowledge and special training when the text of the Quran or a Sunna is not clear enough) and **ijma** (in Sunni orthodox tradition, when a statement which is the result of the process of **ijtihad** is accepted by the learned and becomes common opinion), included in the Scriptures, may become in the future, as they were during the most brilliant pages of Islamic civilisation, powerful instruments at the disposal of progress and reason. Progressive Muslim thinkers, such as Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim (*1990), emphasising the contemporary importance of the process of ijtihad, advocate an Islamic **Reformation**, which would allow a creative re-interpretation of the Shari'a". I would add that economic progress has already created both the material and intellectual infra-structure for such a Reformation. The problem is with actors.

Political fundamentalism and religiousness are not synonyms. Arabs are certainly among the most religious people in the world, but that does not mean that they are automatically "fundamentalists". It is true that the popular understanding of religion is always simplified, often primitive. In many cases, it is reduced to rituals which obscure the essence of God's message, and to public demonstrations of devotion which have little to do with the Message. The already quoted cited Muhammad Abduh, the famous Egyptian Mufti of the last century, warned against **taqlid**, blind imitation and slavish acceptance of authority which are discouraging the free exercise of reason. He was against the type of popular mysticism which obscures the essential nature of Islam and make people forget the difference between what is essential and what is not.

In principle, there are no religious reasons against the peaceful coexistence of different integrist or fundamentalist practices, as long as they are a private religious affair of the individual believer, or an internal practice of a religious

community. The Quran, for example, recognises the "**Peoples of the Book**", who believe in God, the prophets, and judgement, who possess an authentic revelation and so belong to the same spiritual family as the Muslims. Initially applied only to Jewish and Christian communities living among the Arabs, Islam in its later expansion practically extended such a protection to the Zoroastrians of Persia, and the Hindus of the Mogul Empire. As such, they were legally protected peoples, allowed life and property, the exercise of their religion and the preservation of their laws and customs, in return for loyalty and the payment of a special tax to the Islamic state. Being the youngest of the three Semitic monotheistic religions, Islam included into the body of its beliefs the previous two. Of the three Scriptures, the Quran is the only one stipulating religious tolerance toward other believers. Only the idolaters were specifically excluded. Forced conversions to Islam were strictly forbidden, although the rule was sometimes broken by furious zealots. Tolerance of course does not mean legal or political equality, but the fact remains that in the official code of Islam it is impossible to find a reference for aggressive fanaticism. In other words, the old and new outbursts of Islamist fundamentalism cannot be explained by Islam itself. The causes of political violence in the Arab world are social and political, even economic, not religious or cultural.

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CREATIVITY AND DOGMATISM

Iman Sudibjo Reksosusilo

Introduction

The aim of this conference is to promote Peace in the world through changing our way of thinking about things.

One of the important objects of our thinking is **Thinking about God in religions.** People keep thinking about God in a certain way which causes wars of religions. One of the ways of thinking in religions is called dogmatism. In this paper I will explain what is dogmatism, what pattern of thinking about God causes dogmatism, and how this kind of thinking about God causes religious fanaticism.

Against this Dogmatism I will touch upon creativity or creative thinking, and then I will try to use creative thinking to promote a way of thinking about God and religion, which will promote peace. It was Ibn Rushd who has tried to use reason in religion, to open it to new ways of interpretation of its doctrines.

DOGMATISM

In classical Greek Philosophy "dogma" means knowledge or opinion regarded as being true by all people. It can also mean Law, also authoritative decision. In early Christian community the term "dogma" was used for the first time having the meaning of a decision of the community leaders valid for the community. However in the Roman Catholic religion the term "dogma" develops into more specific meaning, that is, **a proposition of doctrine given by those in authority in the Church.** This proposition has to be accepted absolutely as true by the believers because the doctrinal proposition is regarded as revelation coming from God, and proposed by the Church authority who gets its teaching power also from the revelation of God. .

Acceptance of the proposed doctrine which is proposed as dogma, is for the believers a sign of their faith of the absolute truth

which has to be adhered to, and obeyed. Once dogmatic proposition enters the community life a "dogmatic culture", a do to dogmatism.

Although the term **"dogma", and dogmatism,** originates from the Roman Catholic Religion, dogmatic way of thinking finds its occurrence in almost all religions especially in the so-called "great religions" (Jewish, Christianity, Islam), and to some extent in Hinduism and Buddhism and also in non religious convictions such as Fascism and Marxism.

Elements of Dogmatism in Religions in its Development

Although there are differences of expressions and concepts, dogmatism in all religions always includes the following elements:

1) There is a supreme Being, all powerful, all intelligent, mastering Man and the world.

2) Mankind lives in misery and evil.

3) One man claims to receive revelation from the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being uses spoken or written human language, which is the language of the person receiving the revelation and this special person then proclaim the message of the Supreme Being to his fellow men.

4) This message which will lead mankind to a happy life, is usually not in accordance with the existing way of life. That is why those chosen persons are persecuted from the outset. But they continue with tenacity because they speak of the absolute truth and with the authority of the Supreme Being.

5) If the chosen person and his/her followers withstand the persecution, they will grow and form a community, which can become a powerful kingdom or empire, otherwise his/her movement will die.

6) In the beginning the new religion is quite loosely governed, tolerant and humble in its external dealings with other groups, while strong against opposition.

7) However, once this religion begins to be powerful, then internally it becomes rigid, and it becomes aggressive to external groups. The leader uses force basing his authority on the authority of the Supreme Being. And when the founder dies, the successors, also base their decisions on the Supreme Being.

8) For mankind to be saved there is only this one absolute Truth, and this one absolute Way, which asks for absolute obedience.

9) When the revelations are put into writing (usually after the death of the founder) then authorities tend to give to the written word literal interpretation to base the doctrines and rules of conduct. Again authorities ask absolute obedience to these doctrines and rules.

The Thinking Pattern of Dogmatism

This pattern is quite simple. There is one or more gods (in monotheistic religions only ONE Supreme Being, in polytheistic religions there is more than one superior being). These beings have power over mankind, so if they declare their wishes then mankind have to obey , otherwise mankind will be destroyed. The dependence of mankind on these beings is the key concept of dogmatism.

In Monotheistic religion (Jewish, Christianity and Islam) Dogmatism reaches the highest level because they acknowledge only ONE_ABSOLUTE SUPREME BEING and MAN is absolutely dependent on HIM for his BEING and EXISTENCE.

The Characteristics of the Dogmatic

The state of mind of a person embedded in Dogmatism is called the "closed mind". This mind sees only one Truth. He cannot see any other truth. For this reason wars of religions and religious enmities are inherent in Dogmatism.

CREATIVITY

Usually creativity is only related to cognitive or intellectual performance. In this sense creativity is seen as the ability to give new unexpected solutions to problems. However, in its deepest meaning creativity involves the whole person even his unconscious and preconscious mind.

Creativity is an encounter of SELF with Non-being, where non-being is overcome. The creative mind sees relations, possibilities, and solutions not from existing premises through common process of induction and deduction, but through intuitive grasping of relations from what seems to be a non-existence. The creative mind transforms this "non existence" this non-being, into existence, into being.

Characteristics of Creativity

Creativity has the following characteristics: It sees infinite possibilities and that is why it never sticks to one opinion. It searches the "unknown" for the solution of its problems. However, once it gets an intuitive solution to his problems or a brilliant idea about something, he intends to realize it, while keeping open to any new possibility. The creative mind gives impression of being "restless" and " unpredictable" .

The creative person is convinced of his ideas, but he never forces other persons to accept: he only tries to convince them, but he takes the burden of bringing his ideas to reality.

Creative mind is an "open mind". In bringing his ideas to reality a creative person feels himself fulfilling his being. The

object of creativity is not per se the material product but rather the material product embodies the realization of his idea.

The Way to Peace

We can then say that dogmatism is actually "frozen creativity".
The question is then: why is it that especially polytheistic and monotheistic religions fall so easily into Dogmatism. Besides the factor of "dependence" which brings the idea of "possession" there is another factor, that is, anthropomorphism.

Although the followers of Polytheism and Monotheism admit that their supreme beings are spiritual, yet they are conceived as similar to human being. These "gods" speak to mankind, and have feelings of piety, anger, etc. So quite naturally that these people are chosen by the "Gods" appropriate the power of "Gods" to their "being". But God has absolute power, and has to be obeyed absolutely. So they (chosen founders of religion) too have to be obeyed absolutely. This interchange between God and these human beings, due to Anthropomorphism, the authorities of religion to adopt Dogmatism.

Creativity for Peace

As already mentioned "frozen creativity" pushes man to dogmatism, which drives mankind into unending strives and wars. So if we aim to create "Pax mundi", we have to be creative.

If we believe in a Supreme Being (whatever it is called) then we should conceive the relation not within "dependency" but within "togetherness". The Supreme Being is the wholeness of being, and I fulfill my being "together with Him". Then there is no relation of "command", "obedience" or "enforcement" but just a relation of BEING together, and for my part there is only the courage to be.

In order to keep our mind always open to "being" not to "having things" we have to keep an open dimension of the "immaterial", the "spiritual". For this we have to leave the Anthropomorphic conception of the Supreme Being so that we do

not limit our being to this creature called "Anthropos" who is concerned with the material.

The Possibility of non-religion

Throughout this article I use the term Supreme Being and God to denote the God of religions. A question has been raised: Is it better to get rid of religions, or of Gods, because they cause only conflicts and wars? The answer is: of course, we can get rid of this God, or that God. We can say: "I don't believe in God, I don't follow any religion." But I think we cannot get rid of looking for a Supreme Being in which we can develop our Being.

We can cease to regard the God of a certain religion, but unwittingly, we will regard, either Science, or Technology, or Humanity, or Reason as our Supreme Being in which we will develop our being. But once we regard these new "Supreme Beings" within the dependent attitude, we will fall into the dogmatism.

The open creative way means to have open "religion". I serve supreme being in order to develop into fullness my **being** an the be-ing of others. So that every being can develop to be into what they are supposed to be, without any restriction from my own being, and for my own being.

There is no difference in secular and religious. In some sense all, even he secular is religious. Because within the frame of supreme being all beings try to develop towards the fullness of their being without limiting other beings developing themselves. Because in the Supreme being, with the Supreme being, and through the Supreme being, there are possibilities for all beings. The creative mind needs only to grasp those possibilities.

Toward a more practical conclusion

All those mentioned above we can call "flight of fancy", impossible to realize. But it is exactly what we need for creativity in order to start bringing those "fancies" into realization. We can start with

acting creatively in relation to our fellowmen especially those with different convictions.

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SPIRITUALITY AND PEACE

Mohammed Shaalan

Spirituality is different from religiosity: One is inner, based on consciousness and the other is outer based on behaviour. Peace is associated with the ending of conflict - in its lose-lose or win-lose form. But its win-win form leads to dialogue, communication.

The need for spiritual development: Progress in science and technology has created an imbalance in the development of man. Material power has grown at the expense of spiritual power. Moreover, It is backfiring: Pollution, desecration of nature, violence, poverty and starvation and many other ill-effects of imbalanced material progress are rampant.

This is being balanced by a resurgence of spirituality. Spirituality has become a survival necessity in as much as its values can create a balance with material values and help salvage mankind from the destructive effects of its greed, lust, avarice and other sins multiplied by material power. This evolutionary necessity is, moreover, not new. Species that had "spiritual" values, such as altruism, tended to survive more than those that didn't.

Interreligious Dialogue and Unification: Some 70 years ago British novelist and thinker Aldous Huxley developed the idea of compiling selections from all the world's great religions based on the following premises:1) That religion is a universal human need; and 2) that it is most unlikely that a major conversion to any one or other of the current religions will take place. He therefore set out to compile an anthology ("The Perennial Philosophy") around major spiritual themes such as charity, grace, faith, prayer, etc. This would be an anthology acceptable to the followers of the various major religions and close to the unification of all religions.

The other approach that would not imply the giving up of one' s own religion was one that depended on interfaith dialogue.This was one sponsored by various organizations, in the

West, for example, the International Conference of Christians and Jews, the Centre for Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, The Temple of Understanding, the United Religions Initiative; and in the East, the Japan Religious Committee for the World Federation; and many others. Even though some of these organizations were limited in the beginning (Christians and Jews) they gradually opened their doors to various religions.

Historical necessity: A second basis for the need for spiritual values is historical necessity. Arnold Toynbee, the great historian, emphasized the importance of spiritual values in setting history in motion, as opposed to Karl Marx's emphasis on material values. If mankind is to move through its present historical impasse it must rediscover spiritual values. Spiritual values are championed by those who have the least to lose in this world, the "wretched of the earth"; therefore their faith is the strongest.

The New Sciences: A third basis for the spread of spiritual values is the opening up of the sciences, especially physics and biology, to spiritual realities.Nature was being reborn and God and science were greening. Energy and matter were overlapping but even more so subject and object The dialogue between those new physicists and the mystics has shown much common ground between them. Divinity is no more a matter of blind faith but one of conscious awareness. The earth is no more a lifeless rock but Gaia or Mother Earth.

Two recurring themes that bring modern physics and oriental mysticism together are:the unity and mutual interrelation of all things and events, and the intrinsically dynamic nature of the universe.

On the other hand, the world view of classical (Newtonian) physics is traditionally mechanistic and atomistic; as opposed to the organic world view.

Science and mysticism are two complementary manifestations of the human mind, of its rational and intuitive faculties.Both need each other.

The Individual Psyche: Finally at the individual level psychotherapists are becoming increasingly aware of the spiritual dimension in attaining mental health: individuation in Jungian psychology, self-actualization in the case of Maslow, etc. To be is to be in opposition to, in conflict, in suffering. The end of such suffering comes from the cessation of being, or dissolution of separateness (symbolically). This dissolution either takes on a psychotic form or may be induced by therapy. Transpersonal psychologists (Maslow and Huxley) divide religions into two: inner and outer. The first represents mysticism (inner states of consciousness) and the second organized religion (outer behaviour). This division cuts across all religions. Mystics of all religions are closer to each other than they are to non-mystics within their own group.

This opening of boundaries between the mystics across the various religions represents a hope that the return to religion can become a unifying, rather than a divisive, force. Between mystics what takes place is dialogue based on mutuality and acceptance: communication rather than conflict. By the same token interfaith dialogue based on differentiation, rather than unification, can lead to mutuality and dialogue. In other words, in mysticism you and I are one; while in interreligious encounter it is more like "you are one and I am one, and we are together."

In conclusion, the world is returning to religion. The danger comes from coloring this return with ideology and dogmatism associated with violence and terrorism. The salvation comes from a rediscovery of mysticism or spirituality in association with tolerance and pragmatism in parallel with interreligious dialogue. Religion, through mysticism, can once again promote dialogue and peace.

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

D. N. Kapagawani

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of the possibility of intercultural dialogue has been considered and discussed in many fora and in differing guises. Such discussions have been undertaken on the presupposition that there is a plurality of cultures, and divisions have appeared on the fundamental question whether or not certain elements of culture are universalisable. This has put into sharp relief the attendant division between cultural universalism and cultural relativism. In this paper I attempt to consider the question of intercultural dialogue with a view to provide an answer in the affirmative to the question whether intercultural dialogue in Africa is possible. Using some evidence from some Southern African cultures, the Chewa culture in particular, this paper attempts to show that the thesis of intercultural dialogue ~5 consistent with both cultural universalism and cultural relativism to the extent that a dialogue presupposes both similarities and differences.

As regards intercultural conflict, this paper admits its existence in African cultures, but shows that although there seems to be a clear notion of peace in Chewa culture, there does not seem to be any for violence. However, the Chewa culture is nevertheless capable of enlisting acts of violence without necessarily providing a general notion of violence.

II POSSIBILITY OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

The possibility of intercultural dialogue has, surprisingly, been denied by mainly those who embrace cultural relativism. Otakpor N. [1993], for instance, has a case for cultural relativism by arguing that culture is "essentially a boundary marker which not only separates man from animality, but also sets groups apart from

one another. Evidence from both history and experience" he insists, "support the view that human beings are many and vary in customs, beliefs and outlook" [p.58].

Now, the question is: What is cultural relativism? Following in the footsteps of Mitchell G.D. [1979], Otakpor defines cultural relativism as the doctrine that "a culture can only be understood in its own terms, and that standards from other cultures cannot [my emphasis] be applied to it", and "that culture moulds personality, and that the ideas of normality and deviance, for example, are relative to particular cultures" [1993,p.60]. What is clear from Otakpor's rendition of cultural relativism is that it completely throws overboard the possibility of intercultural comprehension by denying, for instance, that a Yoruba can understand a Luo or a Zulu. Surely people from one culture have been acquainted with other cultural practices and customs, and even Otakpor himself is not an exception.

And here I should hasten to point out that even if it is granted that what is normal or deviant varies from one culture to another, the idea or principle of normality or deviance pervades all cultures.

However, Otakpor sees the defence of cultural relativism as lying not so much in the denial of concepts universally employed in various cultures as in the specific justifications of those concepts and notions in a particular culture. Quite rightly, he does admit the existence of "certain invariant ethical [and cultural] norms, certain invariant rules of good conduct common to the entire human family"; cites, as examples, the disapproval in any culture of " killing, cheating, lying or the abuse of other persons"; and goes on to conclude that although all cultures disapprove of these acts, that "is not to say that the reasons behind the prohibitions are universalisable... the reasons are largely informed by particular customs and traditions... the reasons are culturally based and determined" [1993, pp.60-61]. To admit the existence of moral or cultural concepts in disparate cultures is to accept the existence of universalisable concepts. And again, the fact that the justifications

of such concepts are culture-specific and hence not universalisable does not imply the non-universalizability of the concepts in question; all what cultures do is to domesticate these pervasive concepts by providing their justification in specific cultural terms and expressions.

The concepts themselves, in my view, are and still remain universal; the means to them or the justification for them can be culture-specific and hence particular.

Cultural relativists go to the extent of denying cultural universals, the admission of the existence of which is seen by them as a defence for cultural universalism. As a cultural relativist, Otakpor for instance argues that "the possibility of a 'cultural universal' is remote because culture can only be in the particular and can be understood, if at all, only in that framework. There cannot be a culture universal because that negates the idea of a culture area, that is, the geographical area in which there is a high degree and consisting of traits and custom in substantial differences from other areas or regions. There is no one single way of life common to the entire human race though there is only one human race" [1993,p.59]. Notice here the difference between 'cultural universal' and 'culture universal'. The former implies the existence of elements of a culture which also obtain in all other cultures whereas the latter implies, not elements of a culture, but rather a universal culture encompassing the whole human race. Now, that there is no universal culture is quite easy to assert, but that there are cultural universals is a bone of contention between cultural relativists and universalists.

Secondly, the fact that cultures thrive in specific geographical locations should not be a reason for denying the existence of cultural universal. Similarities and differences do prevail among cultures from different locations just as there are similarities and differences among humans from the same or different tribes, races and cultures. Thus, the specific geographical locations of cultures do not in any way militate against the possibility of inter-cultural dialogue and comparison. The main weakness of cultural

relativism is the overemphasis on cultural differences at the expenses of cultural similarities. Cultures do interact at various levels and in varying degrees, and such similarities are possible only if both cultural differences and similarities are asserted. So much on cultural relativism. Let us now consider the case for cultural universalism.

Cultural universalists do in general admit cultural differences; that semantic structures differ from one culture or language to another; and that these differences do indeed to some extent influence the thought patterns of the language users. However, they argue that a cross-cultural discourse is possible because "all languages share a small set [my emphasis] of 'universal concepts'" which, from the point of view of cultural universalism, can form a framework for not only "a cross-cultural understanding", but also a "cultural-independent formulation of philosophical problems" [Goddard et al, 1995, p.37]. Notice the admission of the cultural universalists of the smallness of the set of universalisable concepts. This admission signals an implicit acceptance of the existence of dissimilarities among various cultures. And in pursuit of this line of argumentation Goddard et al [1995] claim that these universal concepts are semantic universals. These are words of substantives: I (Ine in Chichewa), You (Iwe), determiners: this (ichi), other (china), quantifiers: all (zonse), some (zina), attributes: big (kulu), small (n'qono), speech: say (kamba), word (liu), actions: do (chita), move (Yenda), existence: there is (or kuli), time: when (liti), logical notations : because (chifukwa), if (nqati), space: where (kuti), here (pano), under (Pansi), intensifiers: very (kwambiri), partonomy: part of (mbali), and taxonomy. These items do exist in all languages, and as such Goddard et al call them universal semantic primes.

The existence of universal semantic primes provides an opportunity for an intercultural discourse because the primes "and their rules of combination constitutes a kind of mini-language with the same expressive power as a full natural language; hence the term 'natural semantic meta-language' (NSM). If a meaning

analysis is composed purely in term of universal semantic primes it can be readily 'transposed' without any loss or distortion of meaning into ... any other language" [Goddard et all, 1995, p.420].

Here, I must pose to point out that Goddard's cultural universalism goes a bit too far in that it seems to suggest the possibility of creating a universal language, composed of semantic primes, of which all natural languages are instances. Such a rendition runs the risk of ignoring and glossing over fundamental cultural differences, and the differences in the semantic structure of various languages. That Goddard et al [1995] fall prey to such a criticism is evidenced by their explicit denial of the possibility of incommensurable aspects of cultures and languages. "The discovery that there is a common core of linguistically embodied 'common conceptions'", they go on to argue, "means that there are no utterly irreconcilable conceptual differences between languages. Cultural differences between human groups do not reside in the existence of some basic concepts in one cultural group and their absence in another, but rather in the ways in which shared pool of basic concepts are utilized" [p.43]. On this I could not disagree with Goddard et al more.

In fact, Goddard et al are so engrossed in such a line of argumentation that they don't see that the very examples they use is evidence against their claim. They quite clearly and aptly show that the notion of mind is culturally manufactured by the English language, and thus differs in connotation from the notion of soul or of dusa in Russian: "mind cannot even be rightly described as a 'Western' category, but is specifically and narrowly a category of Enqlish", they point out. "In reality, neither French, nor German, nor Russian, has the equivalent for mind" [p.45]. Similarly, they, also put forward, as examples, words like 'freedom' in English, 'libertas' in Latin, and 'svoboda' in Russian to show the variance in meaning across the different languages and cultures [Goddard, 1995, pp.49-56]. What these examples are evidence of is not that they are part of the so called 'small set' of universal semantic primes, but rather that natural languages, in this case English,

Latin, Russian, are notorious for containing incommensurable notions, terms and expression. Such examples should be caveats to wholesale cultural universalists.

Furthermore, what should also be borne in mind is, as Bouwhuijsen [1995] has ably pointed out, that even if it were granted that all natural languages share a common pool, albeit small, the intransitivity of the experiences of the relations of similarity and difference at the cultural level should not be lost sight of. "If we really are to understand cultures against the background of the experiences of their members, we should not reduce cultural differences, but magnify them instead" [Bouwhuijsen, 1995, p.98] because experiences of otherness, the alien cultures as the other, differ due to the intransitivity of the relation of difference [Bouwhuijsen, 1995, pp.91 and 112].

Secondly, to suppose that, through these so called universal semantic primes, one culture can be described in the language of another by basically translating the system of beliefs of the original culture in question is to ignore the distinction between orthodoxic and orthopraxic cultures. Orthodoxic cultures are those that are regarded as possessing an underlying systems of beliefs which can be inferred from the people's customs, behaviour, and rituals whereas orthopraxic cultures do not value the <u>reasons</u> for the customs, attitudes and rituals nor their meanings, but rather how rituals and customs are correctly performed or followed. Studies have shown that the Akha of Thailand, the Gnau of New Guinea, the ancient Chinese and Romans had and "have no <u>ePistemic attitude</u> towards their tradition"; and to describe their cultures as orthodoxic, as ones which are reflection of systems of beliefs, is to commit a category mistake. Of importance to these people is how to perform a particular ritual properly, rather than what the ritual means to them or what belief the ritual assumes to be true or false [Bouwhuijsen, 1995, pp.100-103]. Thus unlike orthodoxic cultures in which emphasis is placed on the meaning of, and reasons for, rituals and customs, orthopraxic cultures tend to be semantically indifferent to interpretations of their rituals, behaviour and

customs. And in this regard, some African cultures, certainly the Chewa of Central Africa, are orthopraxic in certain respects.

Lastly, I would like to insist that, as can be seen from the foregoing discussion, inter-cultural discourse or dialogue is possible irrespective of whether one embraces cultural universalism or relativism. The significant difference between the two doctrines in that cultural universalism underscores similarity whereas relativism emphasises difference. But both principles of similarity and difference are quintessential to dialogue. In fact, cultures do interact precisely because of their differences and similarities. Orthopraxic cultures can and do engage themselves in dialogue with orthodoxic cultures just as universalists enjoy fruitful dialogues with relativists.

III NOTIONS OF PEACE, DIALOGUE AND VIOLENCE IN CHEWA

The Chewa language has a clear notion of peace. In fact the word for peace is 'mtendere'. However, there is no word for 'violence' in the Chewa language. The closest are 'chiPwilikiti' and 'chiPolowe' which respectively could be translated as 'chaos or confusion' and 'collective physical conflict'. The latter seems a better approximation of 'violence' than the former because chaos or confusion is not necessarily violent whereas any physical conflict is bound to be violent. But the Chewa language is incapable of providing a translation of, for instance, the statements that Mr Banda is violent or that the Zulus or Kikuyus or Tswanas are violent. The closest translation of such statements in Chewa language would be : 'A Banda ndiwandeu' (Mr Banda likes fighting) or 'Mazulu, MakikuYu, Matswana ndiwandewu' (Zulus, Kikuyus, Tswanas are fighters or like fighting). It must be admitted that fighting is an act of violence, and what the Chewa language is capable of doing is merely to specify the act of violence although it, as a language, does not possess a general word for violent acts.

From the foregoing linguistic analysis, one might be tempted to argue that since the Chewa have a linguistic notion for peace

and not for violence, then the Chewa are a peace-loving people. But that would be misrepresenting the Chewa. The Chewa language does have a term for 'war' (nkhondo); and in Chewa culture it is recognized that 'Kunkhondo kuli chipolowe' (At war there are fatal conflicts). In fact there is the Chewa proverb: 'Mnzako akaton~'ola maso nawe tonq'ola wako' (If a person protrudes his eyes you should also protrude yours), meaning that it is advisable to follow a titfor-tat principle in situations of conflict. However, there are expressions which do indeed extol an attitude of pacifism. The proverb: 'UkaYenda siYa Phazi usasiYe mlomo' (When you travel, leave your footprints, not your lips) expresses that message by advising that when in an alien culture or environment, one should always avoid conflicts.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that the Chewa culture seems to lean more towards pacifism, through dialogue (kukambilana), tolerance and compromise than towards violence as it is generally said and maintained that 'Ndeu sivimanqa mudzi' (Fights do not build villages).

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Pax Africana: Myth or Reality

Joe Teffo

> Only when we see ourselves in our true human context, as members of a race which is intended to be one organism and "one body," will we begin to understand the positive importance not only of the successes but of the failures and accidents in our lives. My successes are not my own. The way of them was prepared by others. The fruit of my labours is not my own: for I am preparing the way for the achievements of another. Nor are my failures my own. They may spring from the failure of another, but they are also compensated for by another's achievement. Therefore the meaning of my life is not to be looked for merely in the sum total of my own achievements. It is seen only in the complete integration of my achievements and failures, with the achievements and failure of my own generation, and society, and time.
>
> (Thomas Merton)

The quest for a new Political Culture

The much talked about "winds of change" in Africa have changed little for the benefit of the average man. Since the winds of democratic change began sweeping across Africa, all sorts of corrupt politicians and the military juntas have jumped on the "democracy bandwagon" to hijack the revolution. Due to the political and economical struggle of the period after independence, African unity and peace suffered. The próblem of peace in Africa must be tackled within the context that "Africans need to be collectively responsible for the fate of Africa in the post-colonial age". (MAZRUI, 1995: 7). The old view of accusing the West as the trouble maker must come to an end.

African peace is at the same time a myth and also a reality. African peace can be considered as reality in the sense that, there are some countries which are in the state of peace even though they face minor local difficulties. In this case there is absence of war and less solid problems for the people. It can also be considered as myth in the sense that due to certain circumstances we cannot talk of peace in Africa, unless if we define peace simply as a total absence of war. Even in countries where there is no war, people do not have peace, because of political unrest, and poverty. "War has been one of the most constant and distinctive features of human history, and it may even be thought to be a similar, peculiarity of the human species that hordes should pursue borders of the same kind with a persistent purpose of rapine and destruction." (Hastings: 1921: 675).

Our analysis will in the first place focus on African peace as myth, and in our conclusion we will indicate a possible way for African peace to become a reality. We will make mention of some reasons, which count as stumbling blocks, to the implementation and sustaining of peace in Africa.

One of the reasons for lack of peace in Africa is the search for self-determination of certain ethnic groups in African countries. This self-determination is usually based on tribal grounds, and a denial to be governed by a person from a different tribe. This makes tribalism to become a sustainable policy for the sake of tribal survival and domination.

The lack of a political culture is also a reason for the lack of peace in Africa. Most African leaders consider their political opponents as personal enemies. This attitude makes it impossible for any type of dialogue to solve any problem for the achievement of peace. All debates are influenced by the so called "African emotion.".

The fact that there is no accepted procedures for handing over power and succession of government, makes African peace vulnerable. The usual way of taking power is by a "coup d' etat". This gives more opportunity to "violent people" to confiscate

power and rule. If then power is taken by force, it can only be handed over by force also. This explains the continuous state of violence in Africa. Then a violent rule can only install a protectionist government wherein multipartyism is considered as illegal and represents a potential deviance from the government in place. This justifies the view of African leaders who claim that "permitting more than one party would encourage people to form parties based along "tribal" interest rather than national issues." (KHAPOYA, 1994: 193). The real reason for this denial of multipartyism is the fear of any type of challenge.

In the same vein, the totalitarian system of government has proved itself to be inefficient. It turns to become a dictatorship. And elections serve then to spark off political conflicts instead of serving for political communion. The denial of election results becomes common, and breeds the spirit of accepting only an own victory.

Political and the Social of Society

At the social level, the poverty at large scale in African communities forces people to struggle for power, and not for the advancement of the social welfare of people. This behaviour is based on what Sartre calls "bad faith." For him "bad faith" is a lie to oneself." (1958: 48). "In bad faith, a person consciously flees a displeasing truth for a pleasing falsehood. The person must by all means convince himself that the falsehood is in fact true. He then takes the decision to lie to himself." (GORDON, 1995: 8). This attitude may be at the centre human being's essence. But there are ways for a human being to liberate himself from it. In African political circles this attitude seems to be a manual code of living.

The policy of nepotism rooted in African politics is source of disorder in the African continent and prevents it from the achievement of peace. This is manifested by a lack of standardized values among African politicians. And also the denial of meritocracy as criterion of choice for any duty makes it difficult to expect any positive change. There is a total lack of respect for

merits, which are taken in consideration only symbolically, just for the sake of the legitimacy of the system, but in reality only the tribal elite can intervene and influence the decision making processes.

Plato on Political Leadership

Even though Plato claims that the ideal state is aristocracy and that democracy is the degeneration of the ideal society, to our view Plato's way of analyzing the state can be of a great help for Africa. Plato's political analysis considered the state as being "man writ large." The main idea is that he contests the state with the human soul which he considers as divided in three parts. The lesson for us is that, Plato insists that each part of the soul like each member of the society has to be at his place and accomplish his function according to his capabilities. The reason is that if the right jobs are attempted by the wrong people this can only lead to the collapse of the society. From this Plato's analysis we can already understand the reason for the failure of the African continent. In Africa the person in charge of an office is often the wrong person. We cannot talk of real peace in Africa if this system of rule still persists, because peace presupposes also a certain order in the society with a certain standard of life.

Plato distinguishes five forms of government, namely: aristocracy, timocracy, democracy, plutocracy and nepotism. "His ideal state was, of course, aristocracy, in which the rational element embodied in the philosopher king was supreme and where each person's reason controlled his appetites. "(STUMPF: 1993: 74). South Africa has the potential and a pool of talents to produce a crop of leaders envisaged by Plato. Evidence of this is borne by the fact that all four recipients of the Nobel Peace Price from the African continent have been South Africans: Chief Albert Luthuli (1961), Desmond Tutu (1984), Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk in (1993).

Plato believed that when wrong people take wrong social responsibilities, it is difficult both to avoid chaos and confusion and bring about meaningful development. It is impossible to make golden men out of copper talents. It is not possible to make geniuses out of mediocre intellectual abilities. Those who aspire for leadership should be subjected to rigorous intellectual and physical training. Similarly, those who aspire for leadership positions should be beyond reproach, both in deed and word. In this connection Mwaipaya submits that: "when the producers or businessmen, auxiliaries or those in the army and police force or guardians abandon their appropriate social responsibilities and force themselves in executing tasks for which they are not trained, it is not possible for the state to operate effectively and develop a high standard of social morality, social justice, and the preservation of human dignity." (1980: 16). Similarly, soldiers and policemen should not be given the responsibility for the production of material wealth of the state or for making the policies of the state, since, they are often prompted by emotions of pride and courage and, thus, are best suited for defending the territorial integrity of the state, and maintaining law and order. They cannot, contrary to what the Nigerian military regimes would like us to believe, really be competent producers or policy makers, nor can they really succeed in implementing state policies.

The collapse of the society starts when the right jobs are attempted by the wrong people, when men of mediocre insights and capabilities are allowed to take charge of more complicated social tasks. On this reasoning it should be easy to understand what most African states have been going through, and are still going through; a state of social chaos and confusion, considering that policies are handled by people of dubious mental capabilities and social backgrounds. States that are governed by such characters often find it difficult to understand what it means, as Idi Amin of Uganda did, to preserve human dignity and why its preservation is deemed important by the international community.

The full development of a nation depends largely upon the calibre of leadership that is equipped with vision and foresight. Mediocre leadership, looking at the African political landscape is endemic, and seems almost inherent to African Politics given the regular interference by the military with civilian rule. However justifiable the military's intervention might be, essentially it is not civilian rule. It is not a government of the people by the people, and for the people. "The significance of quality leadership is that it engages in rational and objective thinking and tries to make policies that are not far removed from reality. Mediocre leadership usually acts either without following any kind of objective manner of reasoning, or simply follows the dictates of feelings, passions, sentiments or especially, vested interests." (Mwaipaya: 1980: 2).

The dicta that: peace to all men on earth; and peace in our life-time are empty cliches if they are not matched by deeds or actions intended to actualize them. To realize them there has to be commonality of purpose, and collective action. It is a truism that there is no love except in the deeds of love. Principles and conditions, collectively derived and owned, ought to be laid down so that actions can be legitimate and wellgrounded. Thus, the leadership itself should enjoy the recognition and respect of all. In this connection Hobbes wrote:

> "a commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, that is to say, to be their representative, everyone as well as he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorise all the actions and judgements, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peacefully among themselves, and be protected against other men" (1951: 177).

The aforesaid quotation captures the essence of Hobbes' social contract theory. In this type of contract men voluntary elect others to govern them. The governors are given a mandate to govern within certain parameters. The governed surrender their freedom to the govern to the elected assembly, and they reserve the right to revoke the mandate to govern if the governors do not live up to expactions, or act contrary to prescriptions. Similarly, the governed have a duty to obey. The state is the manifestation of the civil society. The parties to the contract intend their own individual self-preservation in bringing the civil society into being. Collective self-preservation is a fortiori, the reason for the existence of civil society. However, "in contracting into civil society, the subject does not and cannot grant away all his rights. The right of the individual to defend himself in mortal danger and to preserve the necessities of life appears to be absolute, and to provide an argument for the individual more ultimate than the preservation of civil society itself." (Warrender: 1957: 188)

PAX AFRICANA

Pax Africana is contingent upon the engagement of quality leadership, that is equipped with vision and foresight, intellectual enlightenment, and objective rational thinking. Without these, Africa, especially South of the Sahara, will not be able to eliminate mass misery , eliminate mass illiteracy, mass execution, mass starvation, detrimental mental conditioning by foreign ideological salesmen, disease and ignorance nor will it be able to contribute fully to Pax mundus and world civilization . Peace on earth can only be realised when those charged with leadership are imbued with UBUNTU/BOTHO, and also infused with the spirit of the universal brotherhood of man. Men and women familiar with the accepted universal standards of governance, yet remaining loyal to the cultural milieus in which they operate. The group envisaged has a firm grasp of the guiding principles of the international community. It also has insight into the values of the nation and its

cultural elements, including its traditional policy making procedures, capable of promoting and preserving basic human needs, that is, human dignity, human rights, and the development of a social moral consciousness and inner potentials of people.

If Africa is to succeed, it needs to clearly identify beacons for success. An enlightened African leader should rise above sectarian interests and put the interests of the country before self. He should strive for a collective leadership of the country. Party political interests, loyalties, and previous political activism, nepotism, favouritism, and obsequious obedience, are no substitute for expertise efficiency, and competence. In this connection Diescho writes: "Like most countries in the world, the new South African nation lacks a leadership with a deep insight into the human condition and a vision with which to mortgage a future for its people in accordance with goals higher than political expedience, material satisfaction and immediate gain. Reconciliation and lack of bitterness are no substitute for vision - they are at best crisis management mechanisms." (1966: 21).

Africa should learn to take responsibility for its own destiny. Rather than to be reliant on hand-outs from world organisations like the United Nations, NATO, UNICEF, WHO, et cetera, Africa ought to speak and act for itself. But with so much turmoil and blood letting on the continent, one wonders at what price will such an ideal be realised. Just as Africa has the right to determine its facts, so has every ethnic or sub-national group within it. The denial of such rights is among the root-causes of instability not only in the world but also in the different countries, or among various peoples. Those who care to help must resist the temptation to deepen the crisis in Africa. They must avoid a repeat of the catastrophic mistakes caused by Otto von Bismarck. Mazrui alludes to this danger as follows: "From Africa's point of view the foundations of the colonial state can be traced back to the Berlin Conference which was convened by Otto von Bismarck in 1884/5 and helped to set a stage for the partition of Africa" (1995: 2).

For a long time Africa has been a battle ground for various political ideologies. The end of the cold war has ushered some fresh air and space and time for Africa to pull itself together. The collapse of the Soviet Block left Africa with no ally in the East, and rendered socialism untenable. Democracy and capitalism seem to be the only options left for Africa's survival. However, one should hazard a caution here. The wholesale transplant of Western style of democracy has dismally failed on the continent. Democracy has to be adapted to and informed by the circumstances in which it is located.

Among the aims of democratic reforms in Africa is the desire by each country to become truly a nation with prosperity and sustainable development. Underpinning this is a desire to attain a level of mutual understanding and respect which is typical of traditional African communities. The continuous struggles and civil wars are sometime attributable to the failure by those in charge to recognize traditional social organisations and institutions. If democracy is to have any meaning and contribute towards peace it ought to put on an African garb. Liberal models of democracy failed simply because they could not respond to the African human condition. A number of African countries succumbed to the pressure from the West to demolish ethnic groups. Democratic reforms in Africa today are responsive to the reality in which they find themselves. This is a rather gradual, painstaking and necessary process of mental decolonization.

Consistent with the spirit of decolonisation and transformation Africa is increasingly developing a radical alternative to liberal democracy. Africans have intensified the effort to search for the principles on which traditional African democracies were based. The freedom or the rights of African communities to develop their own respective forms of democracy can no longer be taken for granted. Neither can Africans be forgiven for taking the escapist route. They can no longer blame anybody for their lot. Even small countries in the East got their acts together, and today are called the Asian tigers. Are there no tigers

on the African continent? Africans should take heed of this phrase adapted from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. 'The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings, put otherwise, the fault, black man, is not in your stars, but in yourself that you are an underling".

In an endeavour to urge Africans to take responsibility for their destiny, Biko once declared: "Black man you are on your own." A black man can become what he can become only if he takes full responsibility for his existence. Africa has been a begging child of the world for far too long. We have to do things by ourselves and for ourselves. Lest we act in bad-faith. In the existentialist sense bad-faith is a lie to oneself within the unity of a single consciousness. Through bad faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of being-for-itself, that is, a free person endowed with free-will, with its attendant responsibilities and consequences. Bad-faith refers to a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognise either one for what it really is or to synthesise them. Authenticity is only attainable through constant strives of disowning attitudes like bad-faith. (Sartre: 1948: 26 - 33).

Freedom means the ability to choose oneself, to determine oneself to wish. According to Sartre human beings are "condemned to be free" , and must forever choose themselves and they must be held responsible for their choices. In choosing oneself one is creating himself, and not to choose, or thinking that one has no ability to choose is to act in bad-faith. through bad-faith a person attempts to escape the responsible freedom characteristic of a human being. Such a man, acts in bad-faith and leads an inauthentic life. An authentic man is one who acknowledges his freedom and is prepared to bear the consequences of his choice.

Freedom as self-realization is at the same time the quest for the self and this quest cannot be meaningful unless one concedes the necessity for intersubjectivity,for communion with other men as well as with God. It is precisely in this sphere of social being that freedom like the Christian faith embraces justice as its twin sister. It

is the commitment to justice that actually becomes the concrete expression of an essential moment of freedom. So it is that freedom without praxis is totally meaningless and empty. The quest for justice is by definition the quest for the creation and recreation of the new man, the new man existing under the novel social and political conditions. Thus conceived is accepting the fact that we are part and parcel of existence. We participate in the unfolding history of existence not as passive elements within the unfolding historical movement, but on the contrary as agents who shape and design the form of history.

Freedom is by definition inextricably intertwined with praxis since it is only in the sphere of praxis that freedom can both be realized and verified. To be is to be free, to be is to be committed to specific goals and objectives. Such a commitment requires discreet actions that will identify the appropriate means for the realization of the goals posited. To become engaged in that type of activity is to labour is to become involved in praxis.

It is in this context that existentialism should be understood as a call to man to take heroic decisions in his surge for his essence. By the choice of his morality, man makes himself. Such pressure of circumstances upon him. And the heart and centre of existentialism, is the absolute character of the moral agent's free commitment, facticity or the "situation-limits" notwithstanding.

AFRICAN HUNANISM AS A WAY OF LIFE

The African conception of man should be understood in terms of a set of beliefs or pictures of man in the form of empirical generalizations, rather than in the analytical or Aristotlean sense. A peoples's conception of man are as varied as there are human communities. For our purpose, the main objective is to provide a picture of man and society held by African communities and to establish how human conduct, institutions and thought patterns are governed by this conception. Selected values characteristic of the African culture will be reflected upon in order to amplify the

view that the spirit of UBUNTU/BOTHO is encapsulated in them, and manifested in different practices. Our emphasis will be on the conception of man in relation to his role-playing in society, and his place in the community.

Ubuntu or humanness implies a basic respect for human nature as a whole. It is a social ethic, a unifying vision enshrined in Zulu maxim: umuntu ngumuntu ngabanye (one is a person through others). The individual commonly says: "I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am. "(Mbiti: 1969: 108-109). Some Akan expressions that also capture this cardinal point in the African view of man are: "The plight of your fellow man is your own plight" (Wo yonko da ne wo da) or 'It is somebody's turn today, it will be anothers tomorrow, literally, somebody's turn has come; another is on the way' (obi de aba; obide nam kwan so). "(Oruka e.a: 1983: 7). It should be reiterated that the ideal of UBUNTU/BOTHO is the common spiritual ideal by which all Black people South of the Sahara give meaning to life and reality. This concept is thus usually described as the spiritual foundation of all African societies. In the Gospel of Matthew, the commandment is "You shall love your neighbour as yourself: "(Mt: 22" 39).

It may be useful at this juncture to list some norms and values that really typify African humanism. The following are among the most pertinent; justice, respect for persons and property, tolerance, compassion, sensitivity to the aged, the handicapped and the less privileged, clear-cut sex and marriage controls, unwavering obedience to adults, parents, seniors and authority, courtesy, reliability, honesty and loyalty. These traits though, apply to all societies, and they differ only in terms of their manifestations. What is perhaps more appealing in the African context is the fact that whilst most of the so-called developed countries have discarded, at a high price for that matter, some of these values, in Africa are still ever-green, though some with necessary adaptations and modifications. The desire to resuscitate some of these values by the West, and their apparent failure in this connection is the more

reason for them to envy Africa. Hence the contention that it is in the context of morality that Africa's bequest to posterity lies.

The philosophy of humanness is imbued with infinite love (agape). This philosophy of "makes us, as individuals within the community, to feel see and recognize our 'being': our very existence, efforts, successes and failures, interests, ambitions and aspirations, in other members of the community. We (individuals) and the community become fused into an individual oneness that is sealed and nurtured by on infinite divine love that is ever present in each one of us.

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Creativity and Civilization: Disturbance and Civilization

Cyril Barrett

On the subject of creativity and civilization there are three questions to be asked:

(1) Is civilization a necessary condition for creativity;

(2) If not, is civilization conductive to creativity and if so how?

(3) Is a stable, peaceful civilization a necessary condition for creativity?

Popular opinion would say that civilization was a necessary condition for creativity. All the great creative achievements that we know of were produced within one civilization or another - the pyramids and the Valley of the Kings, cuneiform script, the Hebrew Bible, the aqueducts, Greek philosophy and science, algebra. This is true, if by great creative achievements, the most spectacular is meant. The creation of civilization itself may not appear great but think what is involved.

If the theory of the evolution of human beings is to believe then creativity must have preceded civilization. Even if one takes the Aristotelian line that humans are social animals with an instinct to live in a society, it still requires creative imagination to found one. Certain asocial termites such as ants, bees and wasps form communities instinctively, and ants even develop a form of agriculture by cultivating and milking aphids. The early humans contented themselves with hunting and gathering wherever game or vegetation was available, which could mean a nomadic life, though in favorable conditions they could operate from caves or other shelters. The transition from hunting and gathering to arable land cultivation and stock raising - sheep, cattle, goats, and pigs- was a creative act. It led to a more stable, i.e. non-nomadic society, but still tribal like a hymenopterous society of ants, bees or wasps and such mammal groups as elephants, lions and tigers. To form a civilized society (a civitas, state)the genetic or family ties have to be

broken and new institutions introduced.: an elected rather than hereditary leader, a parliament of heterogeneous, not necessarily genetically related, members, and a civil service of heterogeneous individuals. This calls for creativity of a high order So, far from civilization being a necessary condition for creativity, creativity is a necessary condition for civilization.

Not only that, pre-civilized societies were creative in many other ways, sometimes in spectacular ways. Before Giotto in theWest there is very little to rival the cave paintings of Lascaux and Altimira, of over 15,000 years, BC. The material out of which the Old Testament, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were woven; the Norse sagas and the Celtic legends; folk music ; great burial grounds and monuments, such as Stonehenge, were among the creative achievements of tribal societies.

Yet however, great those achievements were, they never quite measured up to the creative greatness of great civilizations. This brings us to second question: is civilization conductive to creativity and the answer is: in principle, yes. The most obvious reason why this should be so is that a civilized society by its very nature, its organization, institutions and manpower, has the resources, both material and operational, to create on a grand scale which a tribe does not have. It is doubtful if the great cathedrals in France, Germany, England and Italy would have been built without the wealth generated by the wool industry and foreign trade in the 13th and 14th centuries in Europe.

The importance of civilization to cultural creativity can hardly be better illustrated than by the classical cases of the Medici in 15th century Florence and Colbert in 17th century Paris. The Medicis developed the banking system as we know it and got around the Church's moral objection to usually on the grounds that an interest on a loan of money was nothing more than compensation for lost revenues which, of course, is what it is. This was a creative act, one of the greatest creative acts executed in modern times and the one on which modern culture and civilization has been built. The Medicis patronized both learning

and the arts, and included among their protegies, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael, Donatello, Brunelleschi and the Platonists of the Florentine Academy, Ficino, Pletho and Pico della Mirandola.

Colbert went a step further. He was what came to be called a merchantilist, that is an economist who encourages his nation's wealth by subsidizing home produce, regulating prices and putting a tariff on imported good. He also encouraged trade and colonization But, for his time, perhaps his greatest contribution was the improvement of transportation: roads and, above all, those canals which are not only efficient, if somewhat slow, but added to the beauty of the French landscape. However, his master, Louis XIV, squandered most of this carefully garnered wealth on futile wars to establish natural frontiers for France along the Rhine which he never achieved. But he did put that wealth to some good use in building Versailles and other elegant buildings that could not have been built but for the wealth generated by Colbert's ingenuity.

More spectacular achievements were realized here in Egypt under the Fourth Dynasty with the pyramids of Gizeh; the Valley of the Kings at Luxor tombs, including those of the XVIII-XX dynasties, among them the tomb of Rameses VI and Tutankhamun; to say nothing of the superb figures of the temples of Rameses II, rescued from the waters in the 1960s; in Abu Simbel.

Now if we add to these achievements of cultural creativity those produced in China, India, Imperial Russia,the Mayan, Inca and Aztec Sumerian, Assyrian, Persian and Hittite civilizations, it is hard to resist the conclusion that even if civilization is not a necessary condition for all forms of creativity, it is certainly a necessary condition for <u>great</u> cultural creativity. The evidence that it is, is overwhelming.[1]

Now I am not saying that the civilizations themselves have to be particularly great in material, social, political, economic or technological terms. Compared with modern civilizations what

was the civilization of Greece in Homer's day, or even in the time of Pericles and Alexander, or the civilization of England in Shakespeare's day? All I wish to say is that as that (a) they were civilizations, with material resources and institutions of learning and the arts, that offered favorable conditions for cultural creativity, and (b) cultural creativity does not depend on the magnitude of the resources or the greatness, in non-cultural terms, of the civilization. In other words, what I am saying is that great civilizations do not necessarily produce great culturally creative achievements. And I would like to take this further and say that even the greatest civilizations will not necessarily produce great creative culture, or, for that matter, any creative culture at all.

It was Carl David Alfred Weber, the younger brother of the famous Max, who pointed this out in his book The Principles of Culture-Sociology.[2] Weber distinguished between civilization and culture in terms of continuity and discontinuity. A civilization is a continuous and cumulative process like evolution itself. Unlike Spengler and Toynbee and probably to his credit, he does not discuss the decline of civilization (which may also be continuous and cumulative in a negative ways. By contrast, culture is discontinuous, spasmodic and unpredictable. It crops up anywhere, at any time, for no particular reason, and it does not crop up where you might expect it.

The trouble with this thesis is that from the fact that ancient civilizations may not have left any physical evidence of culture such as buildings, sculpture, paintings, much less written material and still less an oral tradition, it does not follow that they were not culturally creative. However, we have evidence from our own time to support the thesis, though not to prove it. It is arguable that had there been no Russian revolution in 1917 the empire would have developed into as modern a civilization as the rest of Europe, if not the United States of America. Under Stalin it certainly did, even if ultimately the system fell apart. But, except for science and technology, Russia produced nothing in philosophical thought,

musi literature, architecture or the visual arts comparable to what had been achieved under the Tsars. Similiarly in Germany during the twelve years of Nazi rule. However, you might say, that in these cases cultural creativity was positively suppressed. That is true. But what of the United States of America? It has been in existence for over two hundred years and has produced no write,r, painter, sculpto the calibre of dramatist, philosopher of the calibre of Shakespeare. Rembrandt, Michelangelo, Plato Cervantes, Goya or Picasso; nor does it show any signs of doing so, though creative expression is free.

Perhaps some day someone will come up with an explanation of, an even a way of predicting, cultural creativity. Personally I doubt i It is like saying that one day we might be able to predict the muta ion of genes. This is not to say that we might not be able to give a post factum explanation. But that too I find dubious. No one has yet, at least not to my satisfaction, come up with a plausible explanation of how metaphysics evolved in western Asia Minor and reached a climax with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Athens. To say the conditions were right is not sufficient to explain why it happened. There is no means of showing an inevitable mental development. And we can ask how it is that the great British Empire received only five Nobel awards for literature, and most of them dubious, while a little island next door, with a population of about five million people got four and there was an obvious fifth that should have been so honoured but wasn't. I refer to W.B.Yeats, George Bernard Shaw, Samuel Beckett, Seamus Heaney and James Joyce.[3]

Weber maintains that some kind of causal explanation can be given for the progress of civilization - improvements in agricultural methods, in transportation, in mechanical industry, in communication, and suchlike. No such explanation can be given for the pyramids, or the Valley of the Kings or Abu Simbel. Nor does the wealth generated in France in the 17th century by the genius of Colbert explain the building of the Palace of Versailles.

Weber attributes these wonders to human 'immanent transcendence', which sounds like a contradiction in terms. My understanding of it for what it's worth, is that human beings, unlike other beings, have to within themselves the power to transcend themselves without causal help from outside, but whether or when they will exercise that power, we cannot say. So civilizations can produce the conditions for great produce creativity but, of themselves, they cannot/great cultural creativity or so Weber thought, and I cannot see any reason to disagree with him.

So we come to the third question: is tranquillity within a civilization or a state, or between civilizations and states a necessary condition for creativity. I want to say that a few creative activities such as architecture and mural painting do not prosper under continuous bombardment. Nor would agriculture or transported facilities. But even these can survive a moderate amount to turmoil and sometimes profit from it. The spectacular developments in European agriculture since the 1940s and in aerial transport during the same period can be traced directly to the necessities of the Second World War, and even more spectacular technological advances can be traced to the Cold War. And it is not sufficient to say that these developments would have taken place inevitably given time. Perhaps they would have, but can we be sure? Can we be sure that we would have brandy - a viniculture product, and hence a sub-product of agriculture - were it not for the Thirty Years war? Some of you may know it was discovered by a Dutch wine merchant who went every autumn to replenish his stock of claret in the Gironde. In order to cut down his barrel train, and thus avoid harassment he distilled the wine, with a view to diluting it when he got home. That was a bright and creative idea. Unfortunately - or fortunately for us - it didn't work. He had discovered brandy or as he called it brandewiin, distilled wine

War itself produces a creativity of its own, not only in methods of fighting - the Roman legion, Mongol cavalry, British squares, the German panzer unit; but also weapons - the ballista, cannon, rifle, machine gun, atom bomb;and conveyances -

Hannibal's elephants, warships, tanks, bombers; and infrastructure - military roads, pontoon bridges, castles, city walls and harbors. These last can be peacetime or in times of natural disasters.

And, apart from its own creativity, war has also produced creativity in other areas as well, particularly in international politic and economics. Not to go back too far in history, the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15, while not perfect in its deliberations, established a state of peace in Europe that, with a few serious hiccups in the mid-centuary (Crimean, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian War but they were short lived,) lasted a century. Of the Treaty of Versailes I prefer not to speak. There was no treaty after the Second World War, for reasons unnecessary to mention, but there was the highly enlightened Marshal Plan of 1947 which enabled Europe, and, particularly Germany, to rewar. And what with that, and the treat of nuclear war, and the post-Soviet cooperation between East and West (if one can call it that) peace in the all world at large, though not in all areas of it, has been maintained for half a century. The League of the Council of Europe, the United Nations, The European Community, UNESCO, NATO ,and SEATO, though they may have not distinguished themselves, were or are organizations generated by war in order to preserve peace, and they are all creative.

Then we have creative activity that survives disturbance and turmoil. As Harry Lime remarks in the film, The Third Man,Italy was in constant turmoil during the Renaissance, and look what it produced ! Switzerland has been at peace for three hundred years, and what has it produced? The cuckoo clock,"(funny but unfair.) 17th century France was not exactly tranquil, and yet it produced Versailles and many fine buildings, Descartes, Pascal, Racine, Poussin, Bossuet, and Couperin,to name a few. Descartes developped his idea of the Discourse on Method while in the army of the Duke of Bavari during the Thirty Years War. The famous Irish illuminated manuscri were produced during the Viking invasions. Presumably the Vikings were after gold not manuscripts.

But the amount of disturbance and turmoil compatible with creativity depends on (a) the extent and duration of the disturbance,and (b) the kind of creativity it is. The most spectacular piece of creative defiance of war must surely be the composition of Traetatus Loaico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein while fighting sometimes under heavy bombardment on the Austrian army on the Eastern front from 19 Sartre wrote L'etre et le néant and Les mouches during the German occupation of Paris and while working with the French Resistance. easier But, then, it is easier to think, write or compose music in hostile and turbulant surroundings than to paint, make sculpture or tapestry, act or dancor play music in public performance. The same goes for the sciences and other forms research. Theoretical sciences-mathematics, pure physic, political and economic theory - can probably be carried on in the most harrowing circumstances, but where laboratory experiments and fieldwork are necessary/activity may be constrained, thouc not halted even by bombing. Florey and Chain made the use of pennic illin possible as an antibiotic; Fermi was active in devastated Italy,. though the majority of scientists were working in the safety of the United States.

However, though creativity, or some forms of it at least, can survive disturbance and strife, and some forms even ~rive on it, on the whole it is periods of peace which are-most conducive to creativity, and it is not surprising that the great civilizations at peace have been the most creatively productive. The Age of Pericles, which lasted from 460 to 420, though not free from strife particularly towards the end, produced the Parthenon, the sculpture of Myron, the Oresteia of Aeschylus, the plays of Sopholes and Euripides, and the Pre-Socratic philosophers. Under Alexander, Greece was completely at peace, and produced Aristotle and Praxiteles. The victory of Octavius at Actium brought an end to the civil strife that followed the assassination of Julius Caesar, and brought in the Augustan Age, the age of Virgil's Aeneid, Livy's History of Rome, and the poetry of Ovid. I presume the same is true of all the great Oriental, African and PreColomban

civilizations but I have not sufficient knowledge to pronouce on them. I know it was true of China under Kublai Khan, but that is all.

The importance of peace and the absence of disturbance, wether wars, invasions or civil strife, to creativity is not confined to actual fighting, bombardment, pillage and all the other actualities also but it also includes the threat of such things. The threat will certain inhibit the creation of elaborate architectural works or anything a destructable nature that is not of immediate necessity. It may also inhibit dramatists and composers who may never see their work performed, painters and sculptors who may never see their works exhibited, bought or even survive. Why otherwise did so many and composers leave for the United States before and after the last world war? And writers, intellectuals, scientists are not immune from the threat of violence. They have to think of at least two things : (a) will they be left in peace to finish their work and,(b) if they are,will there be anyone to read it or discuss it? For cultural creativity we need peace of mind. This usually means domestic peac of mind in the first place, but it also means assurance of extra-domestic peace - absence of riots, civil war, of invasion,and bombardment. As I write this there is no serious threat to peace in England, much less in Oxford, apart from the normal fracas which don't trouble me. Nor am I seriously troubled by troubles in the Near East to the extent of not going to deliver this paper. There are hazards in going any where, or even in staying at home. But I would not fancy writing this paper in Kabul at the present moment. [3]

That one needs peace and the absence of a threat to peace in or to be creative,can best be seen from studying a civilized society that has endured unrest, turbulence and the constant threat of dist urbance. In no country can this be better illustrated than in Ireland. Between the 8th and 11th centuries, in spite of the attentions of the Vikings, the Celtic Irish produced, besides illuminated manuscripts already referred to, superb sculpture, both free-standing as

decorations on buildings, in particular the high crosses, and also and above, all their intricate gold objects and ornaments such as are to be found in the National Museum in Dublin - the Ardagh Chalice, Tara Broach, the Cross of Cong. Then there is a gap of 800 years, first of interncine strife, and then, following the Norman invasion, the persistent incursions of the English; the Tudor and Stuart attempts at conquest; the ravages of Cromwell; the Williamate War, and finally the penal legislation which nearly, and sometimes did, reduce the Catholic native Irish and so-called Old English to destitution and illiteracy. These are not the conditions in which cultural and technological creativity can exist, let alone flourish. For one thing the wealth needed to generate art is lacking; for another the peace of mind and assurance that that one's work would survive or be performed, according whether it is performative or material, is impaired. Only the literary and scholarly tradition survived, but it did not flourish, except sporadically.

Obligingly, to emphasize the point I am making the subjection of Ireland after the Williamite wars and the imposition of penal laws had the effect of bringing relative peace to Ireland. But this benefitted,not the Catholic majority, but the Protestant, Anglo-Irish minority, known as the Ascendancy, who,fron 1780 to 1801 enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy. The result was that argriculture and industry began to thrive, and the arts an learning flourished: Stately mansions sprang up like mushrooms almost over night. Dublin became one of the most elegant cities in Europe, and other cities erected some splendid buildings, Painting flourished - James Barry became a founder member of the Royal Academy. But, above all, literature and scholarship flourished. The period produced the philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, the orator and statesman, Edmund Burke, the poet, Oliver Goldsmith, and the playwrights, Goldsmith again, William Congreve and Richard Brinsley Sheridan.

It should not be deduced from this, however, that when peace has be established creativity in any, let alone every, form will automatic what ly follow. This brings me back to what Alfred Weber said about civilization and culture. The civilization process, he says, is continuou cumulative; the cultural process is spasmodic, discontinuous and unpredicable: it derives from 'immanent transcenence'. Whatever about the latter, I should like to suggest that Weber's distinction appli also to civilisations at peace and in turmoil or disturbance. Thoug peace is not a necessary condition for creativity, it is a most favourable condition for it. But it is not a sufficient condition either. That is to say, a civilization at peace is not necessarily going to be culturally creative. In Weber's words, creativity is spasmodic, discontinuous and unpredictable. And this, I suppose, brings us back to the cuckoo clock.

NIETZSCHE, CREATIVITY AND EVOLUTION

James Birx

As a process philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) developed ideas that support an evolutionary perspective in general and the fundamental value of pervasive creativity in particular. Actually, one may argue that the great German thinker is a philosopher of evolution, although his interpretation of nature differs from those of the traditional materialists, vitalists and spiritualists.[1] Unfortunately, he never gave a systematic presentation of his ideas (although he intended to do so). Nevertheless, one may place Nietzsche among those thinkers who took seriously both the philosophical implications and theological consequences of the fact of evolution. As such, he offers a dynamic view of cosmic reality that emphasizes the ongoing creativity throughout this material universe in general and within the human realm in particular.

In the history of philosophy, the controversial but influential thinker Nietzsche foresaw this war-torn century with its pervasive conflicts in terms of ideas, beliefs and values. He himself praised struggling individualism as the road to ongoing creativity. Yet, can one reconcile his iconoclastic worldview grounded in the will to power with a modern cooperative desire for democracy, social progress, cultural fulfillment, human compassion, tolerance and world peace? Surely, Nietzsche propounds a provocative framework that seriously challenges the rigorous evolutionist who is concerned with the survival and fulfillment of our global species as a whole through science, reason, and critical inquiry.

For the contemporary philosopher, the fact of evolution is an essential orientation for understanding and appreciating not only this universe and life on planet earth but also the true place our own species occupies within this changing world. However, one may distinguish between the idea of evolution in the history of philosophy and the fact of evolution in the advancing special sciences from paleontology to biochemistry. Understood properly, the

scientific theory of cosmic evolution places all objects, events and relationships within the ongoing flux of universal history. Furthermore, there are a plurality of perspectives and interpretations of evolution (including different explanations for human evolution).[2]

Clearly, Nietzsche's worldview is an outgrowth of the ideas put forward by those earlier thinkers who focused on the fluidity of nature. At the dawn of philosophy, the Presocratic speculations of some early naturalistic cosmologists focused on the creativity of nature. For them, the unity of the world manifests both pervasive and everlasting change. This universe, life on earth, and our own species are subject to endless ruin and rebirth in terms of destruction and creativity, respectively. Among these early cosmologists, it was Heraclitus who saw change as the quintessential aspect of all reality.[3] It is not surprising, then, that Nietzsche was especially drawn to the Heraclitean viewpoint with its emphasis on cyclical change in terms of the ongoing emergence of the same objects, events and relationships throughout this recurring universe. In fact, both Heraclitus and Nietzsche offer a dynamic view of cosmic reality in terms of change, creativity, and the eternal return of all things.

Following the Presocratic age, it was Aristotle who presented a worldview that would dominate Western thought for nearly two millennia (an interpretation of nature that squelched the embryonic evolutionary perspective in Presocratic thought). The Peripatetic philosophy is grounded in essentialism, a pervasive hierarchy of beings in the organic world, teleology and transcendence.[4] It taught that each plant and animal type or kind or form (species) is eternally fixed within an unbroken great chain of being from minerals, up through plants and animals, to our own species as the rational creature at the apex of this so-called ladder of nature. Furthermore, Aristotle presented a teleological interpretation of all living things in terms of their growth and development toward an end-goal which is the final form of their purposive existence. For him, organic growth and development as well as terrestrial and celestial motion are, in the final analysis, grounded in the existence of the transcendent Unmoved Mover (the end-goal or final form or ultimate desire of all reality). In short, the great philosopher was not an

evolutionist, although he fathered the science of biology and contributed to the birth of taxonomy, embryology and morphology.

Challenging the Aristotelian worldview, the Roman philosopher and poet Lucretius (96-55 B.C.E.) offered an early form of evolutionism in his dynamic interpretation of nature, life and the human animal. In his book **On the Nature of Things**, he argued that the earth itself had given birth to all life forms (including the human animal) within a universe that is eternal, infinite and endlessly changing.[5] Unfortunately, because of the priority given to the writings of Aristotle, Lucretius' ideas went unappreciated by other philosophers for many centuries. Only during the recent past have the views of Lucretius been taken seriously by natural philosophers; oddly enough, even Nietzsche was not influenced by the thoughts of Lucretius.

Following the Dark Ages and medieval period, the Age of Enlightenment emphasized critical thought with its return to science and reason. Once again, history as process and progress is taken seriously. Fortunately, the free inquiry of enlightened philosophers during this time offered an intellectual framework which anticipated the emergence of the social sciences in the last century (particularly anthropology) along with an evolutionary framework.

In the nineteenth century, the writings of Lamarck and Chambers paved the way for an evolutionary worldview. Nevertheless, neither naturalist was able to give an explanatory mechanism to account for the origin of new life forms throughout earth history. Consequently, the scientific theory of organic evolution in terms of facts and logic would have to wait for the writings of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), even though the idea of species mutability had been glimpsed by natural philosophers since the Enlightenment.

In the middle of the last century, it was Darwin who presented the idea of organic transformation as a fact of reality. His theory of evolution brought about a conceptual revolution in the special sciences that was soon extended into philosophy and theology.

Darwin himself had been influenced by the geological writings of Charles Lyell, the voyage of HMS **Beagle**, and the population theory of Thomas Malthus. While exploring South America, the young naturalist was very impressed with the great diversity of insects inhabiting a

Brazilian rain-forest, those giant fossils of extinct mammals that were unearthed in Argentina, and the unique species that he found throughout the Galapagos archipelago, e.g., the iguanas, tortoises, finches and mocking birds.[6] These experiences helped to provide Darwin with the empirical evidence necessary to argue for the adaptive creativity of life forms over vast periods of organic history.

Convinced that species are mutable and evolve through time, Darwin presented this new interpretation of the living world in his major work, **On the Origin of Species** (1859).[7] This pivotal volume in science gives a comprehensive and intelligible view of the history of life forms on the earth in terms of "descent with modification" by means of natural selection or the survival of the fittest, as Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) had described the pervasive struggle throughout the organic world (including the human realm). In essence, the eternal fixity of Aristotelianism had been replaced by the pervasive evolution of Darwinism.

The fact of evolution was publicly defended by the paleontologist-morphologist Thomas Huxley[8] in England and the zoologist-philosopher Ernst Haeckel[9] in Germany; interestingly enough, Darwin himself never defended his evolution framework in public or in print. Unlike the scientist Darwin, the philosopher Nietzsche was eager to consider the devastating ramifications of evolutionism for human beliefs and values.

For the natural philosopher interested in our species, it was Darwin's second major work, **The Descent of Man** (1871),[10] which extended the evolutionary framework to also account for the origin and history of the human animal. In this volume, Darwin himself now argued that: Our species is closest to the two living African pongids (chimpanzee and gorilla) with which the human animal shares a common ancestor that will be found in the African fossil record of remote apelike forms. Furthermore, Darwin argued that the human animal differs merely in degree rather than in kind from the two African apes. As such, our species is a product of, dependent upon, and totally within organic evolution. No longer did the human animal occupy a special place within the natural world. Therefore, it is not surprising that mechanistic and materialistic Darwinism threatened traditional science, philosophy and theology.

Anticipating Nietzsche's ruthless criticism of traditional theology (particularly its theistic stance), Darwin's **Autobiography** (1876)[11] courageously expresses the great naturalist's final thoughts on Christianity. Although Darwin rejected divine revelation, one may argue that he represents a failure of nerve by clinging to agnosticism rather than advocating atheism. Nietzsche, of course, never hesitated from boldly expressing an atheistic viewpoint.

In science, the Darwinism of the last century has been modified in terms of advances in population genetics as well as our understanding of and appreciation for extinction. As a result, early Darwinism is now replaced by modern neo-Darwinism. And the ongoing advances in the special sciences from paleontology and biochemistry to comparative studies in immunology, embryology, morphology and psychology all support the fact of evolution.

In philosophy, interpretations of evolution very greatly from the mechanistic materialism of Darwin, through the creative vitalism of Henri Bergson,[12] to the mystical spiritualism of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin[13] (although all evolutionists maintain the mutability of species throughout organic history). A major outcome of evolutionism in science and philosophy has been the emergence of naturalism and humanism within a strictly secular view of nature, life and our own species; refer to the writings of John Dewey, Marvin Farber, Sidney Hook, Corliss Lamont, Bertrand Russell, and Richard C. Vitzthum (among others).[14]

Having been influenced by Charles Darwin's evolutionism and Arthur Schopenhauer's metaphysics, Nietzsche himself came to the bold conclusion that "God is dead" as a result of taking the ramifications of science and philosophy seriously. For Nietzsche, culture is a mask superimposed upon the human animal as a social being. A crucial part of this cultural mask is theology. With scathing criticism, Nietzsche denounced Christianity for helping to perpetuate the mediocrity in Western civilization. For the iconoclastic philosopher, religion's subjective beliefs in God, personal immortality, free will and a divine destiny for moral beings do not correspond to anything in objective reality; a viewpoint that had been presented earlier in **The Essence of Christianity** (1844)[15] by Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872).

For Nietzsche, modern civilization represents the slave morality of the masses and the master morality of those exceptional individuals who quest for truth and devote themselves to creativity. He called for a reevaluation of all values, hoping to discredit the decadent ideas and beliefs entrenched in European society and culture. As such, he developed his philosophy of overcoming, i.e., a rigorous stance with its challenge to overcome all those false values that suppress individual creativity.

Nietzsche presented his own philosophy in **Thus Spake Zarathustra** (1833-1885),[16] his major work. In this four-part volume, the philosopher emphasized the creativity within our species, all life on earth, and this universe. Creativity is the outgrowth of the will to power; the relentless cosmic will strives for novelty and, in doing so, overcomes the limitations of nature through its manifestation of ubiquitous creativity (although the inferior multiplicity in the world often triumphs over the superior few). Nietzsche's ontology or description of nature stresses the endless unfolding of creativity, which has reached its zenith so far in the artistic creativity of exceptional individuals. For Nietzsche, the pervasive will in this universe has resulted in the evolution of life from the worm, through apes, to our own species. As a visionary and futurist, the philosopher claimed that there will be the emergence of the future overman; a being as intellectually superior to our species as the human animal of today is an advance beyond the lowly worm. As such, this overman to come will be both beyond the "human, all too human" as well as beyond the "good and evil" of religious beliefs. Of course, the overman emerges as a result of mental development; not biological evolution in the Darwinian sense. As such, humankind today must will the coming of the godlike overman as the meaning and purpose of the earth. And this artistic overman will accept the eternal recurrence and create his own values.

To justify human existence without theology and the coming of the overman as a result of ongoing ethical/intellectual evolution, Nietzsche maintained that this universe is, in the final analysis, the eternal recurrence of the same.[17] Briefly, reality is the eternal recurrence of absolutely identical, finite cosmic cycles; each particular cycle representing evolution followed by devolution (although, of course, there is no progressive evolution from cycle to cycle).

Rather than merely an "as if" ethical position, the eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's basic metaphysical outlook. Nature is process, conflict and struggle. Within this dynamic universe, Nietzsche focused on the value of superior individuals as the creators of new ideas and values, especially in the arts and philosophy. He stressed the need for human creativity in the future world of superior individuals. Thus, for Nietzsche, one must affirm this life and, in doing so, say "Yes!" to reality by overcoming all of its obstacles through creativity.

In the next century, as a species, the human animal must dedicate itself to those actions which will ensure its survival and fulfillment. Otherwise, our species will devolute and eventually become extinct like the trilobites and dinosaurs in ages before us. The success of the human species depends upon the wise use of science and reason as well as critical inquiry that is open, collective and responsible. Like Nietzsche, one may argue that the ultimate value is the act of creativity which authenticates human existence within an evolving universe that is utterly indifferent to our species.

Today, one sees that the human animal exists in an evolving world society and planetary culture because of the finite sphericity of the earth.[18] Through communication and transportation, no individual is absolutely isolated from other human beings. Just as our species represents a genetic unity, the human world is evolving into a sociocultural unity. In fact, the further evolution of our species is becoming more and more a matter of teleology through human intervention, e.g., the use of nanotechnology and genetic engineering to direct our own ongoing future development on this planet and elsewhere.

By taking seriously both science and reason, rather than blind faith and dogmatic belief, humankind will evolve that cosmic humanism which is necessary for both understanding and appreciating the value of our existence within this dynamic universe. Among other thinkers, it was especially Nietzsche who challenges us to critically evaluate our ideas, beliefs and values within a cosmic perspective and an evolutionary framework. The enlightened secular humanist will follow science and reason, and thereby quest for truth and wisdom. In this pursuit, ongoing creativity affirms the value of human existence.

NOTES

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17. Refer to Karl L.with, **Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same.** Berkeley, University of Chicago Press, 1997.

18. Refer to noogenesis and the terrestrial Omega Point in the writings of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin; contrast with the cosmic Omega Point of Frank J. Tipler in **The Physics of Immortality** (1994). See also H. James Birx, "Teilhard and Tipler: Critical Reflections" in **The Journal for the Critical Study of Religion, Ethics, and Society**, 1(1):51-60, Winter/Spring 1996.

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
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SHAPING CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE UNITY OF THE WORLD THROUGH INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Marietta Stepaniants

Among the frontiers established by people between themselves the most insurmountable and impregnable seem to be those which are build up in minds and hearts, which originate not so much from rational considerations as from a blind belief. The latter is most unshakable when it is a religious belief.

History has demonstrated that too often frontiers were established in order to segregate the adherents of different religious confessions. However, paradoxically that kind of division contradicts the very assignment of religion: to connect man with God, and consequently, to connect people with each other. Pointing out to this very function of religion, an outstanding Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov affirmed: "The unity of God logically demands the unity of humanity".1

As a matter of fact, the Holy Scriptures clearly presuppose the unity of humanity: 'Is it not written " My house shall be called a house of prayer for all the nations? "' (Mark, 11:17, also see Isa, 56:7). In the same spirit the Koran says: " It is He Who created you from a single person" (VII:189), and "Mankind was but one nation, but differed (later)" (X:19).

1 Владимир Соловьев. Магомет. С.Петербург, 1902, 28.

Nevertheless one might find in the Holy Scriptures a number of passages where it seems that intolerance, enmity and even violence towards the people outside one's own confession are justified.

How one can explain the existence of contradictory statements in the Holy Books? An atheist will easily respond to the question, considering religion to be created by man, and thus to be subjected to human passions, vile motives, rivalry and fight for power.

For a believer there is no way for the Lord to contradict Himself, since God is perfect, He is Absolute. Thus, what looks like contradictions in the Scriptures is explained to result from human misunderstanding of the true meaning of the Divine Word.

For centuries those so called contradictions of the Holy Scriptures have been used for moral justification of hostility and even aggression towards heterodoxies. Intolerance to those behind the frontiers, who are segregated as 'the others', is in particularly dangerous when it is sanctified by the Divine authority. Then aggression and violence are presented as actions approved by God being aimed to bring the victory of the Good over the Evil. Thus St. Augustinian warnings are ignored: "Do not fight evil as if it were something that arose totally outside of yourself".

Is peaceful coexistence between people of different religious creeds is possible at all? I believe the answer could be positive if there is a wish and a will to give up confrontation and to start dialogue.

At what religious dialogue should be aimed? What one could expect from it?

Sometimes dialogue is carried on in anticipation of a synthesis. However the latter is rarely achieved. A certain kind of syncretism might take place only in result of long coexistence and interaction of

traditions when they function on the same or at least neighboring territories. (That is, for example, how Sikh Religion emerged in India).

More often that, what is called synthesis, happens to be in fact something else. For example, there have been efforts to bring Christian-Muslim synthesis in XIX-XX centuries. However economical and political inequality of the Muslim side has excluded a genuine synthesis. Economical superiority of the Christian world prompted presentation of the Christian values as higher and more corresponding to the modern demands than those one of Islam. Hence, 'synthesis' has happened to be nothing but a superficial adjustment of the Islamic values to the Western-Christian. An imposed 'synthesis' is in the long run rejected as a forced transplantation of an alien model in the 'body' of Muslim culture.

Equally doubtful is effectiveness of ecumenical form of synthesis, in particularly, when it is aimed to unite all religious creeds in a new world faith. That is how synthesis is conceived by the adherents of the Baha's faith established by Baha'a'llah (1817-1892).

The Bahai community counts about 3 millions inhabiting in all the continents and represents 2100 ethnic groups. The Baha's faith is for sure cosmopolitan. Its leaders, like Shogi Effendi, consider the process of the formation of sovereign national states has come to the end. The mature word should give up the fetish of national sovereignty and accept the unity of the humanity by establishing the new world order:"The Earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens". Bahai preaching appeal to those who sincerely want to overcome race, ethnic, class, religious hostility. However it is not clear how that New World Order could be achieved. The Bahai orientation to establish the New Order once and forever, to maintain it by the World State, etc. is fraught with the threat of totalitarism.

There is also another approach to religious dialogue - a mystical one. In this case, the unity of all the religions is searched on the way of the discovery of the perennial core. It is considered that the differences in beliefs, rituals, institutional forms which seem to be important in everyday experience fade away when we see and affirm the timeless and infinite reality that is no longer broken or differentiate into various forms. In the perennial philosophy infinite reality is compared with light: when light passes through a prism, one can see the various shades of blue, yellow, green, and red, however, no one of these colors, which are like the different cultural forms of religion, is light itself.

As there are different levels of reality (terrestrial, intermediate-psychic, celestial and infinite) there are four levels of selfhood: body, mind, soul, and spirit. The developing, ever changing religious traditions have a common core. The differences of ethical claims and the different evaluations of the life expressed in the physical world, psychic experiences, and theological expressions disappear and become one in a limitless, wholly transcendent pure consciousness, or infinite self. The purpose of the dialogue is to bring forth a deeper apprehension of the spirit, the inner identity of all religions.

Mystical approach is used by the advocates of "the perennial philosophy" like Seyid Hossein Nasr, Frithjof Schuon, Huston Smith. To those who do not share their views, still it would be difficult not to acknowledge that mystical approach could be helpful in carrying on dialogue, in reducing confrontations based on the differences concerning theological, ethical, etc. problems. That might be an explanation why mystical approach is rejected strongly by fanatic fundamentalists, while it is referred to by those who would like to put the end to the communal fights and tension.

However mystical approach is not free from certain shortcomings: religion is looked at as a static phenomena, cut from the developments of history, without proper consideration of the evolution both of an individual and social consciousness. Thus, religion lacks its alive "face". Hence the dialogue which ignores all that is relative, temporal, particular, becomes quite limited in its capacities.

In direct contrast to mystical approach stands a dialogue carried on rational grounds by the religious comparativists. The latter look at confessional differences as complementary alternatives that never could be fully eliminated. The only effective way out then is to concentrate attention on certain notions, categories, trying to grasp the logic of their emergence and formulation (For example, on the understanding of Good and Evil, on life and death, on salvation, on perfection, on salvation, etc.)

None of the participants of the dialogue has a right to claim that the fundamental principle of his/her religion (say, the believe in the Divine Trinity of the Christianity, or in the finality of Muhammad's prophesy in Islam) is of the universal value. and consequently should be acknowledged by everybody. Those who are engaged in the dialogue are expected to be ready to look critically at own religious traditions and their practices, while at the same time to wish to understand the convictions, believes of the others.

The comparativist dialogue is mostly carried on by academics. It is quite effective though not free from its own shortcomings. It is criticized for being too relativist, for ignoring the transcendental Reality, for rationalization of religious experience which never could be grasped by reason.

Still comparativist approach attracts by its orientation on <u>creative</u> understanding of religious cultures as such. It permits to put

to other cultures the questions which they never ask from themselves, and by this way to discover some new meanings. Every culture maintains its identity, while "opening" themselves to each other they are mutually enriched.

The most preferable is the dialogue carried on as a never ending process, the dialogue which is aimed on continuing development of an openness and sensitivity for respectful understanding the particularity of the others' position, on communicating one's own value system, or faith, and learning from others for mutual benefit in living in a global community.

Any kind of interriligious diaologue could be effective only if it is based on the acknowledgement of the equality of all sides participating in it and on their mutual respect. Efforts to convert, to persuade somebody to change his/her belief are inadmissible. One has no right to judge another person's faith as false because one is commited to a given tradition.

Neither should anybody claim for superiority of the his/her belief and on that premise to judge what is right and what is wrong in somebody's actions. Even if it is not accepted that the law is to be administrated on the secular foundations of the democratic procedeure, and one insists on the rule of the Law of God, it is to be reminded that the most important attributes or names of the Lord has been Just and Merciful. "The Lord is gracious and merciful , slow to anger and abounding in steadfas love. The Lord is good to all, and his compassion is over all that He has made" (Psalms 145: 8-9). Likewise the opening sura of the Koran says: "...Praise to be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, the Benficient, the Merciful, Owner of the Day of Judgement...".

The Holy Scriptures prescribe to the believers to follow God's way by being merciful and avoid violence. In fact, teachings of Christianity and of Islam, for example, consider human life to be sacred being, since it is a Divine gift. The Bible reminds about that saying "If a man is burdened with the blood of another, let him be a fugitive until death, let no one help him" (From the proverbs of Solomom 28:17) or "He shall judge between the nations, and shall decide for many peoples, and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isa 2:3-4).

One does not find in the Koran the same direct and clear protection of a human life. The critics of Islam would insist on the contrary by referring to the Koranic justification of a vengeance[2]:"O ye who believe! The law of equality is prescribed to you in case of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman"(II:178). However this injunction could be understood otherwise. In fact, many of Muslim interpreters insist on a quite different reading of that prescription. The Great Sheikh Ibn Arabi in his "Gems of Wisdom" (Fusus al-Hikam) explains Koranic instruction for vengeance as the proof of God's condemnation of killing as such and His wish to defend humanity from violence by prescribing strong punishment for the letter (chapter 18). In fact, the Koran says: "The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a

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2 Christian Holy Book is not free of revenge motives as well, though vengeance in it is expected to be administered by God. The Lord is called by a believer to revenge in the most sever way: "Arise, O Lord! Deliver me, O my God! For thou dost smite all my enemies on the cheek, thou dost break the teeth of the wicked"(Psalms, 5:7); "Arise, O Lord, in thy anger, lift thyself up against the fury of my enemies"(7:6). The same kind of praying on can find in many others psalms.

person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from God; for (God) loveth not those who do wrong" (XLII:40).

The critics of Islam also refer to the practice of *jihad* - holy war carried on by the Muslims - as a proof to the aggressive character of Muhammad's teaching. However one should be really careful with such conclusions.

First, it should be pointed out that the Koran strongly condemns killing of a believer: "If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is hell, to abide therein (for ever): and the wrath and the curse of God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for him" (IV:93). If killing of a believer happens by mistake, it is also condemned and a certain kind of compensation is to be paid to the family of the deceased.

The believers include not only the Muslims but as well the people of all the Scriptures: "Those who believe (in the Koran), those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians, - any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, - on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve" (V:72).

The Koran warns its adherents not to follow the advices of those who want them to take actions of punishment without proper considerations: "Yet they ask thee to hasten on the Punishment! But God will not fail in His promise. Verily a Day in the sight of thy Lord is like a thousand years of your reckoning" (XXII:47). God expects from a believer to be restrained and avoid aggression. In fact, jihad is prescribed as a defensive act: "But fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith" (II:191), or "Let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression" (II:193). All the ayats from the Koran which call for the Holy War would be

misinterpreted if they are taken out of the general context of the history of Mohammed and first years of the life of the Muslim community. One is always to remember in what particular historic situation prophet Muhammadan made his statements.

In case hostility and fight are inevitable, Koran calls Muslims to follow a set of rules of a warfare concerning prisoners, women and children, elderly people, etc. It is said in a number of ayats: "Fight to the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for God loves not transgressors"(II:190). It is quite significant that Islamic teaching prescribes peace-making as an honorable art and duty: "And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in Allah" (VIII:62).

Among the names or attributes of Allah the most important are Just and Merciful. Hence the Koran too calls the believers: " Be foremost in seeking forgiveness" (57:21); "Race towards forgiveness from your Lord" (3:133); "Restrain anger and pardon men" (3:134); "Forgive, even when angry" (42:37); "Let evil be rewarded with evil. But he that forgives and seeks reconcilement shall be rewarded by God. He odes not love wrongdoers."(42:40).

It will not be an exaggeration to affirm that all the religious teachings give preference to achieving victory of the Good over the Evil through non-violent ways. It is true though that the believers instead too often have been resorted to force. In all the times, among all the peoples there have been existingthe two opposite parties: a party of war and a party of peace. Stressing upon aggressive sides of the historical experience or interpreting the Scriptures as justifications to that aggressiveness we consciously or unconsciously take the side of the parties of war. Would not it be wiser to share with the people like Mahatma Gandhi their believe that non-violence is the law of our

species, while violence is the law of animals, hence the dignity of man requires obedience to a higher law - to the strength of the spirit, that the only hope for the suffering world is the specific and direct way of nonviolence, that "the Allah of Islam is the same as the God of the Christians and the Ishvara of the Hindus. Living faith in this God means equal respect for all religions. it would be the height of intolerance - and intolerance is a species of violence - to believe that your religion is superior to other religions" ("Harijan", 14 May 1938).

Non-violence might not triumph in the near future. Its progress is extremely slow, the voices of the champions of non-violence may not be heard by many in the tumult and shouting of today. But it will have to be heard and understood some time or other if this world is to survive in any civilized form. The power and creativity of human reason could and should provide the most cherished triumph of non-violence.

STABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE BALKANS - A QUESTION OF SOCIO-CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Victor A. Tomovich

("Social systems are going concerns through which actors adapt to their environment, attain goals, integrate their activities, maintain boundaries, and manage tension", Charles P. Loomis).

This paper is about the former Yugoslavia.The disappearance of that country caused a civil war which affected two- thirds of its federation. The mere act of dismantling Yugoslavia has been associated with a set of internal as well as external factors. In order to explain Yugoslavia's case, we need to look at how societies, in general, develop and how the state and other institutions become functional. In particular, we need to consider those social institutions which affect the day to day life of the country, including the most complex ones such as laws, education, enterprises and so on. After Tito's death in 1980 some very important institutions in Yugoslavia, including the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists as well as the federal Government, started malfunctioning because Tito left no succesor instead he created a collective presidency. This historical knowledge leads us to many questions and interpretations about the tragic war in the Balkans (1992-1995). One may ask, How can the same peoples who have shared one common state since 1918, under newly created internal and external conditions, now create an atmosphere for pursuing and actually creating new statehoods in a matter of a few years? The answer is to be sought in the international climate of the day and, in particular, in the situation created by Mr. Gorbachev's reform of "glasnost." The new visionaries of their new states have their political philosophy based on many similar examples from past and recent history.

To understand the issues of war and peace in Bosnia, two historical events of the Balkans should be mentioned. First the arrival of the South Slavs in the Balkans during the second half of the sixth century. And second, the military-aggresive arrival of the Turks in the Balkan Peninsula during the fourteenth century. Both of these events had a fundamental role in shaping the future instability of Southern Europe.

It is the objective of this paper to inform the audience of the historical, cultural and social bases for the calamity of the ex-Yugoslavia. In particular, we will turn in the second part of this paper to the issues concerning the absolute need for creativeness, innovativness and the imaginary restructuring of society which is required from the new leaders of the recently instituted countries in the Balkan Peninsula as well as the new nations of the former Yugoslavia.

Let us start with a set of criteria for determining the existential connections between social structures and human knowledge. The Balkans' problem of the coexistence of Serbs, Croats and Muslims is to be understood through the previous actual, social experience of the tree peoples who are, by blood the South-Slavic fraternal groups. They speak the same language, although with the use of both, the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. What historically mattered were not the questions of "Who are we?" but to which religion do we belong. There are three dominant religions in the former Yugoslavia: the Eastern Orthodox (Serbs, Macedonian, the Yugoslav-Ukrainians and Romanians); the Roman Catholic (Croats, Slovenians, Yugoslav-Albanians, Slovaks, and Russianise); and the followers of Islam (Bosnian Muslims, Macedonian Muslims, Albanian Muslims, Serbian Muslims and Croatian Muslims). The principle of diversities (such as the various peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, and other differences, which have developed through geographical isolation, cultural deprivation, external propaganda and internal quarrels, bickering, disputes, and finally divisions) is a crucial element in any attempt to understand the Balkans' instability. In order to develop political, judicial, educational, artistic, and other social-cultural institutions, the innovative

approach of imaginative social creativity would be required in order to recruit and to educate the future business, political and scientific leaders.

Let us now briefly describe the structural components of the Balkan Peninsula for the past thirteen centuries. This history review is to serve as a foundation for our analysis.

George C. Homans (1950:288-289), a distinguished professor at Harvard University, wrote an interesting analysis of social groups and the social control of them.Homans suggests that the following forms of behaviors make up the principal components of human groups on the basis of which social control is structured:

(A) In sociology a rule of behavior is a norm; (B) activities, such as a favour done by persons for others; (C) sentiments in the form of friendship or antagonism between men; (D) sentiments in the form of social evaluation, or ranking, of individuals by other members of a group, and, (E) interaction between members of a group, including interaction between followers and leaders. Based on the above considerations, Homans suggests (Homans *op. cit.* 288-289) that the more fully a group becomes a social system, the greater its control over an individual member. In the end, the whole social system, in its external and internal aspects, is involved

During the whole history of the Balkans' peoples, there were many defects in the attempts to create a meaningful social system. There were many internal and several external attempts to organize activities, to aspire sentiments for union, increase interaction between diverged groups and regions. History shows that, during several centuries of trials, the inhabitants of that part of Europe failed time and again. Bosnia and Herzegovina became a Turkish province in 1463 and were occupied in 1878 and annexed in 1908 by Austria-Hungary. It became a province of the kingdom later called Yugoslavia in 1918. In 1945, it again became a federated republic of Yugoslavia. In 1991, it declared its independence and became a member of the United Nations in 1992.

Ethnic Determinants of Muslims

One of the important variables in any consideration of the stability of social groups in a heterogeneous society is the problem of real, not imaginative, identification of oneself *vis-à-vis* the rest of ethnic and national groups. According to Dr. Wsevolod W. Isajiw (1979:1), a professor of sociology, at the University of Toronto, very few researchers of ethnic relations ever define the meaning of ethnicity. Those who did define ethnicity tend to give us explanations of various phenomena connected with ethnicity and fail to make the link between the empirically observed phenomena and theory which may provide the explanatory import. Two definitions by American scholars are among those that are worth citing:
Theodorson and Theodorson (1969:169) define an ethnic group as: " A group with a common cultural tradition and a sense of identity which exists as a subgroup of a larger society. The members of an ethnic group differ with regard to certain cultural characteristics from the other members of their society". A similar definition is offered by H.S. Morris (1964:167):

> An ethnic group is distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such a group are, or feel themselves,or are thought to be,bound together by common ties of race or nationality or culture. The nature of an ethnic group's relationship with the society as a whole, and with other groups in it, constitutes one of the main problems in describing and analyzing such societies. As Ruth Benedict said of race conflict, it is not *race* that we need to understand, but *conflict;* so, for an understanding of ethnic groups in a social system, it is not on racial or cultural differences that we need to focus our attention, but on group relations.

There are both founded and unfounded theories about the origins of Yugoslav Muslims. There is the belief that Muslims are the descendants of *Bogomils,* forgetting at the same time that the *Bogomils* are also of the South Slav, i.e. Serbian, stock. Another opinion is that Muslims are descendants of the Anatolian (Turkish) agas and beys, i.e. governors, as well as retired Ottoman soldiers who had been serving in those Balkans' lands. Other theories suggest that the origins of Muslims can be associated with Romanized or semi-Romanized Illyrians (inhabitants of Illyria, an ancient region on the east coast of the Adriatic). It was a

Roman province from 1st-5th cc). And yet another theory that they are Kelts (Celts, i.e. Bretons, Cornish, etc.) Others believe that Muslims originate from Islamized Serbian nobility. The opinion that Muslims are no longer Slavs, even genetically, is growing deeper roots. Consequently, the Bosnia's Muslims don't want to be called, or to be referred to, as Slavs, or Serbs to be more precise. At the end of WW II, the Yugoslav Muslims increasingly felt entitled to their identity. And finally, in the 1970's, they become officially yet another of the Yugoslav "nationalities." The political decision to grant a nationality status for a mere religious difference did not go easily with the Yugoslav academic community, including many of the Serbian and Croatian Muslims academics.

The above discussion of the meaning of "ethnicity" helps for the partial explanation of the problem of stability and integration among the Balkans' peoples. The ethnic polarization on the basis of some historical specificity impeded the creation of a solidified union of the national groups in the former Yugoslavia.

Man's ingenuity led him to create symbols to guide and regulate his behaviour in society. Once again let us refer to George C. Homans rules of behaviour called norms. These norms, and other cultural symbols, are to serve universally in one society as effective guides only if these form generalized configurations and have internal structural regularity. They have to form coherent, integrated, compact and internally consistent wholes to be meaningful and bring meaningfulness to man's life. For centuries, Muslims, Croats and Serbs have been subjugated to foreign rules, and after the departure of the Turks from the Balkan for a while they were under the rules of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (The Hapsburg Empire 1867-1918) as it was mentioned earlier. The norms of the local population were their basic rules of conduct, which they commonly could share. Once the foreign influence began to work, the hate, antagonism, increased emphasis on dissimilarity, religious intolerance, and other conflict producing assertions, as well as the existing active hate and intolerance became a permanent feature. This attitude and cultural relativism were injected into each ethnic region of Bosnia

and Herzegovina. Simply said, it becomes a method of labelling the other groups. The labels used are those which will reduce the values of the other group. Typically, the labels were, in full sense of the meaning, derogatory. Those labelling processes unfortunately start with the primary school levels, within the circle of nuclear and extended family, and continue through the whole clans, tribes, as well as the whole ethnic and/or national group level. It becomes the measuring road of the others, who are of different ethnic and religious background.The social norms were inconsistent and the interpretation of these was leading each group to social conflicts and the state of instability which had to result in a social confrontation.

Once a society becomes differentiated in its institutional structure, that society faces the problem of integration. This eventually leads to the emergence of a "center" on which the problems of different groups within society increasingly impinge, for example political and religious centres.

S.N. Eisenstadt (1964: 375-386), hypothesised what can happen when a society does not get into the process of differentiations. He believes that some responses to differentiation may take one of the following forms:

1. Failure to develop institutional solutions to new problems caused by differentiation;
2. Failure to crystallize new, viable regimes in economic, political and cultural fields (e.g., uneven change);
3. New structures, once institutionalized, create their own boundary-maintaining mechanisms, their own direction of change (e.g., they might start "de-differentiation" like militarism in Japan, and Nazism in Germany), where systems were suddenly put into stagnation, rigidity, and instability. Today, at the end of the second millennium, we have many examples to add to Japan and Nazi Germany ranging from Africa and South America to Asia and Eastern Europe. Although with different social-economic and hence ideological positions, many dictators of this century lived their lives with a status qua or stagnant situations. With obtaining the status of a nationality, Bosnian Muslims did start creating their own boundary-

maintaining mechanism. The more they did it, the more they provoked Croats and Serbs to feel as rejected citizens of their own country.

Among the early modern thinkers, Giambattista Vico (1688-1744), Italian philosopher and historian, and Charles Louis de Secondat (1689-1755), French writer, held the beliefs that laws and customs of a society constitute a meaningfully integrated complex of traits rather than a haphazard assortment. More than others, Edmund Burke (1729-1797), Brititish statesman and conservative political theorist, and Joseph Maistre (1753-1821), French writer, the most effective of the neo-Catholic anti-Revolution writers, insisted that a society is like an organism and the natural balance of its parts should not be disrupted by arbitrary innovations derived from abstract reasoning. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who wrote several volumes of 'Synthetic Philosophy' (1860-1900), and who is the founder of an evolutionist philosophy, and an exponent of *laissez-faire* social philosophy wrote (1886: Ch.2): " Progress, therefore is not an accident, but a necessity....As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone...so surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for the social state; so surely must the things we call evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect. Bronislav Malinowski (1884-1942), Polish born social anthropologist, who moved to England in 1910, and Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), the most eminent British anthropologist, among others, made the "structure," "anatomy," "skeleton," and "physiology" of culture as the focal points of their investigations in anthropology.

According to Ralph Linton (1893-1953), American cultural anthropologist, culture is some socio-psychological phenomena, not an organic one. To perform its functions successfully, a culture needs to be integrated to the point where it has eliminated paralysing conflicts in emotional responses and overt behaviour. The data on different cultures, however, revealed that cultural integration was a matter of degree and the condition of perfect adjustment of cultural items was never achieved. Following Benedict, Clyde Kluckhohn observed that most cultures were permeated by apparent contradictions. In relation to other European cultures,

including the Slavic ones, the Bosnian Muslims were considerable behind the rest of Europe. The levels of illiteracy, economic development and use of social institutions for improvement of the cultural standards were very slow and of unexpressed want. The dominant Serbs and Croats in Bosnia were in pursuit of the same goals as their countrymen in the nearby Croatia and Serbia.Their cultural development and evolution approximated the culture of their kin in other parts of the Balkans. The Muslims in Bosnia, for several centuries, had no input in their cultural development. Their cultures were trimmed by either Turks or Austria-Hungarian policy or by their own socio-psychological filters of distrust, geographic isolation, and fear of the Serbs, Croats, Jews and even Hungarians.

Before 1918, there was no industrial, scientific and meaningful economic development in Bosnia. What was economically significant were forestry and mining economic activities. These were organized by the foreign investors who were exporting raw materials to European countries. We know, and we concur, with Dr. H. James Birx (1991:151) who said: "Science affects human conduct and human values". Or, in reference to the choice that the Bosnian's Muslims will have to make *vis-a-vi* the pressure from fundamental Muhamedanians we may, again, quote Dr. H. James Birx (Op. Cit. p.278) : " For its survival and fulfilment, it is imperative that the human animal keep the freedom of choice alive. Likewise, the quest for truth demands a rigorous adherence to science and reason". Being historically undeveloped parts of the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina were bypassed by the scientific and economic development of Europe. It would be tragic if, at this time of its new beginning, the same region would subscribe to those values which would prolong its underdevelopment and would enslave the young people's minds with spiritual, and only spiritual pursuits. Since the 17th century, when the industrialization commenced in Great Britain to the present time, human progress depended not only on the spiritual but, far more, on scientific, exact and tangible knowledge

about matter, nature, organic life, and the human species.

It goes without saying that the Bosnians of Islamic faith have their prolonged historical problems of legitimation of its ethnic character for a long time. The circumstances under which they became separated from the rest of the South Slavs i.e through the process of conversion from one faith to another, affected their social outlook. Their view of the world, and in particular of their neighbours and distant kin, caused many problems for both the Muslims as well Serbs and Croats. By discussing the objective, institutionalized criteria, of subjective and objective living conditions of these peoples, it is our intention to call for the inclusion of the sociology of knowledge into the methodology of causal interpretation of the "case of Bosnian Muslims."

In the foregoing, we have tried to present a few points of otherwise a very long Bosnian history. It is hoped that this paper has just opened the window of a theoretical possibility to use the social sciences along with history in providing many answers as to why the tragic occurances take place among blood- related peoples whose ancestors, mostly by their own choice, decided to belong to different theological traditions.

In conclusion, let us quote Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967:185):" The analysis of objectivation, institutionalization and legitimation are directly applicable to the problems of sociology of language, the theory of social action and institutions, and the sociology of religion". It is up to the scholars to recognize history as a foundation of knowledge about events. And likewise, to let others use sociology, anthropology and social psychology to figure out the cultural, social, institutional and individual contributions to conflicts, wars and peace. On the basis of such understanding, social scientists will be able to offer their expert knowledge in regard to creativeness, innovativness and industriousness. Bosnia needs to eliminate illiteracy, reform education, eradicate as much as its is possible

their fear and distrust of others. There is a need for more functional knowledge, such as applied knowledge of various technologies ranging from medical to electronics. Other practical education is in the field of business ventures or enterpreneourial undertakings; these are necessary in order to prove viability of the new nation. These and other creative measures are equally required from Croats and Serbs, who constitute also a sizeble part of Bosnia's population. We and the rest of the world can help, and can direct some of the knowledge that may be required for the initial first twenty years of embryonic developments.

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JOHANN AMOS COMENIUS' UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY AS A CREATIVE SYNTHESIS
FROM THE CONFLICT OF EXTREMES TOWARDS THE COOPERATION OF CULTURES[1]

Uwe Voigt

Nowadays extremely diverse interpretations of history, some of which stem from different cultures, are trying to influence the course of history according to their goals in an extreme manner[2]. A country like Egypt, nay a whole region like the Near East, lying at the crossroads of the cultures, has to suffer from the resulting acts of violence. *Extreme* expressions of given cultures, however, still remain expressions of these very *cultures*. To overcome the extremes one therefore has to understand them as such expressions which may reveal legitimate needs and desires even if this happens in an alienated manner. If these basic contents are discovered and developed in a creative way, they might be able to encounter and enrich one another peacefully without further polarization. Looking for paradigms of such a solution, as a European I look into the "distant mirror" of European history and see there a similar critical situation in the early 17th century. In this period also an attempt of creative synthesis can be found, made by the Moravian educationalist, theologian and philosopher John Amos Comenius (1592-1670). In the following, I try to outline his attempt as given in his important work 'Via Lucis' ('The Way of Light') which was written in England in 1641/42 as a peace programme in the situation of the Thirty Years' War.

1. The conflict of chiliasm and Augustinism: monistic versus pluralistic understanding of history

Europe was afflicted by the so-called "crisis of the 17th century"[3] so sharply also due to the contrast to the preceeding periods: The vigorous awakenings of Renaissance and Reformation, at least partially connected with immense hopes for a better future, now obviously entered a phase of stagnation. The growing particularism, accompanied by polemic quarrels, also undermined the former optimistic attitude towards man's position in the universe and the capability of the human mind[4]. The confessions and established doctrinal systems reacted to these challenges rather by force than by permitting open discussion, thus only fanning the crisis. The resulting hardened plurality of philosophical sects and churches was sensed as desorientation in wide circles[5]. Although it undeniably had its political, economical and social dimensions, too, this crisis in general was considered as a spiritual and intellectual one; therefore alert minds tried to fight it with spiritual and intellectual antidotes. The different, nay antagonistic outcomes of these efforts

promised to overcome the crisis; by their mutual opposition, however, they threatened to become just another pattern in the structure of the very crisis. This was evident especially in the conflict between the chiliastic and the Augustinian interpretation of history.

Chiliasm in a narrow sense is referring to certain expectations in the monotheistic religions: namely hopes for a positive conclusion of world history through divine intervention which turns final turmoils into messianic peace and order[6]. These hopes originated from apocalypticism, but became a position of their own: Apocalypticism and chiliasm both distinguish between two aeons. Their first one, the present period of history, is in disorder from its very beginning: Revolting cosmogonic powers (the "fallen-angels") have also entangled man in their guilt. This universal entangling in demonic destructivity increases throughout history and finally culminates in general depravity from which only the chosen few stay preserved thanks to special divine support. The apparent triumph of evil, however, does not dethrone God as the master of history. On the contrary, God's sovereignty stands the test by tolerating the existence and even the increase of evil until a certain predetermined time when the order of the creation seems to dissolve totally; then God proves His power by restoring this order in a perfection which is hitherto unknown.

By apocalypticism, this salvation is expected to happen only in the "world to come" and not in the present world whose end is believed to be imminent. So there is a radical dualism between the two periods of history which - especially in the context of monotheist religion - causes problems: Is God really a merely external force facing this world from outside, having to utterly destroy it in order to realize His plans? This question is answered by chiliasm which is looking forward to a turn of history before its apocalyptic end: Still in the course of history a period of perfection will be reached - be it after a cleansing desaster (post-millenarism) or before the final cataclysm (pre-millenarism): The network of evil will be destroyed; the tensions within mankind will give way to common happiness under a just ruler given by God. While the apocalyptic hope is longing for a near end of history, chiliasm sees history - at least from a certain not-too-far moment on - as a growing and at last optimal presence of all divine promises to mankind. The 'paradise lost' of unity among God, creation and man will be regained still on this earth.

Therefore chiliasm can be understood as a monism which - in the context of the Near East - was closely related to the interpretation and in some cases even active organisation of world history: The conflicting plurality of the present times is taken for a doomed phase of transition towards a new close union of transcendence and immanence. In its most radical shape, chiliasm tries to eliminate everything which seems to keeps up the separation and prevents the expected unity; this elimination then is regarded as divine service. In the early 17th century, chiliasm was predominantly represented in its refined, spiritual form, but still suspected by the

authorities because of former violent outbreaks and - on a more theoretical level - not least because of the verdict spoken by Saint Augustine.

Augustine's interpretation of history[7] was marked also by his critical discussion of chiliasm resp. its transformation into the ideology of the Christian Roman Empire. Augustine himself had been in favour of this position which took the rule of Christian emperors for an eschatological realization of God's kingdom on earth. This opinion at least was "tolerable" to him as long as it hoped for merely "spiritual blessings" by a more intensive presence of Christ in the time of history[8]. Chiliasm was fiercly opposed by Augustine, however, as soon as he came to the conviction that this kind of expectation necessarily was linked to waiting for immanent, "carnal" fulfilment. Such desires were incompatible with the basic philosophical orientation of the Father of the Church: According to a certain facet of Neoplatonism which stresses the distance between infinite archetypical and finite ectypical reality, all worldly events are provisional and decrepit. Therefore one has to avoid commitments to immanent facts, because when dispersing into time, man never can encounter super-temporal transcendence. The last goal of all human history accodingly lies beyond history; it lies in the beyond into which man enters through the end of the time of history - in individual death and in the apocalyptic end of history.

Until this salvation of the elected, man has to stand his way through time as 'pilgrimage', i.e. as lasting absence from his timeless destination. There is a meaningful structure in history also in the eyes of Augustine; but it aims only at giving edifying examples. Who can gain insight into this cryptical message of history perceives more clearly that history is just something to be calmly crossed in expectation of the world to come[9]; so Augustine has renewed the original apocalyptic outlook by means of Neoplatonic philosophy, defusing the dualism latent in apocalypticism by declaring all moments of time as in-different in contrast to eternity. Here we have a kind of pluralistic interpretation of world history: The given plurality within history is seen as acceptable, since man are incapable of manifesting a final unity within time; this manifestation stays the privilege of a transcendent God putting an end to the time of the world. This was the conviction shared by the theologians of all great confessions in the 17th century who fought any melioristic or even chiliastic expectation and rather looked forward to the imminent apocalypse[10].

2. The reconciliation of chiliasm and Augustinism by John Amos Comenius in 'Via Lucis' (1641/42)

Due to his descent and profession, Comenius was destined to experience the conflicts of his age in manifold ways[11]. Belonging to a small religious minority, the Bohemian Brethren, he worked as a clergyman on the territory of the catholic Habsburg dynasty, in a time when the attempt to install Calvinist rule in Bohemia and Moravia failed, causing a series of battles and cruelties known today as "Thirty Years' War". In the context of confessional cleansings, Comenius had to leave his home country - bound to hope for a return he should never attain. In the turmoils of war Comenius lost his wife and children to a plague; he had to make a new start chiefly by educating children in the Polish town of Lesno. In contrast to this biography which was coined more and more by violence and suffering, his intellectual development evolved decidedly towards his "pansophical" project of all-embracing reform: Essential insight about "everything" - i.e. about the holistic structure of reality - should be mediated to all human beings in all ways. So mutual cooperation and completion should be the highest goal of human existence.

In order to attain this position, Comenius had to face another conflict which was fought with spiritual weapons rather than with material ones: On the one hand, the tradition he belonged to was deeply influenced by Augustine, and the works of Comenius show a continuous interest in this thinker, also in his interpretation of history which was adapted by Comenius especially in his early works[12]. On the other hand, Comenius came to know the chiliastic expectation through his academic teachers, and he appreciated this perspective more and more, for it was in accordance with his own longing for a better future[13]. So when Comenius was invited by some like-minded persons to visit England and to compose a comprehensive program of his planned pansophical reform, he had to reconcile this antagonistic influences[14]. The resulting creative synthesis is recorded in 'Via Lucis / The Way of Light', written in 1641/42 on English soil, but published not before 1668, after the English Civil War had frustrated the initiatives of Comenius and his friends.

In 'Via Lucis'[15], Comenius pictures the universe as a 'school' which, amidst all confusion, has preserved its three main text-books: the material world with its order in time and space; the human being as a wholeness of body and mind; and the Holy Scripture which reveals the teleology of nature and man more clearly. These sources of knowledge - of "light", as Comenius puts it in accordance with the Neoplatonic tradition - remain intact, i.e. the principal structures of human realization which permit a conscious participation in reality are not destroyed. Moreover, Divine providence makes these sources of light, due to human cooperation, to reveal their contents increasingly. Accordingly, history - "tota mundi aetas" - to Comenius is the

very being of mankind which unfolds itself into space (as a ordered plurality of different peoples and cultures) and into time (as a succession of different epochs) and which, having reached maximal plurality, is bound to reach a new, enriched unity now containing also the gained multiplicity. This may sound quite chiliastic, but a closer look at 'Via Lucis' proves that Comenius follows his own maxim: Every partial truth and even every error has to be based on the truth which is distorted or negated in it. This holds true also for the partial insights into the essence of history in chiliasm and Augustinism; they have to be - and are - brought into a synthesis: the expectation of worldly perfection which man can attain in universal activity, at the same time calmly trusting the communicative Divine foundation of history.

Man's proper answer to the self-communication of such a God consists in communicativity, because the finite beings can soar up to the (Augustinian) vertical only by intersubjective exchange in the (chiliastic) horizontal; 'logos' discloses itself only by 'dia-logos'. This dialogue can be intensified decisively through the "new technologies" of early modern times because their world-historical meaning is not the mastering of nature but communication more and more transcending the limitations of time and space, thus bringing its participants closer to their trans-temporal and transspatial origin.

This process is divided into the 'seven ways of light'[16]: In the beginning there is 'autopsy', the first man's direct contact with the world that surrounds him. The insight that all living beings exist in pairs makes him conscious of his own loneliness and makes him wish for a mate. To Comenius, already the first actions of human knowledge reveal the participative and communicative structure of this knowledge: The harmony of the outside world enters the human mind and coins human desires and human actions. This doesn't remain a one way event; the dialogue between the first couple, the second 'way of light', vice versa increases their understanding of the world. Even the Fall cannot stop the dynamics of unfolding knowledge, but rather seems to be a further stimulation for saving humaneness by the installation of schools and by the invention of writing, the third and fourth 'way of light'. In writing knowledge shows its communicative power by making it possible that "persons who were separated from each other in time or in place could teach each other such matters as were necessary; and by the same invention even the dead could teach the living for ever"[17]. In order to reach the highest degree of this power another two ways of light have to be added: printing and navigation which allow mankind to unite their intellectual possessions. Printing (i.e. the application of modern technology to the mode of the mediation of knowledge) tears down the time barrier by bringing into light all of the insights of the past as well as of the present. The discovery of the intercontinental sea routes (the intensification of intercultural contacts by modern means of transport) renders the spatial borders obsolete. Hereby all sources of knowledge reach their maximum radiation or at least are inevitably tending towards this maximum. This is not only a chance to mankind, it is also an

urgent task and may become a danger: The unfolded knowledge can be overviewed and especially used in a humane manner only if it is re-folded and ordered into the system of pansophy. Disposible in a totally indifferent way, the ever growing knowledge would become a threat to the human beings and their world[18]. History as a meaningful wholeness is preserved and proved only through the last, the seventh 'way of light' which co-ordinates the amount of knowledge already gained out of the perspective of the holistic structure of man and world, thus making it possible to teach "everything (which is to be understood in a qualitative sense rather than in a quantitaive one) to everybody in every way".

Such a "pansophy" could bring about the peaceful period expected by chiliasm which through the integration of Augustinian motives is freed from any totalitarian, aggressive features. Because pansophy will teach man also that under the conditions of immanent finiteness he will keep his limitations. All his knowledge will refer to the Divine foundation, but in a mediate way. Space and time will have become, so to speak, transparent; their separating force will have been diminished, but not totally overcome. So the final destination of history to Comenius will be the transition from the "seven ways of light" to the "blissful octave in the heavens" wherein, thanks to immediate 'visio Dei', everything is present to everybody in really every way. This conclusive eschatological perspective, however, should not dispense human beings from the obligation to work for a mutual connectedness between themselves, with nature and with God; on the contrary, it should be a motivation to make history even now a preliminary emergence of the new, transcendent and perfect 'autopsy'.

Thus the chiliastic aspiration to worldly perfection, to an immanent unity of God and man within history on the one hand and the Augustinian hope for a final salvation beyond the pluralities of time and space on the other hand are transformed into the integral components of a coherent movement. Perfection in time and space is only re-flecting transmundane completion and is not identical with it; but nevertheless the historical time is not only an indifferent medium of pilgrimage in contrast to the sphere of the ideal. History rather possesses a definite adjustment towards (relative) perfection which does not refuse transcendent salvation but which anticipates and prepares it. So chiliastic monism and Augustinian pluralism are connected in order to gain a holistic view. While the pure chiliast in-sists in a period of perfection within history and while the pure Augustinian in critical distance to all worldly events ek-sists towards eternity, Comenius reaches a con-sistent perspective.

3. Comeniological impulses for the topical situation

Now, in the crisis of the late 20th century, have we anything to learn from this 17th century thinker Comenius? A look at the current situation might tell us that we could do so, for this situation is also marked by the clash of extreme - now let us say more concretely: monistic and pluralistic - concepts of history. Hereby one of the most aggressive factors is the fundamentalism which can be found all over the monotheistic religions[19]. Its adherents regard the present times as a period of decay, of a meaningless pluralization. But because the decaying powers will destroy themselves or are bound to be destroyed, a new, better age is dawning, a period of global unity maybe through the universal rule of the one true religion, maybe at least as the preservation and inner cleansing of one's own culture. This monism partially - e.g. in Islam and Jewry - was not weakened through Augustinian resistance and in general is strenghthened by the opposing pluralism of the Western world which is on principle negated but which also is to be exploited in regard of its still superior technological resources. Reacting to these challenges, the West is in danger of dogmatizing a kind of "universalism" which is unconscious of its own particular provenience, thus missing the chances of genuine dialogue[20].

A "Comeniological" offer for a creative de-tente of this conflict cannot consist in compromising between the existing extreme positions. The possible "way of light" could be elaborating the positive basic contents of the different positions, to gain insight into the reality which lays their foundation and is expressed by them in divergent manners, and finally to search for possibilites of mutual understanding and completion in the context of this (maybe communicative-Divine) reality.

This could mean for the contemporaneous monism: The longing for unity is an important impulse which might enable mankind to tackle global problems which cannot be overcome by any partial culture of the earth. This longing, however, has to abandon its aggressive disposition which, in confrontation with pluralistic counter-positions, rather endangers than effects the desired unity. Such a 'purification' of monism - not of the acute fundamentalisms, but of the cultural contents which lay their basis and which are meaningful in themselves - such a 'purification' could result from the encounter with the kind of moderate pluralism which has already been developed especially by Indian thinkers[21]. This viewpoint shows a certain similarity to Augustinian pluralism: The difference of cultures is to be tolerated in regard of the underlying transcendent unity. From monism this position could receive a more dynamic perspective on future encounters especially with Western partners.

Of course, the required processes cannot be initiated out of only one culture; they has to be started and promoted by "universal consultation" - to use another catch-word of Comenius[22] - of world cultures and all their partial cultures. If these

cultures are able to encounter one another not only superficially but from the uniting depths, they might finally reach some kind of creative peace[23].

Endnotes:

1. This contribution is an modified extract from the author's doctoral thesis: Das Geschichtsverständnis des Johann Amos Comenius in 'Via Lucis' als kreative Syntheseleistung. Vom Konflikt der Extreme zur Kooperation der Kulturen, Frankfurt/M.-Berlin-Bern-New York-Paris-Wien 1996.

2. Cf. *Samuel P. Huntington*, Der Kampf der Kulturen / The Clash of Civilizations. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, München-Wien 1996.

3. Cf. *Hugh Trevor-Roper*, Religion, Reformation und sozialer Umbruch. Die Krisis des 17. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt/M.-Berlin-Wien 1970, pp. 53-93; *J. W. Evans*, Das Werden der Habsburgermonarchie 1550-1700. Gesellschaft, Kultur, Institutionen, Wien-Köln-Graz 1986 pp. 49-97.

4. While a broad syncretist Renaissance movement tried to unify religious and philosophical contents from all available traditions into the framework of a Neoplatonic world-view, now the struggle of ideological systems made it advisable to denounce any claim of validity as pure means of power. Cf. *Frances Amelia Yates*, Giordano Bruno and the hermetic tradition, London 1964; *Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim*, Über die Fragwürdigkeit, ja Nichtigkeit der Wissenschaften, Künste und Gewerbe, ed by Siegfried Wollgast, Berlin 1993, pp. 280ss. (remarks of the editor). Even if the sceptical attitude is chosen as a transitory passage to safe knowledge it marks the crisis of any given authority; cf. *René Descartes*, Discours de la méthode II, 2 ss.

5. Cf. *Hans-Joachim Schoeps*, Deutsche Geistesgeschichte der Neuzeit Bd. II: Das Zeitalter des Barock. Zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung, Mainz 1978, pp. 127ss.

6. Cf. *Otto Böcher*, "Chiliasmus I. Judentum und Neues Testament". In: TRE 7, S. 723-729; *Alfred Doren*, Wunschräume und Wunschzeiten (Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 1924/25). In: Arnhelm Neusüss (ed.), Utopie. Begriff und Phänomen des Utopischen, Frankfurt/M.-New York [3]1986, pp. 123-177, esp. 143ss.; *Roland Haase*, Das Problem des Chiliasmus und der Dreißigjährige Krieg, Leipzig 1933; *Ladislaus Radványi*, Der Chiliasmus Ein Versuch zur Erkenntnis der chiliastischen Idee und des chiliastischen Handelns [doctoral thesis 1933], s.l. 1985; *Henri Desroche*, Deux d'hommes. Dictionnaire des messianismes et millénarismes de l'ère chretienne, Paris-La Haye 1969, pp. 19ss.; *Michael J. St. Clair*, Millenarian movements in historical context, New York-London 1992.

7. Cf. *Robert A. Markus*, Saeculum. History and society in the theology of St. Augustine, Cambridge (Mass.) 1970, pp. 30ss; *Ernst A. Schmidt*, Zeit und Geschichte bei Augustin, Heidelberg 1985; *Karel Floss*, Čas, dějinost a Aurelius Augustinus, Olomouc 1991.

8. Cf. *Augustine*, De civitate Dei XX, 7.

9. Cf. *ibid.*

10. Cf. *Robin Bruce Barnes*, Prophecy and Gnosis. Apocalypticism in the wake of the Lutheran reformation, Stanford 1988.

11. The most comprehensive work on the biography of Comenius still is *Milada Blekastad*, Comenius. Versuch eines Umrisses von Leben, Werk und Schicksal des Jan Amos Komenský, Oslo-Praha 1969.

12. Cf. *Renata Flossová*, Augustinus Aurelius v díle Jana Amose Komenského. Brno 1995; *author*, op. cit., pp. 126-132.

13. Cf. *author*, op. cit., pp. 101-118

14. Cf. *author*, op. cit., pp. 30ss. (with further literature).

15. "Via Lucis vestigata et vestiganda" etc. Critical text in: Dilo Jana Amose Komenského. Vol. 14, Prague 1974 [quoted as: DJAK 14], pp. 279-370. English translation by E. T. Campagnac: John Amos Comenius, The way of light, Liverpool-London 1938 [quoted as: WL] German translation by *author* in print: Johann Amos Comenius, Der Weg des Lichtes, Hamburg 1997 (Felix Meiner: Philosophische Bibliothek Nr. 484).

16. Cf. chap. XIII, §§ 2 - 10; WL, pp. 102 - 108.

17. Chap. XIII, § 6; WL, p. 104.

18. Cf. chap. IV, § 12; WL, p. 25; ibid., Dedication, § 24; WL, p. 19s.

19. Cf. *Gilles Kepel*, Die Rache Gottes. Radikale Moslems, Christen und Juden auf dem Vormarsch, München-Zürich [3]1994.

20. Cf. *S. P. Huntington*, op. cit., pp. 76ss. About the given limitations and possible principles of such a dialogue cf. *Antonio Pérez-Estévez*. The Other through dialogue. Latinamerican contribution to intercultural peace. In: Heinrich Beck / Gisela Schmirber (edd.), Creative peace through encounter of world cultures, Delhi 1996, pp. 325-335.

21. Cf. *Ram A. Mall*, Buddhismus - Religion der Postmoderne? Hildesheim 1990, esp. pp. 103ss.; *Hari Shankar Prasad*, Ethical-holistic meaning of emptiness. A Buddhist contribution to peace. In: H. Beck / G. Schmirber (edd.), op. cit., pp. 277-286.

22. 'De emendatione rerum humanarum consultatio catholica' is the title of his intended main work which was only partially completed and remained lost for centuries. It was rediscovered in 1934 and published in Prague 1966 (two vols.).

23. Cf. the contribution of *Heinrich Beck* to this seminar (with further literature).

THE LIBERATION OF REASON FROM RACISM

Tibore Ramose

The following theses underlie this essay.

1. If human beings were to retain their biological composition and, in particular human sexuality but be devoid of the powers of reason and speech, human life would have been radically different in terms of human relations.

2. Myth is not its own cause. It is a construction of reason. Myth is reason reproducint itself in another mode. Therefore, the radical opposition between *mythos* and *logos* is more apparent than real. Similarly, irrationality and rationality are one because they are different manifestations of reason.

3. Reason, like unreason or irrationality, is neither a thing nor an entity. Accordingly, it can neither be proved nor disproved in a laboratory. Rather reason is apparently a non-spatial power of discernment which humans have and use to judge experience.

4. Being is constantly becoming. Being-becoming is what there is. The insertion of **and** between being-becoming is the bifurcation of the originary *oneness* into a *two-some.* It is the introduction of a false opposition between being-becoming for we thenceforaward speak of being **and** becoming. This false opposition is strengthened by a plea or command enjoining being-becoming to **BE! BE!** is the human construction to contradict the fundamental uncertainty of being-becoming in order to attain "certainty" in human life.

The Liberation of Reason From Racism

The liberation of reason from religious superstition, irrational forms of government, ecclesiastical or civil and oppressive authority stands out as one of the major themes of the Enlightenment in the history of Western philosophy. Similarly, the struggle to release reason from the yoke of theology and metaphysics is among the main features of the Enlightenment.[1] The general experience of entrapment in the bondage of metaphysico-religious superstition reinforced by the overbearing authority of the government and the church encouraged the view that the individual was not yet truly free. Reason projected an alternative vision and prompted the individual to pursue that vision. Reason was thus both the foundation and the driving force for a better and happier human condition in the future. It was thought, particularly in the French Enlightenment, that the human quest for betterment, welfare and happiness could be attained "Provided that he ('man') frees himself from the notion that his destiny depends on a supernatural power, whose will is expressed through ecclesiastical authority, and provided that he follows the path marked out by reason, he will be able to create the social environment in which true human morality can flourish and in which the greater good of the greatest possible number can be successfully promoted. ... It was...a question of substituting... 'free thought', the autonomy of reason, for authority."[2] In a sense, the Enlightenment can be described as the celebration of Aristotle's famous definition:"man is a rational animal". It purported to be the veritable Age of Reason. It was reason which was the principal and indispensable vehicle for the affirmation and assertion of human freedom. The emancipation of reason from the Dark Age of unscientific thinking was deemed to be an essential precondition for the realisation of human liberation. There was thus

a link between the freeing of the human mind and the liberation of the human being. In a sense, this was the basic theme of the Enlightenment. "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. *Sapere aude*! `Have courage to use your own reason!" - that is the motto of enlightenment."[3]

Seen in the light of Aristotle's definition, the motto and, even the challenge of the Age of Reason is also the age of `man'. The latter is understood as a composite of body and reason. Before the dawn of this Age the body was in general debased and subordinated to reason which was supposed to be superior to the body by nature. What emerges here is the conception of a human being in dualistic terms: body and reason. According to this conception, reason was the decisive defining criterion of being human. To be human is to be rational. Consequently, a man without reason is a beast in season.

The above definition of a human being, celebrated thoroughly in the Enlightenment had and continues to have far-reaching consequences for other human beings particularly since the inception of the "voyages of discovery" undertaken mainly by the West Europeans. The United Kingdom is included in our understanding of West Europeans. At the same time, the latter undermined the celebration as well as the supposed primacy of reason - "the scientific study of man"[4] - by sinking into the irrationality of scientific racism[5] in their encounter with the Amerindians as well as the indigenous peoples of Asia and Africa. One of the presuppositions of the Age of Reason appears to be that the meaning of the term "reason" was so obvious that it did not require any clarification at all. Yet, it is the entitisation of "reason" and the corresponding inference that it can therefore be quantified which lie at the core of scientific racism.[6] The scientific study of man in the form of scientific racism had strong theological[7] and philosophical underpinnings.[8] The thesis to be defended in this essay is that the liberation of reason from the irrationality of scientific racism imposes the duty to recognise that the Aristotelean definition of the human being must apply to and be equally valid for all human beings wherever they are. Without this recognition there is little chance for building and sustaining world peace. In order to substantiate this thesis we will identify examples to show that the prevalence of racism in our time is deeply rooted in a philosophical framework traceable in the history of Western philosophy from the ancient, through the Enlightenment[9] and right up to the present.[10]

Philosophy and Racism

Aristotle, Hume,Locke and Kant[11] to mention but only a few, are among the great Western philosophers who made no small contribution to the philosophical foundations of racism in the West. Concerning Aristotle, and, indeed the whole of Western Europe, we proceed from and support the view that:"The influence of Aristotle's geographical conceptions on the discovery of America has long been known, but it is only in recent years that the application of his doctrine of natural slavery to the American Indians during the Spanish conquest has been studied seriously. Generally speaking, there was no true racial prejudice before the fifteenth century, for mankind was divided not so much into antagonistic races as into `Christians and infidels'. The expansion of Europe to Africa, America, and the East changed all this and thus the story of Spanish experience has a value for those who would understand race issues on the world

scene."[12] With regard to Locke the following argument is, in our view, well-considered. "Locke, I contend, is a pivotal figure in the development of modern racism in that he provides a model which permits us to count skin color as a nominally essential property of men. This comes about because in the course of his formulations of theories of essence and substance it emerges that the essential properties of men are computed like those of *gold*. What appears to be a simple system of classification based on tallies of observed properties in fact facilitates counting color, sex, language, religion, or IQ as "essential". Indeed, there is no mechanism within the Lockean model to rule out counting skin color as the "essential" property of men."[13] This contention, particularly with regard to the calculation of IQ also supports our submission that the contribution of the philosophers mentioned is apparent even in our time. The ongoing controversy surrounding the publication of *The Bell Curve*[14] is an example here.[15] Neither has D'Souza's *The End of Racism*[16] calmed the storms of the ensuing controversy. With regard to this latter publication it has been argued plausibly that:"If D'Souza had made a persuasive case that racism is an insignificant obstacle to black progress, affirmative action and other race-specific policies could not be defended before American public opinion, however advantageous they might be for blacks as an interest group. But he has not made such a case." [17] David Hume's racism was even more explicit. "I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In JAMAICA indeed they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly."[18] Although Hume refers to "ages", a pretension to knowledge of history and, "our colonies", yet another claim of knowledge of the colonies, it is apparent that such imagined knowledge exposes Hume's ignorance of history and the reality prevailing in the colonies. Hume's racism is therefore based upon his idiosyncracy than upon objectivity.

Kant's racism, like Hume's, is based on appeal to nature or a biological quality. On this basis Kant "discerns four races in a racial pecking-order. The 'white' on the top, followed by the 'yellow' and the 'negro' and at the bottom the American or 'red race'. The pecking-order is defined by a decrease in mental and general ability: ... there are no possibilities to defend Kant's racism within his edifice in a non-contradictory way."[19] In may ways Kant may be regarded as the precussor of Hegl's racism. Hegel relied on his ignorance of Africa and on that basis proceeded to defy empirical facts. At the same time, he robustly contradicted his own logic[20] in defence of his racism.[21]

Of course, to state that these philosophers made a contribution to the philosophical foundations of racism in the West is not necessarily to claim that all of them were racists. However, none of them may be exempted from being the holder of a racist attitude. Furthermore, since philosophy

cannot yield useful insights if it is completely isolated from the wider social context within which it is born, it is important to understand that for our purpose here the wider social context, especially nascent scientific racism, is taken into account. On this reasoning, we proffer the following definition of racism. Racism is "the doctrine which a group may articulate in order to justify its oppression of another group by appealing to some putative flaw (in recent times usually understood as being contained within the biological constitution) in the oppressed group. Thus I mean to include within racism 'congenital inferiority' by virtue of skin color as well as by linguistic differences."[22] We add that the "putative flaw" included even the denial that some members of the human species were created by god.[23] Racism thus assumed a theological character which is far from dead in the contemporary world. Surely, the maintenance of racism either by legislative fiat or through behaviour can hardly contribute to world peace. Similarly, the theological anchoring of racism makes non-sense of all the qualities attributed in superlative infinity to god. On this basis religion is positioned to contribute more to war rather than peace in humam coexistence.

Some "men" are rational animals

The celebration of Reason during the Enlightenment was a reaffirmation of the Aristotelean definition of "man" as a rational animal. At the same time it envisioned the emancipation of reason from all forms of oppression and in that way proclaimed the desideratum for human liberation. Intellectual and physical slavery of any kind decreed by whatever authority were to be abolished. However, these basic aims of the Enlightenment appear to have been conceived as the natural and exclusive "rights" of the West Europeans. This means that in practice Aristotle's universalist definition was particularised and localised to include and refer only to Western "man". Instead of it being understood to mean that all "men" are retional animals, it was interpreted as some men are rational animals. On this basis, slavery, plunder, conquest in unjust wars as well as enforced "civilisation" and "Christianisation" became the rights of every human being outside and beyond the geographical boundaries of the West.

It is common cause that the various Popes, through their bulls, granted permission to prospective colonisers to "go and teach all nations" in order to Christianise the world. In their devout urge to see the world Christianised, the Popes granted the prospective colonisers even the right to kill the indigenous people if the latter refused to accept the Christian religion.[24] Accordingly, the indigenous people in the prospective colonies were deemed to have only one right: to accept Christianity or die.[25] All this was sanctioned and done on the basis that other people outside and beyond the frontiers of the West could be recognised only as animals with human-like features. But they could not and did not qualify as human beings since they lack reason: the very decisive criterion for being a human being. In his discussion of "The Great Debate at Valladolid, 1550-1551", Hanke narrates that a certain Alonso de Zorita "referred to the widespread idea that the Indians were believed to be human in appearance only..."[26] On the other hand, "more energy went into attempts to deny that Africans belonged to the same species as the rest of mankind."[27] The Western preoccupation with reason, logocentrism, assumed the proportions of an apparently incurable disease, namely, the irrationality of racism. A potential remedy to this disease is the intellectual recognition, translated into practice, that all human beings are rational animals.

All "men" are rational animals

The Age of Reason contained within itself the remedy for racism, namely the intellectual recognition and the practical implementation of the maxim that all "men" are rational animals. Although Hume could probably challenge this on the plea that a parrot could never become a rational animal, the challenge would be unsustainable for the following reasons. Even before the parrot were recognised for what it is, approaching it in the language of human beings would involve the presupposition that the parrot had some capacity to "understand" human language. Such "understanding" would become manifest not only in the parrot's imitative repetition of human language but also by displaying behaviour consistent with that language. The question is: once the parrot "understood" human language in this manner why would it still require human agency to initiate human language independently and act accordingly? There is no limit to the racially based answers which will share one basic point in common, namely, that whatever the parrot does would and could not change its nature as a parrot. Therefore its conduct and use of language would always remain imitative. It would appear human-like but it would not and could not be authentically human. On this reasoning, racism and its justification of slavery in all forms could be maintained even when the now decolonised people continue to starve from imposed democracy, the free enterprise system and alien religions like Christianity. According to this reasoning, democratisation and the upkeep of the free enterprise system still require that the now decolonised people of the world must be placed under the perpetual tutelage of the Europeans. Hence the condescending appellation, "Third World." It has been pertinetly argued in this connection that:"By 1648 there was ample evidence that civilisation was rapidly supplanting Christianity as standard of moral assessment of non-Christian states. This continued to be the case long after Christianity had ceased to be a relevant factor in international relations, with a hard rsidue of Augustinian exclusiveness and Aristotelian superiority surviving in the attitudes of European powers towards political communities encountered in their expansion overseas. This was partly reflected in the terrms contained in so-called "capitulation" treaties. The same mentality was epitomised in the treaty relationship between European colonial powers and African tribal chiefs, who were refused recognition as subjects of international law. It survived the termination of the colonial, mandate and trusteeship systems in the second half of the twentieth century to resurface in the form of growing racial prejudice against those originating in the former "uncivilised" fringe. In our own days, lurking behind an outward benevolence, it is manifested in a generally condescending attitude towards what we are now pleased to call the "underdeveloped countries" or, relegating it instictively to the bottom of the scale, the "third world."[28] Thus the so called "first-world's" racism appears to be not only incurable but it is also seemingly "instinctive". It manifests itself in the context of international economic relations: relations of enforced dependency as a structural necessity for the protection and preservation of the Western economic system. Such manifest injustice can hardly be conducive to the construction and preservation of world peace. Despite the existence of "people of mixed race", racism is still very much alive even in love relations between the Westerners and human beings from other parts of the world. Strange that the Westerner's love is not blind whenever it encounters human beings who are not the same as themselves. If futurology is anything to go by then today's "people of mixed race" are an indelible indictment against racism in human relations. They are also a living assurance that ultimately humanity will, either by design or default, recover from the supposedly incurable disease called racism. Thus the racism that some "men" are rational animals shall ineluctably conform to the imperatives of biology. The result

of such conformity must be the admission that all "men" are rational animals. Until and unless the so called "developed" or "first world" swallows the remedy that all human beings are rational animals, true peace in the world will remain highly elusive.

Still under the theme of love we are told that *agape* or love is the basic law of Christianity. Indeed, acts rather than words of love are said to be the gateway to the Christian heaven. This latter is said to be the final destiny - depending on how one made one's choices while on earth - not only of Western Christians but of all human beings. The Christian missionary endeavour, "Go ye and teach all nations" was based upon this premise. In this context the problem was the following. If the Christian God of "perfect" and "infinite" love had opened the door to heaven for all humankind and, humankind existed only in the West according to the maxim that some "men" are rational animals, what would justify the expansion of Christianity beyond the boundaries of Western Christendom? The expansion would either be contrary to the racist ideology that some "men" are rational animals or it would be consitent with Christ's instruction that "all" nations were to be taught the "good news" for the sake of their own salvation. Confronted with this dilemma, Christianity opted to obey Christ and accordingly declared that all "men" are rational animals. In this way *Sublimis Deus*[29], the bull of Pope Paul III, containing this declaration stood in sharp contrast to, contradicted and counterbalanced the irrationality and inhumanity contained in *Inter Cetera*, the bull of Pope Alexander VI, *Dum Diversas* and *Romanus Pontifex*, the bulls of Pope Nicholas V.However, *Sublimis Deus* neither obliterated nor overcame the apparent instinctive racism of the West. For as along as this is the case true world peace remains a remote possibility.

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PEACE AND DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Bishara Sargi

Every body acclaims peace, at least apparently, but we can't say that every body speaking about peace wants peace really. Every human group desires peace, but many of them don't reach peace. Every body wants peace, but we don't find that every body works for peace.

The politician and the philosopher are both interested in peace. The philosopher doesn't aim to take the place of the politician, however. The politician's role is to ensure the strength and the well being of the state by means of the right laws which coordinate individual freedomms with the authority of the state, and each individual freedomm with other freedoms. The philosopher's mission is to discover the origine of evils that affect humanity and to prescribe treatements for these evils in order to control or to win over all of them. The philosopher witnesses that human beings are the authors of their own misery, when they pursue wealth without any limitation, and doing so they neglect completely their spiritual growth. Freedomm becomes a miserable slave when it searches only the body's satisfactions and the power's desires. In these cases conflicts devastate all nations and wars drive their roots in human hearts.

LOGIC OF CREATIVITY AND PARTICIPATION

Working for peace, I choose from the different kinds of logic, logic of creativity. I found it in the original human experience where self-creation begins. In the authentic first experience, consciousness discovers how she is a participating reasonable freedom to "Whole Présence", and therefore she is fit to work for peace. Consciousness should not be limited, at the beginning, in reason only, independently of

participation and freedomm, development of thinking shows how currents of philosophy, based upon reason alone, have led finally either to dogmatism or to agnosticism, and both attitudes don't prepare the way to peaceful dialogueand to approach others with kindness. On the other hand, philosophy based upon freedom, without any fundamental relation to reason, could end in absurdity and lead to different forms of nihilism. In both attitudes, there is a continuous danger of awaking a sentiment of superiority, dominating all things and human beings, or awaking a will to power. In both teachings many ways are opened to conclude that the other human being is dangerous and consequently the ennemy, and even more, sometimes they conclude that "Hell" is the others.

ADVENTURE OF RATIONALISM

We all remember, I think, how in the sixth part of his "Discourse on the method" where he put the principle of the new rationalism, deeply influenced by new mathematics, Descartes declares clearly that this new rationalism where philosophy is considered as a unique universal science, would lead us to become masters of all the unique Universe intended as an extensive substance wich is all the material world, and submitted every where to the same rules of understanding. So human reason is able to dominate all extensive substances, including human bodies themselves, what are parts of the unique extensive substance, and are at the same time, united with the individual thinking substances who are effectively human beings. It is evident that Descartes maintains a very particular dignity to the thinking substance, which is substantially united with a private part of the extensive substance. He develops a very particular teaching in his book "the Passions of the soul" where he exponed rules in order to become leader of personal passions and to dominate passionate movements of the proper body in order to save the special dignity of the thinking substance.

But Descartes himself found many real difficulties concerning the true and good relations with other human individuals. It is very significant how, in the second of his "metaphysical meditations", he compares individuals, wearing hats, who from a high window are perceived walking and mooving in the street to mooving dolls. Others are in any case, across from me, cause of trouble and difficulties because of their unexpected behaviour.

Later, the notion of substance loses its ontological statute with the empiristic english philosopher David Hume. The transencendal idealistic german

philosopher Emmannuel Kant writes in 1795 a philosophical essay on "Perpetual peace", where we read:

"Peace between human beings, living together, is not a natural state. The natural state is rather a state of war, even if it is not always an evident declared war, it is at least a threat of war. In consequence, it is necessary to create peace, because stopping aggressive acts doesn't give sufficient guarantees. If neighbours do not obtain that (which is obtained in judicial situation only) then he can treat the other as an ennemy always threaten from his by recourse to war".

Hegel put in the beginning of the "Phenomenology of spirit" the initial experience of human desire, and revealed how initial desire is to dominate the other himself when he faces me as ennemy. So human relations are conceived as savage struggle until death. But later, when reason interfers, it leads those who are fighting, to concluse a peace treaty, which could never be definitive, by reason of the fundamental continuous human desire, to possess every thing, and specially other desires, that relate to other human beings.

So Rationalistic civilisation is rooted in a fundamental tendency to dominate all the extended universe, and to satisfy fundamental human desire of possessing all together material goods and other human beings. This civilisation sometimes manipulates human desires in different parts of the world, pushing some groups to war, leading others at a temporary peace.

It is true that Descartes based his philosophy on reason, and thus he is called "the foundatour of the rationalism". But Descartes himself, in the fourth of his "metaphysical meditations" reveals that a human being can also use his freedom, which is "God's picture" in human being in order to overturn and overthrow every thing. Freedom in a human being, is an unconquerable faculty, it can desire what it . wants, it can even impone its desires upon reason himself, and push him to formulate judgements that are not containing "clear and distinct" ideas. In other words freedom could become an absolute master who justifies anything he likes without any definitive reference.

This particular aspect of freedom has been adopted by a contemporary french philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. In his analysis, freedom becomes an isolated for-self who is unfit to create any sane relation with other beings. Every relation with any human being should be either sadistic or masochistic, but never a sane relation of love. In conclusion Sartre declares in "Huis-clos", a theatrual piece that "Hell is others", and that existence is "vain passion".

Self creation, by participation, is an autonomous realisation of possibilities presented at the basics of our choice, liberating our development from obscurity and vagueness. Participation is not acceptance only, it is free assumption of what is received, and agreed consent to collaborate with the Act of self- creation. So participation is not subordination, but, liberation. We consider absolute source not as a stable substance, but as freedom, and so participation is the genesis of freedom. Every freedom is an appeal for freedom, needs other freedoms to stimulate the free act, collaborating within them to build with them human civilisation. Thus every body exercises freedom in the presence of other freedoms, only. "The Pure Act", by generous participation, gives birth to individual freedoms, and their plurality causes ties of solidarity between them. The freedoms of others are not obstacles to mine.

Participation makes human beings separated and united at the same time and the relation with others a constituant of creativity. Every term of relation keeps, in interaction with others, his own being and becomes other. Participation and creativity become the rythm of every human existence. Participation in the same source of being and acting is the best guarantee of any basic unity, and therefore of any peace.

I- CULTURE TO SERVE PEACE

Culture is a fundamental element in life and growth of all participating individuals and groups. It helps human being to attein true and full humanity. It is therefore normal to clarify what is culture and how does it peace.

Culture results from the manners in which people expresse, in a particular country and determined epoch, all their religious beliefs, their intellectual and artistic researches, their technical realisations, and how they conceive work and organise spare time..

Every group of people has its own culture that groups behaviours, thoughts and public opinions, how he looks at himself, his society and external world. It includes a mental structure partaged by a social group in a particular epoch, language that expresses, transmits and conserves culture, participation of every individual to historical destiny of the nation. So the Culture of any people becomes deeply attached to its own history. Even though traditional culture is in perpetual transformation by effect of political and technical evolution.

Culture includes all institutions that maintain solidarity of society, and arrange conditions to satisfy basic needs such as hunger and sex. Culture helps everybody to organize life with comprehension of environnment, efficacity in work and self responsability.

The world is actually marked by mobility and complexity of cultural life. We notice that most important cultural events are: invasion of scientific and technical thinking developping sens of exactness and critical spirit.

Progress of human sciences as sociology, technology, psycho-analysis, history, linguistic, economics explaining deeply human activities, and preparing individuals to face things as changing and growing; very big diversity in cultural references, and particular revolutions in fundamental human representations as human, world, selfish, relation to other, God. International expansion of some languages, particularly english.

There is a beginning of a very strong tendency to refuse, in culture, all myths that threaten human beings. Every cultural element aims to form collectivities able to live together without any fear or despotism. New generations are searching to discover ways to more human life, liberating humanity from all inhibitions, keeping regard for human dynamism.

Culture is pushing traditional populations to acquire scientific knowledge, and refuse all fanatism, superstition and illusion, and submit all actions to conscious reflection.

It is evident that scientific and cultural progress could cause occasionally some difficulties to people, but even so it remains very useful and beneficial.

Kant writes: "Culture depends on reason and leads to the idea of universal peace".

In order to promote peace, culture denounces first of all war. Many peoples or nations had lived long periods of war, some of them or another groups are still suffering of it, others live with sentiment that war is a perpetual threat. Sometimes war seems like fatality imponed to human beings. Even when all reasons are hiden, every body could understand that unknown humans are responsable of any war. In any way, war can't resolve human problems, it has always been an irrational means that never ethicaly is acceptable, in order to rule

relations between groups or states. So war doesn't appear as a crime only, but as an absurdity...

Culture denounces also some incomplete forms of peace, so as: simple absence of war, simple quiet obtained from a limited balance of power, every body remembers the Cold war that followed the second world war. Totalitarian domination and any agreement which includes the possibility to war are also considered as incomplete forms of peace. Moreover when the bases of peace are materialistic only, they are not able to eliminate definitively the possibility of war.

· Culture shows howmuch peace is fundamental for humanity. It merits all pains experienced on its behalf, because it is at the same time the first step to peace that unifies human's spirit, prepares union and solidarity in collectivities and realises the best of humanity. Union and cooperation help to winn difficulties of life and open largerly ways to all kinds of creation.

Peace requires a very big effort from every individual who must dominate passions and respect particular values in order to build a new happy world, where human beings can live together, in freedom, dignity, well- being and justice, the world where every body shares in all goods; meanwhile all political, economical and social conflicts are resolved with a spirit of dialogue and good way.

On the other hand it is indispensable to eliminate causes of disputes between human beings: all forms of unijustice, spirit of domination, distress of any person, jalousy, pride, egoïstic passions, absolutism, individual and collective memory of past wars and aggressions because of difference in religion, any practice that reduces persons to be used for profit. A particular attention must be directed against runing to armaments, producing and trading all kind of arms.

Sometimes abuses of freedom which confuses truth with opinion, right with selfishness, freedom with sudden fancies, could prepare the way to abuses of authority. It is necessary to preserve spiritual will against the invasion of free instincts, restore it by pursing ideals like: truth above fraud, right above strength, freedom above cohesion by constraint, and by searching to obtain through human friendship what strength and hatred are unable to give, and to promote such basic values as: respect, kindness, confidence and human's love.

Society is in peace when every individual gives to the other his right, when the State gives to people their rights, and when every person lives according

to her conviction. The whole world should be in peace when every group is satisfied with his rights.

Peace is common life based upon justice. As justice is never definitively established, it needs continuous creation in order to preserve human lives and to advance continuously. A particular attention should be paid to dangers that threaten peace and particularly today, as periodical conflicts in regions, possession by many states of nuclear destructive arms, and terrorism, trading of drugs, problems of enviroment, specially bioethical manipulations.

II - THE CULTURES OF WAR

It is realy a pity that there are yet cultures that do not serve peace, they are even at the service of wars. They have always existed all long history and between all nations.

They all take a fanatic segretationist form or racial totalitarist regime. Fanatism could be religious or atheist, political or scientist. Fanatic, who is often dogmatist, is persuaded that he is possessing an absolut truth that other human must accept in thinking and in acting. A fanatic wants firmly to impose his truth by any means. He has a very closed mentality accopagnied with a strong belief in will to power. He refuses any dialogue, and declares that he wants to submit all humans to his beliefs, even by recourse to arms.

Racism is a particular form of segregationist fanatism. It teaches that a group of persons is superior to all other groups of human beings. This group is superior, because of its race only. There who are considered inferiors are treated with an arrogant discriminating manner. They are hated, excluded, even exterminated.

Nazism was a particular segregationist racism. It has been exponed in Hlither's book "Mein Kampf" 1924. The Main ideas of the book are: pangermanism, racism, antisemitism, adoration of State and strength. All ideas are marked by Nietzsheist "will to power". The slogan, repeated in any time and occasion, was: One people, one Reich, one leader." German people are superior race, they are in world in order to dominate all people on earth. In order to maintain purity of race, it is absolutly forbiden to contract mixed marriage, where one is not german. At the same time a very meticulous selection must be done in birth. In order that superior people grows, policy of strong natality must be

applied, and systematic extermination of inferior races must be accompliched, specially jews, who were considered by Hitler, origine of all evils in the world.

To establish this new power, it is necessary that strong authority gouverns germany, directed by a leader who possesses all powers. He has to be an absolute despote. Racial totalitarisme lead Europe, and most of the world, to the second world war, which resulted in the death of millions.

It is completely vain to seek peace when sentiments of hostility and contempt, racial hatreds and ideological prejudices that divide human and place them as ennemies are still alive. It is very important then to renew our ways of thinking and to change the tone of the public discourse.

If we don't work for peace, then we will be threatened by its death.

III - DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN ORDER TO SERVE PEACE

Culture is a very good instrument for communication between peoples. It contributes to international comprehension and recognizes, in every society, particular forms of expression and cultural values.

Cultural cooperation is a very important factor to fight against ignorance, intolerance and prejudices - specially racial prejudices that generate distrust and aggressiveness, provoke tensions or wars, and impeed all initiatives directed in favour of desarmement and peace.

It is very useful to stimulate intercultural exchanges based on the reciprocal knowledge of cultures, and to help everybody, specially children and young people to understand different cultures and modes of life expressed in those cultures.

Meeting of cultures has not been always voluntary and free. So European cultures have been exposed and imposed on all humanity, as a model of progress.

Western culture, supported by modern technology, is accepted almost, with resignation. Dialogue doesn't eliminate relation of strength and submission. Mass-media expand cultures upon all the earth.

Cultural pluralism imposes itself on the contemporary consciousness as an essential value in contemporary humanism. It must be understood in a dialectical meaning, opposed cultures show deeper opposition between different interests. We can't separate the diffusion of a culture from the political, economical and technological strength of the group.

True cultural pluralism requires of everybody to recognize the other's culture as worthy to be known, appreciated and studied. In to pass beyond conflict situations in direction not of war but of dialogue, between cultures, that requires a conscious effort in order to reach a precise meaning of culture.

Healthy culture is dynamic and able to change. Without reciprocal exchange, dialogue of cultures becomes an object of doubt. It is possible to understand better the proper culture by interacting and exchanging information with other cultures. If meeting of cultures is free, it allows every group to recognize its own values an understand the importance of other's contributions, and the creative exchange of values at all levels.

As much as all cultures are recognized equal in dignity and right, the union between culture and dialogue opens a royal way to international cooperation and peace.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion I suggest some urgent problems that logic of creativity and dialogue of cultures should directly consider in order to serve peace:

I - Human rights are recognized by all nation belonging to the U.N. These human rights are often despised unregular manner, particularly by those who with abusive right pretend, to be Judges over all the world, in reason of their economical possibilities and military power. So they take the initiative to judge any other people and condemn them in the name of human rights. How could such behaviour serve world peace really?

II - The world is clearly divided into big areas the rich north and the poor south: this division is resulting from rushing to progress and development. Three main factors contributed to the realisation of this great division:

1 - First is intensity in automatic production of machines, technological firms and goods to consumption.

2 - Second is very big investments of financial capitals in sectors that product biggest benefits.

3 - Third factor is birth and expansion of society of consumption.

Rich states, especially those that pretend that they eliminated old colonisations, are establishing, nowadays, a worse kind of colonisation. How to face with equity such situation and contribute to a real international justice.

III - New rights of minorities in the world: For many different reasons, some human groups become minorities, either within their own countries or in the international relations. It is normal that, with all these minorities, who are becoming more and more numerous in the world, new crucial problems should arise, concerning how to preserve peace either inside state, or in the whole world.

Dialogue of cultures could lead to maintain new rights concerning collectiv rights of some human groups. Every people could decide according to rights belonging to national, cultural and religions minorities. It is very urgent actually to take in consideration new dimensions in rights, so as rights of cultures or minorities belonging to a particular religious culture to decide about their proper being, and how to establish equality between different groups of minority.

IV - Usually, it is openly affirmed that pluralism of religions,cultures and traditions is an honourable aspect of common human heritage, but on the other side society has to face danger of unconquered nationalism and cultural fanatism. This is a very urgent problem poned to dialogue of culture.

V - In this particular period of history, we need to take in consideration, in every meeting, all elements of integration and collaboration in common work. We live in a period of complementarity and collaboration, not a period of self sufficiency and self affirmation without any attention to others. Those who are suffering on earth need a very particular effective kinde attention.

* * *

POTENTIALITY FOR CREATIVITY AND PREREQUISITES FOR PEACE

R. Balasubramanian

I

Creativity is a characteristic of all living beings. In the absence of creativity survival and growth are not possible. Plants, animals, and humans are creative. In the case of plants the vital force inherent in them makes them creative. The creativity of animals is attributed to instincts. But in the case of human beings the power of reasoning is the source of creativity. The organizing principle, which is identified as propensity, or instinct, or reason depending upon the stage of evolutionary process, is responsible for the creative activity, which is obvious in the case of living beings. I shall confine myself to the phenomenon of creativity of human beings, who are rational and moral agents. If wars begin in the minds of men, then peace also must originate in the minds of men.

Peace is a moral ideal which human beings have to pursue and preserve, individually as well as collectively as it is necessary for the fulfilment of the "common good" with which the good of the individual is connected. It is in the moral agenda of both the individual and the state.

II

There are two questions to be considered in this connection. The first one is whether a human being has the capacity for creativity. The answer is yes. In the East as well as in the West the potentiality of human beings for creativity has been accepted. The second question relates to the source of this creativity in a human being. It is well known that a human being is a complex entity consisting of the body, the senses, the mind, and the Self, to mention only a few factors which are important from the epistemological point of view. The mind as well as the senses are located in the body; and both of them function as instruments of cognition being inspired by consciousness which is at the back of both the mind and the senses. Consciousness, which is otherwise called the pure Self, is the revealing principle. It reveals on its own and also through the medium of the mind and the senses. It is not necessary here to go into the question of the

metaphysical status and the epistemological role of consciousness. Evaluating the importance of consciousness in the phenomenology of knowledge, Edmund Husserl characterizes it as the "principle of principles"; and a text of the Upaniṣad speaks of it as the "light of lights". In the present context it is the role of the mind that deserves special consideration. The manifold cogitations of the mind, sometimes known as the mental episodes, can be classified into three groups — cognitive, emotive, and conative; and these three dimensions of human life are the characteristics of the mind. The emergence of the mind constitutes an important stage in the evolutionary process. It is the mind that helps a human being to have indeterminate cognition, a vague, confused awareness of a thing. Also, it is the mind that gives us determinate knowledge of a thing. What we call memory is also the work of the mind. Moreover, it is required for the sense of "I" that a person develops from time to time. Depending upon the function it does, it is variously called *manas, buddhi, citta*, and *ahaṅkāra* in Indian epistemology and psychology. The power of reasoning which distinguishes humans from other animals is a characteristic of the mind.

It was Protagoras, the Sophist, who held the view that man is the measure of all things. Socrates examined this view and rejected it.[1] In spite of Socrates' criticism, it must be admitted that the Protagorean thesis that the human being is the measure of all things conveys an important truth. This statement may be interpreted in more than one way. According to one interpretation, it means that a human being who is rational is the measure or standard of everything, because s/he is capable of reflection and analysis, which are necessary to discriminate between truth and falsity, good and bad, right and wrong. Only humans are endowed with this power of discrimination and judgement, and so they are the measure of all things. This interpretation which emphasizes the preeminence of humans among all living beings has been highlighted in the Indian tradition. In one of the Upaniṣads there is an account of the creation of the world from ether (*ākāśa*) through air, fire, and other elements, to the human being (*puruṣa*).[2] The Upaniṣad does not give a systematic and detailed account of the creation of the world. Nor should we expect such an account from it knowing that its aim is something different. Its aim is to help the human being discover his/her Self, through inquiry, through investigation, taking advantage of scriptural teaching; and the human being has the marvellous capacity for inquiry through reasoning. Śaṅkara in his commentary on this text brings out the importance of humans in the cosmic scheme of things. The Upaniṣad tells us that first of all the five elements — ether, air, fire, water, and earth — came into existence one after another, and then plants and other things which serve as

food came into being; and from food, humans came into existence. Why is it, one may ask, that, even though all creatures — reptiles, birds, and animals — without exception are products of food, the human being alone is mentioned by the Upaniṣad? Śaṅkara's answer is that the human being alone is mentioned by the Upaniṣad because the human being alone is preeminent among all beings.[3] According to Śaṅkara, the preeminence of human beings is due to their capacity for the pursuit of knowledge and performance of action conducive to their well-being. The twofold capacity of the human being which Śaṅkara speaks of has also been emphasized in the Western tradition. For example, T.H. Green, who has been greatly influenced by Kant, says that the human being is in possession of "reason" and "will". By "reason" he means the capacity for conceiving a certain ideal, some state of perfection to be attained by action; and by "will" he means the capacity to action as determined by the ideal, the state of perfection, that has been conceived on the basis of reasoning.[4] What Śaṅkara calls the competence for "knowledge" and for 'action" (*jñāna-karma-adhikāraḥ*), which a human being possesses, is the same as the competence for "reason" and "will" mentioned by Green

The twofold competence mentioned above reveals two dimensions of a human being, the cognitive and conative. While the former shows a human being as an epistemological subject, the latter, as an agent of action. Though the two dimensions are interrelated, it will be helpful to study a human being initially as an agent of action. While Descartes commences his study of the human being as an epistemological subject, Heidegger begins his study of Dasein as an agent of action, as a being-in-the-world engaged in various kinds of activities. The contrast here is between the theoretical world and the practical world. According to Heidegger, we have to start with the practical world, the world which we inhabit first before philosophizing or engaging in scientific investigation. To start with, a human being deals with objects, not as objects of perception, but as objects which are either "ready-to-hand" or "unready-to-hand", which are either "near" or "distant". An object is "near" when it is available for use when needed; and it is "distant" when it is unavailable for use even though it is spatially proximate. All human activity is worldly, is creative. A human being functions as a being-in-the-world, as a being-with-others. The practical world of a human being, the net work of relations which determine a human being, helps us to understand the notion of creativity.

The word "creativity" must be understood in a comprehensive sense to include all kinds of voluntary activities which a human being performs — cooking food,

producing an object, greeting someone, talking to somebody, helping someone in distress, and so on. In short, the activities which a person performs may be through body, through word, through mind. Instead of trying to understand a human being in isolation from the practical world, in isolation from the net work of relations which determine the status and role of a person, we must view him or view her in the context of the practical world. Both reason and will play their part in the practical activities of a human being.

III

From the concept of "creativity" and the notion of "practical world", I go back once again to the understanding of human nature. One must take into consideration not only the actuality, but also the potentiality of a thing in determining its nature. The term "nature" in Greek and Latin means not only what a thing is, but also what it is expected to be when its growth or development is fully completed. According to Aristotle, "what a thing is when its growth is completed, that is what we call its nature."[5] What a human being actually is at a given time will not be the true index of her nature. On the contrary, the full development she is capable of will reveal her nature. What is characteristic of the human being, what may be called the "species character", is manifested in the "life activity" in which she is engaged in pursuit of values, making use of both reason and will. Social and political theories are based on, and presuppose a certain theory of human nature. They can be accepted only if they fulfill two basic requirements. First, the theory of human nature on which they are based must be sound. Secondly, the various aspects of the socio-political theory must form a consistent whole: that is to say, there must be both cogency and consistency. As one reads it, one must be able to see that the theory is developed step by step as if there is a gradual unfoldment of the various steps from the first and also that the different aspects of the theory are consistent with one another. A socio-political theory which is based on a defective theory of human nature cannot be sound, whatever may be the logical rigour with which it is developed. The political philosophy of Hobbes is a classic example of a theory which, whatever may be its logic, is to be rejected because it is based on a theory of human nature which lacks both depth and insight. We have learnt from Kant that the problems of political philosophy must be viewed from the normative point of view. Both the human being and the state must be examined from the standpoint of what they *ought to do*. Kant considers Rousseau's distinction between the "natural man" and the "conventional man" useful

and understands the former as an ideal; and the "social contract" too as dealt with by Rousscan is not, according to Kant, an historical occurrence, but an idea of reason. One must, therefore, view both the human being and the state teleologically and not historically in order to find out the real or essential aspect in them. Kant explains his approach to the study of the human being as follows:

> I shall set forth the method by which we must study man — man not only in the varying form in which the accidental circumstances have moulded him, in the distorted form in which even philosophers have almost misconstrued him, but what is enduring in human nature, and the proper place of man in creation.[6]

Kant not only has faith in the ideal shown by reason, but is also convinced that what is valid in theory as shown by reason is also valid in practice.

Keeping in the background Greek philosophy, the idealist tradition which emerged through the critical philosophy of Kant which had a tremendous impact on the English philosophers like T.H. Green, and the Indian philosophical tradition of which Mahatma Gandhi is the best spokesman, we can explain the theory ot human nature and the relation between the individual and society as a preliminary to our understanding of the problem of peace.

We have to start with the basic proposition that a human being is a rational agent who is capable of deliberate action. Human experience is what it is because of thinking or rational activity. It is nothing if it is not thinking experience. The one factor which is worthy of consideration in any deliberate action is the *motive* with which it is done. We have to take note of it for two reasons. It is at once indicative of the end which the rational mind wants to realize and the reason for doing the action which he does as being conducive to that end. We do not have access to the motive as such. We know it only through the activity in which he engages himself.

Secondly, the human being is not only a rational agent, but also a moral agent who has responsibilities both in his/her personal and impersonal relations. A rational action is one which is morally imputable; that is to say, it is an action which can be called good or bad. Further, a deliberate action of a rational-cum-moral agent has its impact on

others in society, whether he or she knows them personally or not. In the words of Gandhi:

> There is not a single virtue which aims at, or is content with, the welfare of the individual alone. Conversely, there is not a single moral offence which does not directly or indirectly affect many others besides the actual offender. Hence, whether an individual is good or not is not merely his own concern, but really the concern of the whole community, nay, of the whole world.[7]

Thirdly, individual personality is the ultimate standard of value. It is no doubt true that an individual is what he is because of society. Society is responsible for the development of our personality. But society cannot take the place of the individual, however useful and necessary it may be. The individual is an end in himself and that, though his life as a social and moral being is involved with that of others constituting society, he is in the ultimate analysis the measure of society.

Fourthly, the personal good of the individual is inseparably connected with the common good. The good of the individual is not what is private to him, but good to him as a member of the community of persons. It is a good for others as well, for they are also rational and moral agents like him.

Fifthly, the commitment of a human being as a rational and moral agent extends to all beings, living as well as non-living, because the well-being of others is indispensable for one's own well-being. Since all beings, living and non-living, are interconnected, we cannot stop with the ideal of human fellowship; on the contrary, we have to think in terms of fellowship with all beings. No individual and no group of men could remain exclusive. Nor could they pursue a course of action which is destructive of the interests of others without jeopardizing their own interests.

IV

There are two ways of dealing with the problem of peace, negative and positive. War is the opposite of peace. The outbreak of war means the absence of peace. This, however, does not mean that the absence of war is the presence of peace. What has been characterized as "cold war" creates conditions in which peace in the true sense of the

term is impossible; for, it provides an opportunity to the state to encroach upon the rights of its citizes in many ways, to prevent them from functioning as rational and moral agents by suppressing or disabling the institutions of civil life which give reality to the capacities of will and reason of human beings. Since the absence of war paves the way for the preservation of peace, we have to pay attention to the problem of war; and this may be characterized as the negative approach to the problem of peace. There are four questions to be answered in this connection. They are: (1) Who is responsible for the occurrence of war? (2) Is there anything which would justify the outbreak of war? (3) Why is it that it takes place? (4) What is the means by which it could be prevented? The answer to the first two questions is simple. The last two questions which are interrelated can be answered only by bringing in the machinery of the state. The origin of war must be attributed to intentional human agency, one or many which exercises power. War is not a natural occurrence like a downpour of rain or volcanic eruption. The destruction of life in war is not accidental. It is the result of human decision which is deliberate and intentional. It is an evil, a great wrong, as it involves a violation, on a large scale, of the individual's right to live, and so it can never be justified from any point of view. Sometimes the reason of self-defence is given in support of war. Though this argument may appear to be convincing when viewed superficially, it has to be rejected in the final analysis. There are two points against this argument. First, the preservation of the integrity of the state for the sake of which a defensive war is waged cannot alter the character of the wrong that results. Secondly, we should answer how the integrity of a state has come to be endangered. It is not due to accident or forces of nature, but it is due intentional human agency. If the present holders of power are not responsible for precipitating such a contingency, then to that extent they are absolved of the guilt, for they are not responsible for the state of things which renders the maintenance of the integrity of the state impossible by other means. Some intentional human agency must be held responsible for the wrong that takes place — if not the present rulers, obviously their predecessors. If it be said that it is difficult to locate the human agency responsible for the wrong that results, that is only an admission of the complicity in that evil which has to be resorted to for preserving the freedom of a state.

To answer the last two questions, we have to look at the organization of the state. It is the imperfect organization of the state that is the root cause of conflicts among nations. It is the function of the state to secure and give fuller reality to rights which individuals come to have as rational and moral agents. It is the duty or the state to organize and enforce the system of rights in society. That is to say, it has to maintain

equality — political, social, economic, and religious — among its citizens in such a way that everyone would be in a position to exercise his right without prejudice to a similar exercise of the same privilege by others. Consider the case of a state in which (1) there is a privileged class, (2) there is an oppressed section of people, and also (3) there is an antagonism of religions confessions. Such a state, it is obvious, does care for the principle of equality among its citizens and is not interested in the enforcement of the system of rights. In other words, it permits reciprocal invasion of rights — the invasion of the rights of one section by another section — in addition to its encroachment on the rights of the people. The presence of these factors which could all be traced to the imperfect organization of the state tends to jeopardize the harmony among the people within and without. so long as the states are imperfectly organized, so long as they do not fulfil the idea of a state, there is bound to be civil war as well as war inter-state war. The remedy prevent this evil lies in the proper organization of the state.

If the organization of the state from within is necessary in order to prevent the evil of exploitation and all that it leads to in its turn endangering peace among the nations, how is that to be implemented? This is a vital question of the mechanics of government. According to Gandhi, the enforcement of the system of rights and obligations can be achieved through decentralization of both authority and power. Society is federal in structure consisting of a net-work of associations. It is by as wide a distribution of power and authority as possible that individuals could be made to feel the responsibility in the exercise of power and authority. In the words of Gandhi:

> The end to be sought is human happiness combined with full mental and moral growth. I use the adjective "moral" as synonymous with spiritual. This end can be achieved under decentralization. Centralization as a system is inconsistent with non-violent structure of society.[8]

According to Gandhi, decentralization of political authority and power and also of the means of production coupled with the ideal of trusteeship will ensure the proper organization of the state.

V

Political philosophy is concerned with two basic problems. The first is about the proper relation between the individual and the state; and the second is about the method by which such a relation can be realized. Extending the scope of these two problems to the interstate relations, we may say that political philosophy has also to explain the proper relation between nation states and the method by which such a relation can be realized. Two entities are involved here — the individual and the state. The action of both the individual and the state should be viewed from the normative and the ethical points of view. What holds good for the individual holds good for the state. Following Plato we can say that the state is the individual writ large and that the individual is the state writ small. The individual is a moral person; and the state, too, as maintained by Kant, is a moral person. By virtue of the moral will in him, which is unique and which is the source of moral action, man is aware of his "obligation". To act according to the moral will which is outside the sphere of causal sequence is to be free. Kant speaks in terms of the maxims or prescriptions of the moral will. A maxim is a man's subjective idea of what he ought to do, and a law is the objective requirement of practical reason. The imperative of the moral will is as much binding on the state as it is on the individual. There cannot and should not be, according to Kant, two standards of morality — one standard for the individual and another for the state. The individual must act in such a way that what he does will hold good as a universal law. The state must legislate in such a way that its acts are of general validity; then only can it maintain a "legitimate" order in society. Further, the individual must treat everyone as an end, never merely as a means. The state, too, must treat its subjects and other states as ends, never merely as means. This point is of great importance more particularly in the context of interstate relations for promoting as well as for preserving peace. We now take it as an accepted principle that the state must respect the worth of the individual and treat him as an end in himself. But this principle has not been given due recognition in international politics. By subjecting the state to the same moral standards applicable to the individual, Kant repudiates the Machiavellian thesis of the double standard of morality. A state which does not act on the basis of the two moral principles stated above will be discriminatory in its policies, and despotic and belligerent in its functions.

As already stated, there is the need to approach the problem of peace in a positive way. It is impossible to promote and preserve peace without the proper organization of

the state. Since both the individual and the state are moral persons, Kant has worked out a parallelism between them. The three principles on the basis of which the state is constituted are (1) the freedom of each member of society as a human being, (ii) the equality of each member with every other as a subject, and (iii) the autonomy of each member of the state as a citizen.

Kant explains freedom as the opposite of paternalism, equality as the opposite of hereditary rank, and autonomy as the opposite of authoritarianism. His interpretation of freedom, one of the foundational principles of the state, is classic. He says:

> No one may force anyone to be happy according to his manner of imagining the well-being of other men; instead, everyone may seek his happiness in the way that seems good to him so long as he does not infringe on the freedom of others to pursue a similar purpose, when such freedom may coexist with the freedom of every other man according to a possible and general law.[9]

The principle of equality insists that the laws of the state apply to all its members. Kant explains this principle as follows: "Every member of the commonwealth must be able to reach every level of status in the commonwealth which can belong to a subject and which (he can achieve) by his talent, his industry or his good fortune. No subject may stand in his way as a result of hereditary privilege and thus keep him and his descendants down forever. The principle of autonomy guarantees the right of a people to govern themselves. The state should function on the basis of the will of the people. Kant argues that "no other will is possible but the will of the entire people because (through this will) all men decide about men and hence everyone decides about himself."[10]

If the state is instituted on the basis of these three principles, it is because the members of a society who constitute the state have three attributes that inseparably belong to them by right, viz., (i) constitutional freedom, (ii) civil equality, and (iii) political independence.

The state has to function only through the system of laws. Kant holds the view that the criterion of law must be arrived at only through reason, and actual laws must be judged in terms of the criterion of law. There are three features which a law has to fulfil. First of all, it is concerned only with the way an action of one person affects another

person. Second, it does not take into consideration the motive with which an act is done. Third, it is concerned only with the form of the act and not with its matter. In short, the state has to maintain a system of rights and obligations through its laws for the realization of the good life which it is the vocation of human society to realize.

Kant makes a valid distinction between the sphere of morality and that of law. Moral duties cannot be enforced by law, for they are duties to act from certain motives, and motives cannot be enforced. But legal obligations which are concerned only with external acts can be enforced. Green conveys this important distinction made by Kant in a sentence justly famous for its brevity and forcefulness: "There is a moral duty in regard to obligations, but there can be no obligation to moral duties."[11] As a liberal in political thinking Kant was opposed to paternal government; and the distinction between morality and law provides him the true ground of objection to paternal government. A state which is constituted on the principle of benevolence and which undertakes to promote morality and happiness in the way in which a head of the family would do is, indeed, the greatest conceivable despotism, for it rests on a misconception of morality, and what it does will be detrimental to the exercise of freedom by the individual. Freedom consists in the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties; and it is the business of the state to maintain those external conditions in which the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties shall be possible. Two points emerge clearly from the distinction between morality and law as emphasized by Kant. The first is that law serves a moral end, because it helps to maintain certain conditions in which morality or freedom shall be possible. Secondly, the relation of law to morality is only ancillary and not creative.

Kant's philosophy, existentially speaking, revolves around "peace" and not around "cognition". His way of thinking is closely related to his basic political outlook. Peace and freedom which occupied the centre of his hopes and fears were the themes to which he returned again and again. He has made significant contribution to the theory of international relation. In spite of the fact that international politics is much more complicated than what it was to centuries ago, Kant's insight into the problem is no less relevant today than in his own times. He goes deep into the problem of war among nation states, and his solution thereto is not of a temporary character. He tells us what we ought to do. The practical reason, Kant says, gives us the imperative, "There shall be no war." So there ought to be no war among states. If Kant entertains this view as a visionary without any appreciation of politics as a struggle, one may be justified in

dismissing Kant as naive and simple-minded in his hope, and one may share Crane Brinton's view that Kant's vision of perpetual peace is a "pathetic relic of the Enlightenment."[12] The truth is that Kant is not a visionary. His proposal for eternal peace is not a pious wish. Kant draws his conclusion taking his stand on the firm basis of a theory which deserves to be studied in the context of the current theories of international politics on this problem.

Excluding Kan's theory which may be called normative-ethical, we can identify at least four theories of international politics on the problem of interstate relations. They are: (i) the theory of despair, (ii) the theory of complacency, (iii) the theory of scientism, and (iv) the theory of realism. It must be admitted that Kant is quite familiar with the basic standpoint of each one of these theories, whatever be the label that we give them today; and he takes a stand quite different from them, as he is dissatisfied with all of them.

The first theory holds the view that conflict among states is inevitable, that there is no way of overcoming the conflict by means of ethical and other considerations, and that national interests alone will finally count. The situation, therefore, is one of despair. According to Kant, there is nothing in the nature of the state which drives us to the conclusion that conflict between two states is inevitable. The theory of complacency maintains that the solution to the problem of war consists in removing "bad men" from the administration of each state and in establishing a world government. We know that the problem of eliminating "bad men" from the helm of affairs is not an easy one. Who is to do this job, is the question here. Kant argues that a world state would lead to despotism and that it would be the cause of a greater evil than the wars it is designed to remove. It would be a case where the remedy proves worse than the disease. The theory of scientism looks at the problem as one of strategy or technique, as one of balance of power or equilibrium of forces. This theory which is a modern version of Machiavellism is not new to Kant. Kant is fully aware that the equilibrium attained through the balance of powers would be precarious. He characterizes it as "a pure illusion, like Swift's story of the house which the builder had constructed in such perfect harmony with all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed as soon as a sparrow alighted on it." The theory of realism which is not entirely different from the previous one has received emphasis in the hands of historical sociologists. It is said that due attention must be paid to the historical situation and that the approach must be empirical. The empirically based historical sociologist asks us to consider the following factors: (1) the area of diplomatic relations,

(2) the disposition of power in the area, (3) the method of warfare available to the statesman, (4) the problem of frontiers, (5) the bearing of domestic policy on the statesmen. and (6) the way in which statesmen understand peace, war, and interstate relations. The list of factors enumerated is no doubt impressive. What solution it offers to the problem of war, is not clear.

It should not be thought that Kant has not paid attention to the importance of realism, the problem of diplomacy and the signing of treaties, the issues involved during war as well as before and after war, and so on. in interstate relations. Kant has formulated six preliminary articles, three definitive articles, and two supplements for perpetual peace, all of which testify to the realistic outlook of Kant coupled with the normative approach to the problem.

The range of the preliminary articles is wide, covering treaties, transfer of states, standing armies, national debts, non-interference, and the code of conduct during war. The following are the six preliminary articles:

1. No treaty of peace shall be held to be such, which is made with the secret reservation of the material for a future war.
2. No state having an independent existence, whether it be small or great, may be acquired by another state through inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.
3. Standing armies shall gradually disappear.
4. No debts shall be contracted in connection with the foreign affairs of the tate.
5. No state shall interfere by force in the constitution and government of another state.
6. No state at war with another shall permit such acts of warfare as must make mutual confidence impossible in time of future peace: such as the employment of assassins, of prisoners, the violation of articles of surrender, the instigation of treason in the state against which it is making war, etc.

The definitive articles which are *normative* refer to the institution of republican states, the formation of a federation of states and of world citizenship. The first definitive article says: "The civil constitution in each state should be republican." The

second definitive article says: "The law of nations should be based upon a *federation* of free states." The third definitive article says: "The cosmopolitan or world law shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.

Of the two supplements, the first one considers the work of Nature tending towards peace, and the second one which is called the secret article for perpetual peace refers to the freedom of speech particularly for philosophers. Explaining the work of Nature as a guarantor of peace, Kant says:

> No one less than the great artist nature (*natura daedala rerum*) offers such a guarantee. Nature's mechanical course evidently reveals such a teleology: to produce harmony from the very disharmony of men even against their will. If this teleology and the laws that effect it are believed to be like an unknown cause compelling us, it is called *fate*. But if it is considered in the light of its usefulness for the evolution of the world, it will be called *providence* — a cause which, responding to a deep wisdom, is directed towards a higher goal, the objective final end [*Endzweck*] of mankind which predetermines this evolution.[13]

In the course of the elucidation on this point, Kant observes:

> If I say of nature: she wants this or that to take place, it does not mean that she imposes a *duty* to do it — for that only the non-compulsory practical reason can do — but it means that nature itself does it, whether we want it or not (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trabunt*).[14]

The second supplement says:

> A secret article in negotiations pertaining to *public* law is a contradiction objectively, i.e., as regards its substance or content; subjectively, however, i.e., as regards the quality of the person which formulates the article, secrecy may occur when such a person hesitates to declare himself publicly as the author thereof.[15]

Let us consider the step involved in Kant's theory which lead him to think in terms of eternal peace among nations, which is no doubt an ideal. *First*, politics is a purposive activity which involves moral questions, and this is true of both national and international politics. *Secondly*, the fulfilment of man's vocation as a moral being as

required by reason is possible only in a civil state. Since a republic state instituted on the basis of freedom, equality, and independence of its members is conducive to the leading of moral life and the development of capacities by the people, it is a necessary step to achieve the goal. And every effort must be taken to approximate to this ideal of a perfect state. *Thirdly*, it is not possible to think in terms of isolated states, each unit functioning without any concern for another. The imperative, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only," is comprehensive enough to cover all communities and all nation states. Peaceful external relation is necessary to institute a perfect civic constitution. It means that peace among nations is necessary for realizing the common good, for leading the moral life. *Fourthly*, the two issues, viz., the state functioning according to its principle, and peaceful external relations, are related in such a way that the one requires the other (*vide* Kant's first definitive article for eternal peace and his seventh thesis for *A Universal History*). *Fifthly*, it is necessary to think in terms of world citizenship and a society of states functioning on the basis of the principle of equality among them (*vide* the third definitive article for eternal peace and fifth thesis for *A Universal History*). Every state must act according to maxims that could be universally followed without conflict. *Sixthly*, it is necessary to form a voluntary federation among states which would be dissoluble at any time.[16] *Finally*, "a long internal working of each political body toward the education of its citizens is required" in order to achieve the goal.[17]

Kant is realistic enough to admit that eternal peace is an ideal. But men and nations must work towards the realization of the ideal. Kant declares that the political principles which aim at the ideal and which enjoin the formation of a union among the states as may promote a continuous approximation to a perpetual peace are not impracticable.[18]

According to Kant, moral behaviour is possible. Peace among states, too, is possible. There is a moral duty only with regard to what is possible. Kant says:

> . . . the question no longer is as to whether perpetual peace is a real thing or not a real thing, or as to whether we may not be deceiving ourselves when we adopt the former alternative, but we must act on the supposition of its being real.[19]

It is not out of naivety and simple-mindedness that Kant hopes for eternal peace. Progress may remain *interrupted*, but never *broken off*. It is his belief in the inevitability of progress that makes him seriously think of eternal peace. Practical reason must triumph in the end.[20]

We may now ask the question whether Kant's theory has been shown by the critics to be false, or inadequate, or outmoded. The answer, I venture to think, is in the negative. Is there any theory of international politics which can be a suitable alternative to Kant's theory? We are, it seems to me, yet to find one. It is certain that any theory of international politics to be acceptable must be grounded on the normative-ethical aspect emphasized by Kant.

Kant was clear-sighted and also far-sighted. He saw the problems of politics as they were, and told us what we should do as moral beings. This is his formula: "First, think yourself; second, think is every other person's place; and third, always think in agreement with yourself."[21] The problem here is not just one of mere thinking; it is ultimately one of commitment as well.

Before we conclude, reference may be made first of all to the views of two existentialist philosophers, Sartre and Jaspers, and then to the views of the well-known educationist-statesman, Dr Henry Kissinger, to show how contemporary thinking on the problem of the freedom and responsibility of the individual and the unity of mankind is grounded on the ethico-political thinking of Kant.

Explaining the freedom of man, Sartre argues that man is responsible for everything he does, and that he shoulders a responsibility for the entire mankind in the exercise of his freedom.[22] Here one can notice the relevance and application of Kant's categorical imperative. According to Sartre, there is a universal human condition, and every concrete situation, every configuration, however individual it may be, has a universal value.[23] Whatever an individual does in a given situation as a result of the exercise of his freedom must be viewed and evaluated not only from the individual point of view but from the standpoint of the entire mankind as well.

Jaspers maintains that absolute politics has failed and that world-peace can be achieved only if politics is guided by the *supra-political* element manifested in the ethical

idea and in sacrifice. Speaking of the ethical idea he says that it becomes "moral" when it exhausts itself in commands and prohibitions. He adds:

> There is truth left in this morality, but only as an element of something more inclusive. As the substance of Kant's categorical imperative it is indeed inescapable and absolutely valid; but its concrete embodiment in a particular situation is incalculable. The form of the absolute is no help in deducing the content.[24]

It is a truism to say that the world problem is the individual problem. Change at the level of society will be possible only if there is change at the level of the individual. Jaspers remarks:

> What happens on a large scale is but a symptom of what is done in the privacy of many lives. The man who cannot live in peace with his neighbour, the mischief-marker or secret ill-wisher or slanderer or liar, the adulterer or undutiful son or negligent parent or law-breaker — by his conduct, which even behind locked-doors is never wholly private — keeps peace from the world. He does, in miniature, what on a larger scale makes mankind destroy itself. Nothing that man is and does is quite without political significance.[25]

The virtue of sacrifice is necessary on the part of the individual — as members of a family, as neighbours in a locality, as residents in a village or a town, as workers in a functional group, as citizens of a state, and as members of the world community. Stressing the importance of sacrifice, Jaspers writes:

> . . . sacrifice is the inescapable foundation of true humanity . . . Without sacrifice we are not truly human. The great renunciations are not only necessary to save a free world but also to bring man back from a life lost — in an empty consumer's existence after a few hours of unrelished work. Sacrifice would not only make peace possible; it would fulfil it . . . A lasting peace could only be achieved if the greatness, the strength, and the valour of the sacrifice hitherto shown by the soldier would now materialize in no lesser form.[26]

In a lecture delivered under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs, Dr Henry Kissinger observed:

> The political lesson of our age is that the national interest can no longer be defined or attained in isolation from the global interest. And the moral challenge of our age is to free ourselves from the narrow perception of the nation state and to shape a conception of global community.[27]

These three ideas, viz., the theory of responsibility for the entire mankind stressed by Sartre, the guidance of supra-political element emphasized by Jaspers, and the conception of global community mentioned by Kissinger, will make us think and rethink of Kant as a great political philosopher.

NOTES

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[1] See Plato's *Theaetetus*. Francis M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (New York : The Liberal Arts Press, 1957), 177C-179C, p. 89.

[2] See *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.1.

[3] See his commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.1.1.

[4] T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (Longmans Green & Co., 1955), A. § 7.

[5] See *Politics*, 1.1.

[6] Quoted by Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant and Goethe*, Princeton, 1945, p. 21.

[7] See N. K. Bose, *Selections from Gandhi* (Ahmedabad : Navjivan Publishing House, First edn., 1948), p. 27.

[8] *The Harijan*, January 18, 1942.

[9] See Carl J. Friedrich, *The Philosophy of Kant — Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings*, New York, 1949, p. 416.

[10] Ibid., p. 420.

[11] T.H. Green, *op. cit.*, A. § 10.

[12] Crane Borinton, *A. Decade of Revolution*, 1789 - 1799, New York, 1934, p. 216.

[13] Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

[14] Ibid., p. 452.

[15] Ibid., p. 455.

[16] Kant, *The Philosophy of Law*, tr. by W. Hastie, Edinburgh, 1887, p. 225.

[17] Kant, *On History*, ed. L.W. Beck (Library of Liberal Arts, 1963), p. 21.

[18] Kant, *The Philosophy of Law*, p. 224.

[19] Ibid., p. 230.

[20] Hans Reiss. *Kant's Political Writings*, Cambridge, 1970, p. 88.

[21] See Karl Jaspers, *The Future of Mankind*, tr. Chicago, *1961, p. 248.*

[22] Sartre. *Existentialism and Human Emotions*, tr. New York, 1947, p. 23.


[23] Ibid., p. 45.

[24] Karl Jaspers, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[25] Ibid., p. 25.

[26] Ibid., pp. 55-6.

[27] His address as Secretary of State, USA, in Indian Council of World Affaris, New Delhi on October 28, 1974, published by USIS, New Delhi.



CREATIVITY VERSUS DOGMATISM

Hans Nicklas

Four items I wish to interrelate: Violence-Peace and Dogmatism-Creativity.

There are various ways of explaining the reasons for violence. I wish to point out only two here:

- violence as the natural heritage of mankind, that is to say violence as a native part of humans.

This idea of man as wolf goes back to antiquity. In a comment of Plautus we find the sentence: "homo homini lupus." Thomas Hobbes uses this sentence to epitomize this theory of state.

Also modern theories like Freud's psychoanalysis and Konrad Lorenz's ethnological research see this kind of natural bias towards violence in humans. In Freud's theory it is the transformed death-drive, in Lorenz's theory it is the aggression instinct which leads to human violence.

I wish to call this type of theory: H-type theory- because Hobbes is the most influential and important representative in this group of thinkers.

The second group of theorists see the origin of violence in society, in social structures. According to this theory, the violence exerted by the individual is a reflex of violent structures of society. A violent society produces violent people. This kind of theory also goes back to antiquity. In modern times the name of Jean-Jacques Rousseau stands for this theory: for him man was originally good, only culture makes him bad. This type of theory I wish to call R-type remembering Rousseau.

One of these R-type theories is, for example, the frustration/aggression-hypothesis of Dollart and others. The basic idea of this theory is that when humans are kept from fulfilling their wishes and from satisfying their drives they will react aggressively. Also various theories of learning belong to this group of R-type theories. They represent violence as an acquired quality either learnt by operative conditioning or imitation. Finally , we have neomarxist theories in this group, like that by Herbert Marcus. The basic pattern of this kind of theory is the idea that the suppression of people through violent social structures produces violence. A society without violence can - within these theories - only be achieved through the abolition of suppressive structures. I wish to quote Sartre from his preface to Frantz Vanon's book "Les damnés de la terre." Sartre is convinced that people have to be killed in the struggle for freedom and he says: "To kill a European is to hit two birds with one stone: you get rid of one suppression and one suppressed at one time. What remains is one man dead and one man free."

From these two groups of theory, different strategies for reducing violence result.

From the H-type theories follows the necessity to tame the human animal, to put him into the cage of a strong state - as Hobbes proposed. This, however, will do only for crating peace within one state. Violence between two or more states cannot be abolished in this way. To abolish war in this type of theory you need to establish an international legal system which prevents one state from attacking the other by sanctioning such action.

Another way of taming the homo lupus is to civilize him. This--, according to the theory of civilization by Norbert Elias, means to have humans learn to control their affects. *Affect-control,* as Elias put it, is the ability to not immediately satisfy aggressive drives, but to check them. World peace according to Elias could be achieved by world wide progress in the process of civilization.

Starting from R-type theories one will develop different strategies of reducing violence. Here one will ask: how can violence, producing structures in society and in the international system be changed? Such structures would be: capitalist society, imperialism, the unequal distribution of power and wealth in the international system.

I personally tend rather to put priority on H-type theories. It is our task to further the process of civilization. R-type theories, however, do not lose their relevance because the progress of civilization depends, to a large extent, on the social framework.

Social circumstances, during the IIIrd Reich in Germany, were largely responsible for the happening of the Holocaust. National socialism meant to regression, a break in civilization, which made violence possible to an unthinkable exert.

Yet H-type theories have to be modified. Some of these theories suggest that if violence is natural to humans one has to live with it. Within these theories freedom from violence is often an unreachable utopia.

This I do not agree with. That humans use violence to reach their goals is not a consequence of human nature but of the nature of violence. Violence is a universal language, the most universal language, it has a universal semantics. Everyone can use violence. There is nothing one has to learn in order to be violent, there are no learning processes involved. And everyone understands violence, no matter what language is spoken. A further advantage for the person using violence is that violence has its effect immediately, the situation is changed instantly.

All other strategies for achieving ends and for satisfying needs are highly complex. The require communicative skills, the ability to achieve something by negotiating, knowledge about your opponent and so on. Finally they require the postponement of satisfaction.

Such non-violent strategies for solving conflict require learning processes to build the complex skills which make such strategies succeed. I will come back to this later in my argument.

Dogmatism

The term *dogmatism* has been coined in the French speaking world. Montaigne and Pascal use it. From there it went into English and German. In modern use *dogmatism* means the statement of possessing absolute truth. You are dogmatic when you think only you are right. This implies the inability to question your own beliefs, convictions and opinions and the inability to question your own beliefs, convictions and opinions and the inability to permit other opinions and beliefs. And it implies intolerance against skeptics. This leads to dualist view of the world, a manichean vision: on the one side you have the true believers, on the other you have the unbelieving. Thinking in black and white is characteristic of dogmatism.

Hegel defined dogmatism: "Something which is conditioned by its other is raised to be absolute." (Hegel 1965, p 72) This means that only one aspect of life or only one aspect of the world is put on top of everything else. That is why a dogmatic will not endure skepticism or doubt.

A late Latin proverb says: *timeo lectorum unios* - be afraid of the one who only reads one book. The dogmatic is the one who read only one book, who knows only on book which contains the truth.

For people, from Middle Europe, dogmatism is closely linked to Christian dogmatism. Christian dogmatism was the enemy of enlightenment, of the French Revolution. Enlightenment hoped

that rationality would destroy superstition and dogmatism, but this hope was not fulfilled.

Religious dogmatism seems to be something specifically occidentals Oriental religions like Buddhism or Confucianism have almost not dogmatism.

Old Islam, also, did with very few rules for ritual praxis, and so did early Christianity. Yet the more a religion becomes a priest-religion, the more the priest or teacher becomes the carrier of a religion, the more dogmatic differentiations in practical and theoretical terms will be developed. (Weber 1956, 363)

It is characteristic of the twentieth century that political dogmatism comes to religious dogmatism. Political ideologies harden into dogmatic systems - one just has to think of Soviet communism, although Marx was categorically against any dogmatic inflexibility of his theory. In a letter he writes: "I do not say: this is the truth, kneel down."

Dogmatic attitudes increase conflicts and can lead to war. Remember the crusades, the thirty-years war and the holy was in the first generation of Islam. Part of the motivation in these wars were, of course, political and economic reasons, but the cause for the fierceness of these wards was that people fought for a dogma.

One can differentiate between conflicts which are over divisible goods and those which are over indivisible values. Indivisible values are honour, dogma and truth. When you fight for goods,

you can reach compromise by dividing the goods. You cannot do that when you fight for truth.

There is little research into dogmatism. I wish to quote two important works and speak about them: "The Authoritarian Personality" by Adorno and his collaborators and The Open and the Closed Mind" by Milton Rokeach.

In the centre of Adorno's research was the question: Which kind of character would make the fascism of the early twentieth century possible in terms of social behaviour? Adorno could prove, on an empirical basis, that a specific character, the "authoritarian character" formed the mass basis for the initiation and success of the fascist movement. The specific qualities of the character are:

- authoritarian subordination
- aggressive behaviour towards non-conformists
- fighting off imagination.
- stereotypical world view.
- dogmatism

The listing of these qualities shows the central importance of dogmatism for this character. Dogmatism requires subordination under authority. Aggression is directed against non-conformists, unbelievers and heretics. Imagination has to be fought off because it threatens to de-stabilize the dogmatic closedness of the system. The stereotypical world view finally is the general characteristic of dogmatic system.

This, in its turn, is only possible on the basis of the ability to recognize the relativity of one's own subjective truth.

Now, I wish to attempt and epistemological legitimization of tolerance. The basis of my argument is that the possibility of error is part of human nature. Nobody can say that he is free from the risk of being wrong. If everyone can be wrong, no believer, in specific idea, opinion, or creed, can declare his own belief to be absolutely right unless that person pretends not to be human. Therefore, one has to remain open for other ideas. Therefore, the recognition of the fallibility of humans is a proof of the necessity of tolerance.

The word God - if there is God - would not be fallible. But the word God is given only in human language. Therefore, we cannot insist on the infallibility of the word God: it is never given in its pure form.

Rokeach considers the authoritarian character as an example of the closed mind. Man interprets the world and acts in it on the basis of a cognitive system of orientation, which consists of opinions, norms and values. This system contains subjective ideas about truth which serves as bases for perception and action. This orientation system is dichotomically organized in beliefs and disbelieves. It provides the possibility to distinguish between good evil, and between friend and enemy.

On the basis of this belief-disbelief system, man can say, "I agree with these aims, I can identify with this set of beliefs, these people

are my friends". On the other hand, one can say: "I disagree with these goals, this opinion I cannot share, these people are may enemies"

The important thing now is the question if this belief-disbelief-system is open or closed. "Closed" means that people with this cognitive system are unable to make new experiences, to question their own belief-disbelief-system and to redefine it. The closed system functions as a shield which protects against all ideas and information which could endanger the cognitive consistency of one's own world view. Rokeach writes: "Indeed, we suggest that, in the extreme, the closed system is nothing more than the total network of psychoanalytic defense mechanisms organized together to form a cognitive system and designed to shield a vulnerable mind." (Rokeach 1960, 70)

People with a closed cognitive orientation system are not able to be tolerant. Tolerance requires acceptance of the other.

Creativity

If dogmatism presents a closed system of thought, it is now necessary to show the characteristics of an open system. Dogmatism is based on a static understanding of truth. Truth is, for dogmatism, the given, the unchangeable. Hegel describes this understanding of truth in this way "Dogmatic thinking and the study of philosophy is nothing else but the opinion that truth consists of one sentence with is an unchanging result of known immediately. (Hegel 1964, 39) On the contrary one will have to say, that "truth is not a coined penny which can be given out or taken

in." (Hegel 1964, 38) And then follows the famous and shocking sentence: "Truth is the dionysian delirium of which no part is not inebriated." (Hegel 1964, 44f). Hegel theory means that truth exists only in the fluidity of thought. It is the creative provess of thinking which signifies truth. This creative moment of thinking prevents truth from hardening into falsehood.

Hegel does not yet use the term "creativity." It was not commonly used in his time. Only in the fifties of this century creativity became noted by psychological and sociological research. Mainly Guilford initiated intensive research into the phenomenon of creativity. He defines creativity as the ability of divergent thinking. This thinking is characterized by flexibility and the readiness for new ideas. Its opposite, convergent thinking, only repeats the given and known

One could characterize creative thinking in this way:

- ready for new information
- flexible
- intellectually curious
- able to articulate problems
- able to combine information in many ways

This list shows that creativity is the opposite of dogmatism.

Now, I wish to continue the idea I have sketched in h beginning. I said that if you follow H-type theories on violence peace strategies

will have to consist in an increase of control over effect. I said that Elias conceived in this the sense of the process of civilization, "To be civilized" is no value judgment in Elias' terminology. It is the ability of people to postpone satisfaction, to tame ones drives. "Uncivilized" is someone who has to immediately satisfy his drives.

The process of civilization is collective learning process. However, it is not a kind of learning where you have teachers and students but it is a kind of learning where people learn from reality. The closeness and density of people's relationships force humans to exercise the control of effects. The more people are relying on each other, the more they have to design their behaviour around each other's needs and desires. So, the individual is forces to regulate his behaviour in a more differentiated fashion. This means that violence is more and more reduced in the relationships between people and replaced by differentiated strategies of negotiation. This development which has a certain necessity is, of course, always threatened by regression.

The condition for continuation of the process of civilization is the further increase of interrelationships, the even closer knit network between people. This leads to an increasing interdependence of people, says Elias, and leads to the recognition of people that they are mutually dependent.

There is no doubt that the mutual dependence of people grows. The increasing world wide exchange of people, goods and information, the globalizing of economic relations, of traffic

connections and news exchange lead closer to the realization of the concept of One World. Already Immanuel Kant pointed in this aspect: because the earth is a sphere nature has set borders for the peoples. It is, therefore, inevitable that peoples have to live together in one world. Elias concludes from looking at the history of mankind that the path to world peace leads through a lot of fights and wars. European states like France, Germany, England and Spain fought long and bitter wars for centuries until after the Second World War an era of peace began. This peace in Europe has one precursor: the Nordic states had fought for centuries until there peaceful era began more than one hundred years ago. But do people need the, "teacher war" to realize that there is no alternative to peace?

Once more creativity offers a way to a new solution. The new solution to be found here is a way to peace which leads not through war. A solution which does not make it necessary for peoples to fight to utter exhaustion to be ready for peace.

Dogmatism, Creativity, Peace


I wish, now, to related dogmatism, creativity and peace. Nowadays there are two kinds of identity people are ready to fight and kill for: these are ethnic and religious identities. Many of the conflicts and wars after the end of the east-west conflict prove this. Surely, most of these conflicts have also economic aspects. But if they were only conflicts over divisible goods, compromises could be found. The bitterness of these wars points towards ideological elements. Difference between ethnicities and religions are dogmatized. Not the economic resources of a nation are focused on but the

"honour" of a people or a nation. Honour and truth are not divisible. The have to be fought for.

If dogmatism is hardened thinking, and if hardened thinking makes people fight and die for the truth they have put down as the absolute, then it is necessary to call the forces of creativity in aid against this hardening. Fluidity of thinking is characteristic of creativity. So, creativity is the antidote of dogmatic hardening.

Creativity leads to tolerance. Creativity teaches that things do not have to remain the way they are. It shows us that there are always more than one way of solving a problem. Particularly it shows that no truth is so inevitable that it could not be replaced by a better one. This is the requirement for tolerance.

ساقط من أصل المصدر



EUROPE - AFRICA - ASIA
THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATION BETWEEN WORLD CULTURES

Heinrich Beck

Introduction:

Urgency and disposition of the topic in question

At present mankind in an ever growing extent is experiencing the provoking challenge to enter into intercultural communication; the world is changing towards a comprehensive community of interdependent cultures. Is this the emerging of a "*holistic structure*" of mankind's culture, implying the traditional cultures, so to speak, as "members"? In order to reach this aim, for the sake of our future philosophically inspired, politics could face the task to enact resp. to promote readiness for mutual completion and integration throughout the cultures. This demands a decisive opening and transformation of the spiritual dispositions underlying each different culture.

Thus arises the necessity to develop perspectives of an intercultural thinking which favourize mutual understanding and appreciation between the cultures. Hereby intercultural encounters would grow more "effective" and, in a deep humane sense, enriching. The task basically includes the philosophical effort to ask for the Being of man as an entity disposed for the development of culture, and to elaborate the evolutive sense of man's differentiation into a multitude of different partial cultures.

To such a holistic-philosophical foundation of intercultural thinking all the cultures have to contribute from their point of sight. In doing so, it has to be kept in mind that there is the always threatening danger to take one's own position for absolute (and, correspondingly, to take the position of the others as "relative"). Especially an "European vision" of cultures could bring about such a temptation, because, as the historical experience has proved again and again, the European spirit possesses a peculiar inclination to "conceptually grasp" reality, thus determining it rationally. But this very readiness to reflecting putting-into-distance also reveals the ability to see, to recognize and to appreciate the other *as other* and so to enter into a conscious relationship with him, what lays the basis for a dignous partnership and cooperation.

In this sense we want to ask subsequently *in an European manner* whether the culture of mankind and its differentiation into different cultures displays an *ontological structure* which (at least to a certain degree) can be understood rationally. Hereby we have to pay special attention to the question if and to what extent the model of a "living organism" can serve as "heuristic principle of possible understanding". This would mean that the *cultural Being of mankind is related to the individual geographically-historically distinct partial cultures as a whole is related to its partial members*. Given this, the whole would be the "meaningful aim of the direction of evolution" and, regarding the content it expresses, it would be greater than the "mere summation" of its parts - similar to a corporeal living being or a musical melody[1].

Undertaking such an attempt to understand the cultural Being of mankind out of a "*theory of wholeness*", it has to be considered right from the beginning that the human person (as subject of culture) is essentially different from a biological organism or an acoustic melody, for it isn't totally determined by anything else (even not by the "higher whole"); rather the person provides its own final determination in responsible individual freedom. This should happen, however, as a re-sponse given to holistic-comprehensive "higher demands of meaning" which in the first place have been recognized. I.e.: Mankind's Being would be disposed as a differentiated whole which is not (like it is in a merely biological structure) *given in its complete actualization* right from the start;

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[1] On the "whole transcending the sum of its parts" cf. the fundamental works by *Arnulf Rieber*, Vom Positivismus zum Universalismus. Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung und Kritik des Ganzheitsbegriffs von Othmar Spann [From positivism to universalism. Inquiries into the development and critic evaluation of the concept of wholeness in Othmar Spann], Berlin 1971; *id.*, Die Entwicklung des Ganzheitsbegriffs bei Othmar Spann [The development of the concept of wholeness in Othmar Spann]. In: Zeitschr. für Ganzheitsforschung N.F. 13 (1969) 171-190; *id.*, Der Ganzheitsbegriff bei Thomas v. Aquin [The concept of wholeness in Thomas Aquinas]. Ibid. N.F. 28 (1984) 99-131; also *H. Beck*, art. 'Ganzes/Teil' ('Whole/Part') V. In: Joachim Ritter (Hrsg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 3, Basel-Stuttgart 1974, col. 18-20; *id.*, World peace as dynamic unity of cultural differences. The onto-hermeneutic basis for an understanding of the structure of the culture of mankind - as a perspective for a 'dialectic-triadic' conception of reality. In: H.Beck / G. Schmirber (edd.), Creative peace through encounter of world cultures. Delhi 1996, pp. 19-65. On the aspect of *living* holistic structures differentiating themselves into *opposite* parts *in order to* their mutual *completion* towards a *more complete* unity, cf. esp. *R. Guardini*, Der Gegensatz. Versuch einer Philosophie des Lebendig-Konkreten [On opposite relations. Essay of a philosophy of the living-concrete], Mainz [3]1985. Cf. also on the aspect of the whole signifying the "meaningful aim of the direction of evolution" of the parts in the context of a "humanely creative peace": *H. Christof Günzl*, Fortschritt zum Frieden. Versuch über die geistigen und strukturellen Prämissen des Friedens [Progress towards peace. Essay on the spiritual and structural premissses of peace], Linz 1981.

instead of this, it is *given as a task* of further actualization, according to its meaning. This task has to be carried out through a re-sponsible use of freedom by man (and his partial cultures).

Subsequently, as "relevant partial cultures" primarily the extensive cultural areas *Europe*, *Africa* and *Asia* are to be taken into consideration. These regions, however, all come together in regard of their spiritual effects in *America* and *Latin America*; to that extent even this continent, which can offer a striking example for the problems and also for the possible creativity of a world-wide intercultural encounter, is implied in the topical horizon of our reflection. Through an onto-anthropological understanding of the specific "basic patterns" of the different cultures (and the proportion of their mutual similarity and dis-similarity), the conditions of creative intercultural encounter gain profile.

Our consideration is to be divided into three steps:

In the first place, we look at the essential relationship of each *culture* towards the *nature* which lays the ground for the given culture; then we put the question to what extent culture is affected by its natural conditións. These are different to a certain degree - to add an elucidating example which has to be worked out in our further deliberations - on the European, the African and the Asiatic continent. Hence the hypothesis arises that the regions of culture differ due to their ontical foundation so that they can complete one another by their specific form of humane value.

In a second part, this hypothesis has to be substantiated and differentiated by pointing at corresponding empirical phenomena. Hereby, at first a "contrary" opposition between the cultural traditions of Europe and Afro-Asia comes to appear; then also a "sub-contrary" opposition between the African and the Asiatic area of culture emerges.

Thirdly, we want to ask in ontological reflection whether the cultural differentiation of mankind implies a dynamic-evolutive structure of meaning. As is to be shown, this structure can be understood as a holistic dialectical-triadic movement of Being. For a more concrete, deeper understanding, therefrom direction-giving impulses can result which are important for intercultural action and for promising future developments.

I. The relation culture - nature and the opposition between the spheres of Europe, Africa and Asia

Being the expression and actualization of human spiritual life, every culture depends on physical-material conditions, i.e. basically: on the structure of the surface of the earth and on the climate. In this sense culture, so to speak, means the human mind's re-sponse to the demandings and provoking challenges given by nature.

Apparently, this dialogue between mind and nature partially succeeds; partially, however, it fails. For it is actualized always by the interplay of two components: On the one hand, the full "act-uality" of nature consists in its effects carried out on man - and he has to receive this acting actuality and to take it in. This acutality is "addressing" him and he has to "listen". But then - on the other hand - man can act back on it and give the "re-sponse", by articulating himself in the direction of nature and into nature, forming and determining it, thus actualizing and objectivating his ideas and his will. Inasmuch man really perceives the meaningful structure inherent in nature, i.e. inasmuch he comes to see this structure out of nature itself, to acknowledge and to appreciate it, his culture is a "re-specting", re-sponsible re-sponse; in this case, the self-expression and the re-presentation of human mind in nature through the products of culture "cor-responds" to the expression and the re-presentation of nature in the consciousness of the human mind. Inasmuch, on the contrary, man does *not* live in dialogue and con-sent with nature, but rather dis-regards or even de-spises it, culture which was in accordance with nature is perverted into anti-culture raping nature. However, experience teaches: A human subject which exclusively is monologizing on the long run needs must destroy itself in the basis of its natural existence, unless it achieves new openness through necessary self-critizism. Thus, in most of the cases de facto an ethics open to the environment and hence in accordance with nature which *in a deeper sense* is "cosmocentric" (and therefore in a unlimited way "in accordance with Being itself") mingles with an anthropocentic point of view locked up into itself and alienated from nature; both of them as discrepant components characterize mankind's real history of freedom and of suffering[2]. Thus concrete culture appears to be an

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[2] Cf. *H. Beck*, Freiheit und triadische Struktur des Seins - im Ausgang von Erich Przwara [Freedom and triadic structure of Being - starting from Erich Przwara]. In: Freib. Zeitschr. für Philos. u. Theol. 38 (1991) 385-398 [German version of the Conferencia magistral auf dem Tercer Congreso Mundial de Filosofia Cristiana 1989, in Quito/Ecuador]; *id.*, Kulturphilosophie der Technik. Perspektiven zu Technik - Menschheit - Zukunft [Philosophy of technical culture. Perspectives on technology - mankind - future], Trier 1979 (esp. chap. 2: 'Der positive weltgeschichtliche Sinn der Technik' ['The positive meaning of technics in the

always more or less fitting and adequate re-action of man towards what nature gives him. This might signify: The world is disposed as a meaningful whole, as an "onto-logical" structure comprehending nature and culture; how this structure is actualized more or less in accordance with its meaning depends on the historical dia-logue between the two.

From this point of view, the extensive main areas of the earth, the continents, inasmuch they show significant differences regarding their natural dispositon, correspondingly have brought about different "re-actions" and "responses" of human mind. So the historical spirit gains concreteness by objectivating itself in different types of culture which always imply a closer or more distant accordance with (or even partial alienation from) the disposition and "meaningful structure" of the nature which lays its basis.

Let us at first take a look at the Afro-Asiatic area: It appears to be a giant bulk of mainland, filled with oppositions which have no less gigantic dimensions, and determined by a transcontinental far-reaching climate rich in contrasts; just think of the monsoons and the trade-winds which cover enormous regions of Asia and Africa.

In contrary opposition to this, the continent of Europe shows the face of a delicately differentiated landscape, interrupted and marked by many oceans and middle-sized seas and determined by a moderate climate.

Therefore it might be no surprise if in Africa and Asia reality was understood as unlimited unity of strong contrasts and man there developped an according sensitive, intuitive ability and basic habit. Hereby, in the formation of its surface the continent of Africa shows more in-cluding transitions and less sharp oppositions as does the continent of Asia. Thus Africa invites man to live immediately out of nature, to chose the "vital identification" with nature as his way of life; the continent of Asia, however, rather provokes an "intellectual withdrawal", a way of life shaped by introverted "spiritually keeping distance" (and "con-fronting") against nature by balancing calmness.

In Europe, nevertheless, according to the mentioned geographical-climatic conditions of life, the consciousness primarily inclines to differentiate and to structure reality rationally; there is the typical strife for setting demarcations and for reaching articulating clarity.

The more intuitive disposition of the African and Asiatic consciousness seems to have a more immediate and original relationship to reality; the Euro-

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context of world history'] and chap. 3: 'Die negative Situation der modernen Technik' ['The negative situation of modern technics']).

pean disposition, the stronger inclination to rational differentiation, demands more clearly an objectivation which puts the empirical reality into distance, a re-flection turned outside.

The immediate-intuitive Afro-Asiatic and the abstract-rational European disposition appear to form a contrary opposition, in which, as we will state more exactly later on, between the two modes of African and Asiatic intuitivity again a sub-contrary opposition can be realized. So the differently accentuated structures of consciousness all over the continents could stimulate and complete one another through intercultural encounter; this would promote and enrich the spiritual life of mankind in a "holistic", dynamic-creative sense.

Of course the described dependance of the structure of consciousness from the structure of nature cannot mean a mono-causal deduction of the mental-spiritual from the physical-material. For a point of view which sees the spiritual and cultural merely as an effect and a function of its physical and material conditions of existence would not pay enough attention to the free self-determination of the human mind and the re-sponsibility man has for his very own acts and dispositions of behavior. Therefore in this context one should not so much talk of a (total) "determination", but, more conveniently, of a (primordial) "disposition" of the human consciousness through physical reality. Nature, which lays the basis for us and which surrounds us, to the human mind means a provocation and a task. Developping a cor-responding structure of consciousness and activity, mind tries to as-similate itself to this challenge. Such a ac-cordance and as-similation obviously *to a certain degree* is necessary and inevitable for the sake of survival (and development); on the other hand, it also allows *certain degrees of freedom* for self-determination regarding the way how this is going to take place.

In this "dia-lectics" of necessity and freedom of the human mind in its relationship to its material basis of existence an immanence-transcendence-reference of mind towards matter shows up: On the one hand, human mind is *immersed* into matter and to that extent determined by it and depending on it (this is the specific human feature of human mind, differing basically from a *merely spiritual entitiy*); on the other hand, human mind *transcends* the basis of its material existence and confronts it in a determining way (to this extent human mind represents the specific feature of mind itself, namely an elevation and superiority against matter).

II. Further ontological elucidation of the basic spiritual dispositions of the cultural main areas of the earth

Now let's try to elaborate in a more differentiated way at first the fundamental contrary opposition between the European-occidental and the Afro-Asiatic hemisphere and then, in a second step, the specific divergence between the African and the Asiatic disposition.

II.1. The contrary opposition bewteen the European and the Afro-Asiatic area of culture

In propositional logic, two propositions are said to be contrarily opposing each other if their positions regarding the same matter are at maximum distance so that there can be a medium between the two positions. E.g.: Between the proposition: "Every body is heavy" and the proposition in utmost distance against it: "No body is heavy", by all means mediating transitions are possible, namely: "Some bodies are heavy", and also: "Some bodies are not heavy". (Consequently, propositions contrarily opposing each other cannot both be true at the same time: It is impossible that all bodies are heavy and that at the same time no body is heavy; but they can both be false at the same time: It is thoroughly possible that neither: "All bodies are heavy", nor: "No body is heavy" is right.)

Accordingly, now is to be shown that the general structure of consciousness of the European on the one hand and of the African and the Asiatic on the other hand are disposed in the way of a contrary opposition.

As mentioned above, the European consciousness tends towards rational differentiation and distinction of partial aspects which it ab-stractingly picks out for itself. Thus it gains fixing-objectivating distance against the unity offered by the experience of the flowing concrete connection of life and Being. In this manner, within the *unity of Being* European consciousness separates and lays emphasis on the *plurality of the beings*. Contrary to this, the Afro-Asiatic consciousness has a more original and powerful intuition into the concrete and deep connection of all there is; so it proclaims and stresses within the *plurality of the beings* the coherence and the *unity of Beings which lays the foundation*

for the beings[3]. Now this is to be explained by some examples for the relationship to *nature*, to *man* and to the *divine* which differs according to specific cultural features.

The *relationship to nature* in the occident typically is marked by the intention of the quantifying natural science and technology - expression of a modern development of mind which is to be understood on the historical background of an access to reality which always chiefly has been logical-rational. This access shaped the character of Europe from Greek Antiquity on, during the Middle Ages up to the Modern Times and the present[4]. Science, according to its modern understanding, has to analyze the empirical connection of reality rationally, i.e. the immediately given "unity of experience" has to be resolved into its components ("partial units"); these components have to be picked out, in order to con-struct out of them - according to mathematical possibilities - in a technical-creative way new complex unities which serve the human intentions better than did the structures of reality as given by nature. Therefore in physics, chemistry and biology, as well as in psychology and sociology by analytic-synthetic acts of science and technology the given structures of the beings are divided into their elements and elementary functions, and out of these new structures are build up which correspond to the purposes of man. Such a re-structuring of reality through the disposing mind of man is to be understood as the manifestation of a spiritual habit which is typical to modern times. This habit originated in Europe and spread all over the world in a determining manner[5].

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[3] This typical diverging accentuation in the understanding of reality might be pointed out according to the perspective and terminology of *Martin Heidegger*'s view of Being. The European-occidental interest is settled on the level of the *Ontic*, while the African and, in still another way, the Asiatic orientation apparently is directed more consciously towards the *Ontological*. I.e. the former one turns to the different and multiple empirical data which can be rationally grasped and disposed of; the latter one, on the contrary, lives out of the intuitive experience of the truth of Being which "lays the foundation" and which cannot be rationally handled by man, which rather grasps and de-termines man and in which he has to historically actualize himself as an event and to de-terminate himself further. Cf. on this aspect: *F. G. Furtado* [Bangalore/India], Asian perspectives for the development of intercultural thought [contribution to the 'Primer Congreso Mundial de Filosofia Intercultural' at the Universidad Pontifica de México in March 1995; is going to be printed presumably ibid. 1996].

[4] Cf. *H. Beck*, The relation of European thought to the 'Logos' and 'Logic'. A possible contribution to cultural World integration. In: Lingua ac Communitas 2 (Warsaw-Poznań 1993) 45-55.

[5] Cf. as more detailled explanations: *author*, Kulturphilosophie der Technik [footn. 2]; *id.*, Das ek-insistentielle Verhältnis von Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften in der abendländischen

As an example might serve the European-occidental approach of *the science of medicine* which is different from the Afro-Asiatic tradition in a culturally specific way. If there seems to be, e.g., a disease of the liver or of the heart, *the Western science of medicine* primarily pays attention to the physical organ at question; it tries *by analysis of the causes* to determine the single elements of the defective structure and function, in order to put them into another, more desirable proportion, influencing it by drugs or attacking it chirurgically, i.e. through a rationally planned measure centred on the organ. Given certain circumstances, thus not only the original and "natural" structures and modes of functions can be re-paired; maybe even new systems can be created which increase the performance of the organism regarding additional purposes - which significantly transcends mere "healing". As on the level of such "biotechnology" the material elements of structure and functions of life are to be isolated and to be put into new dispositions, likewise the modern "psycho- and socio-technology" intends to dissolve the complexes of consciousness in human individuals as in social groups psycho-analytically into their elementary functions, in order to create out of them psycho-synthetically new complexes of individual and social experience and action: the "happy" husband or father, the "gayful" consument or partisan and so on. Here also results a playful area of manifold possibilities: ranging from mere therapy, i.e. the re-construction of a "healthy", "normal" mental state, to the psycho-technologically guided evolution of the individual and social consciousness.

It becomes evident: In occidental culture, mind aims at leaving the habit of receptivity and being determined and at con-fronting the contents of experience through active determination and alteration, i.e. through de-stroying the given structures of the physical and mental world until they are broken into their elements, and out of these con-structing new structures which correspond to man's very purposes. By objectivation and domination of the world obviously the own freedom and all-determining power and glorious master-ship of mind is to be experienced and actively more and more actualized; constituting the world as object that can be determined and dominated, man aims at his self-constitution as determining and dominating "subject".

Kultur [The ek-insistential relationship of nature-orientated sciences and spiritual scholaship in occidental culture] In: H. Beck/I. Quiles (edd.), Entwicklung zur Menschlichkeit durch Begegnung westlicher und östlicher Kultur [Development towards humaneness through encounter of Western and Eastern culture]. Akten des IV. interkontinentalen Kolloquiums zur philosophischen In-sistenzanthropologie, 1.-6. Sept. 1986, an der Univ. Bamberg, Frankf./M.-Bern-New York-Paris 1988, pp. 171-186; *E. Schadel*, Neuzeitliche europäische Rationalität und ihr Ausdruck in der Zwölftontechnik [The European rationality in modern times and its expression in the technics of twelve-tone music]. Ibid., pp. 221-240.

In a totally other, contrarily opposed way the spiritual attitude manifests itself in the areae of the *Afro-Asiatic* culture. There it is tending less towards "objectivation" and "domination" but rather towards "participation" and "integration"; man experiences and understands himself as part of a preceeding meaningful structure of reality. Appreciating this structure, he doesn't try so much to dispose of it, but rather to be at its disposal - in order to make it "come" and "happen" ever more.

The contrary-complementary attitude towards nature in occidental culture and Afro-Asiatic tradition reveals itself, as it does in the relationship to nature, maybe even more clearly in the *relationship to man*. This could already be sensed in the example of medical science. The tendency towards laying emphasis on the individual person against the connection of the whole of reality (up to the degeneration into an egocentric individualism), the proclamation of individual "human rights" as foundation of a "constitutional state", the claim of "freedom of conscience" demanding respect for the individual decision of conscience even if it is in contradiction to the collective opinion - all these historical phenomena are typical products of *occidental* culture and, in their specific manner, they have no parallels in other areas of culture. Doubtlessly, they embody basic humane values and represent a necessary contribution of occidental culture to a communicative world integration and peaceful global order. This tendency towards stressing the individual caused social developments which - inasmuch as they imply partially even an exaggeration of the individual and the particular - are ambivalent in their humane value: in economy, "free enterprise" (following the "capitalist principle" of maximalisation of individual profit), in politics the idea of the perople's democratic "self-determination" (which can be understood also as absolute relativity of moral and juridical values), in science the principle of "free investigation" (which, in the competition of specialisations, can seduce to "ideological particularism and individualism"), in art, philosophy and religion "revolutionary" phenomena (which can comprise both creative and destructive aspects)[9]. Just recall the

[8] So the Western empirical-technological science of medicine could appreciate the Afro-Asiatic understanding of wholeness as an exhortation and a direction-giving impulse, encouraging now to do research in regions of experience which usually aren't taken so much notice of. Likewise, on the other hand occidental science of medicine would be able to provide for the African resp. Asiatic holistic science of medicine more perfect technical instruments which serve the precise dealing with physical (and mental) partial phenomena.

[9] For further explanations on these areas of culture cf. *author*, Partnerschaftliche Solidarität als Strukturprinzip der zukünftigen Gesellschaft, konkretisiert an Ehe und Familie, Schule, Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Politik [Solidarity in the spirit of partnership as structuring principle of future society, with concretions in the fields of matrimony, family, school, scholarship, economy and politics]. In: Günter Pöltner (ed.), Personale Freiheit und pluralistische Gesellschaft, Freiburg-Basel-Wien 1981, pp. 23-38; *id.*, Schöpferischer Gegensatz

emancipation movements which accumulate in occidental history, promoting the freedom of the individual in social and religious communities, e.g. the demand of female "equality of right" in relation to male human beings - this postulate, too, was brought up at first in European-occidental culture; now it is spreading also over other areas of culture[10].

In contrary opposition to this certainly legitimate strife for differentiation and accentuation of the individual against the unity of the whole (a strife, however, that can be perverted into pluralistic separatisms) the *Afro-Asiatic* area of culture shows the inclination towards highlighting and preferring the unity of the whole against the peculiar identity of the manifold and different members. This has also (at least seen from the European point of view) brought about partialities, exaggerations, and distortions: especially by taking for absolute the unity of the whole and correspondingly retarding the formation of the individual "consciousness of *me*" resp. totally repressing or subjecting it in favour of a collective "consciousness of *ourselves*", which means an integration into the whole whereby all differences are set aside.

So in the *African* cultural tradition the individual is defined by its very relations to his tribal fellow men. Life is attributed also to the ancestors, inasmuch (and *only* inasmuch!) as they are immediately present to the unity and to the consciousness of the community[11]. Mutatis mutandis, also according to

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zwischen westlicher und östlicher Kultur [Creative contrast between Western and Eastern culture]. In: Zeitschr. für Ganzheitsforschung 26 (1982) 99-106.

[10] Cf. *author*, Decline of culture or setting out toward a more humane world? Philosophical considerations on the present consciousness of crisis. In: Philosophy and the future of humanity 1 (Jakarta/Indonesia 1991, # 1) 75-91; modified version in: Journal of humanities 6 (University of Malawi/Africa, Oct. 1992) 17-33. Inasmuch as holistic thinking is involved in the perception of reality in occidental culture, this happens according to the mode of occidental rationality, i.e. rational analysis and synthesis. Hereby (especially in modern times) intuitive parts of knowledge serve only as pre-ceeding function of direction-giving impulses or hypothetical pre-conceptions for the rational process resp. are meant to be conclusively comprehending interpretations which scarcely make the claim of "scientific" value. Nevertheless, in this regard the geographically distinct cultural traditions of Europe show significant differences; cf *Arnulf Rieber*, Basic types of holistic thinking in the occident. In: H. Beck/G. Schmirber (edd.), Creative peace through encounter of world cultures [footn. 1], pp. 111-144.

[11] Cf. beside the literature mentioned in footn. 6 (esp. by J. M. Nyasani and J. Kurasha): *H. Odera Oruka/D. A. Masolo* (edd.), Philosophy and cultures. Proceedings of the 2[nd] Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference in Nairobi 1981, Nairobi [Kenya] 1983; *Joseph M. Nyasani*, An African metaphysical conception of the Absolute. In: E. Schadel (ed.), Actualitas omnium actuum. Festschrift für H. Beck zum 60. Geb., Frankf./M.-Bern-New York-Paris 1989, pp. 83-87; *Jameson Kurasha*, Plato and the Tortoise. A case for the death of ideas and a place for peace and life. In: E. Schadel/U. Voigt (edd.), Sein-Erkennen-Handeln. Interkulturelle,

Asiatic traditions the Being and the behavior of the individuals was totally determined by their place in the unity of the whole. Just think of the rôle of the woman in Islam, of the demands the casts carry out on their members in Hinduism, or of the detailed moral codex in Confucianism. The principle of an absolute "preponderance of the whole against its parts" influenced the formation of marriage and family, economy and politics and the community, especially the religious one, in general.

The contrary way of referring to reality reveals itself basically in the relationship to nature. It is heighthend in the relationship to man, and now it reaches its climax in the *relationship to the absolute and the divine*. While in *occidental* cultural tradition the difference between the unlimited and absolute divine Being in contrast to the limited and contingent world of time and space, i.e. the "transcendence" of the Divine was stressed, in *Afro-Asiatic* spirituality transcendence and immanence do not enter in too great a distance from each other; here more emphasis is laid on the closeness and immanence of the Divine.

In *African* religiosity, as mentioned above the ancestors go into the dimension of the Divine; nay, the very Divine is conceived of as the starting-point of the series of ancestors. So it is especially in typically African Christianity: Jesus Christ is believed to be the omni-present, all-embracing primordal ancestor, the omni-potence and vital force which permanently permeats everything within the immanence[12].

In *Asiatic* religiosity, obviously emphasis is laid not so much on the transcendence but rather on the immanence of the Absolute and Divine: whether human life as "fate" or "kismet" is totally determined by its divine source, so that there scarcely is any freedom-granting distance between the two, like in the

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ontologische und ethische Perspektiven. Festschrift für H. Beck zum 65. Geb., ibid. 1994, pp. 83-87; *id.*, The African concept of personality as a possible contribution to global reconciliation. In: H. Beck/G. Schmirber (edd.), Creative peace through encounter of world cultures [footn. 1], pp. 199-209.

[12] Cf. *John S. Mbiti*, Afrikanische Religion und Weltanschauung [African religion and understanding of the world], Berlin-New York 1974; *Jean Pliya*, La spiritualité de la culture africaine. In: H. Beck/I. Quiles (edd.), Entwicklung zur Menschlichkeit durch Begegnung westlicher und östlicher Kultur. Akten des IV. Interkontinentalen Kolloquiums zur philosophischen In-sistenzanthropologie. 1.-6. Sept. 1986, at the Univ. Bamberg, Frankf./M.-Bern-New York-Paris 1988, pp. 265-275; *Segun Gbadegesin*, African Philosophy. Traditional Yoruba Philosophy and contemporary African realities, New York-San Francisco-Frankf./M.-Paris-London 1971; *Reginald Nnamadi*, Afrikanisches Denken [African thinking], Frankf./M. 1987; the both contributions of J. M. Nyasani and J. Kurasha quoted in footn. 6.

Islam of West Asia; or the Divine manifests itself as a plurality of deities immanent to nature and "incarnations" ("Avatars") immanent to history, like in the Hinduism of South Asia; or the all-embracing final source of mankind's Being and life doesn't confront us as personal, addressable "Thou" (as "the one and only God" or as a plurality of deities), but merely is considered to be an immanent standard of human behavior, like in the Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism of East Asia[13]. A further significant difference which still accentuates what has been said may be seen in the fact that in the tradition of the European-occidental inculturation of Christianity the Deity pronouncedly was conceived of as "male" (as "Lord" Panto-crator, "Father" and - in a trinitarian intensification - even as "triumvirate") who faces his work, the creation, as opposing an ob-ject. Up to a certain degree (however, as indicated, modified in a specific manner) this holds true also for Islam which is to be understood as being relatively close to Christianity. But it cannot be applied to the spirituality of Inner, South and East Asia. Here also femal deities are known, resp. the Divine and Absolute is rather conceived of as a "bearing" feminity and maternity which acts by "letting the beings come and grow and taking care of them". However, it can be observed that Asiatic (and, lately, also African) ways of understanding exert an ever increasing influence on European-occidental mentality, thus stimulating new forms of a "cosmic consciousness". This could be understood as "historical counter-reaction" to an era of "Christian world mission by Europe", when together with the Christian religion also its inculturation into the European culture, i.e. this very culture was propagated all over the globe.

[13] Cf. our explanations: World peace as dynamic unity of cultural contrarieties. The onto-hermeneutic basis for an understanding of the structure of the culture of mankind as a perspective for a "dialectic-triadic" conception of reality. In: H.Beck/G. Schmirber (edd.), Creative peace through encounter of world cultures [footn. 1] (esp.: bb. West, South and East Asia, pp. 38-50); *Ram A. Mall*, Die drei Geburtsorte der Philosophie [footn. 7]; *Ralf Moritz*, Die Philosophie im alten China [Philosophy in ancient China], Berlin 1990 (pp. 277-283: lit.); *Kenneth Ch'en*, Buddhism in China, Princeton 1964; *William E. Biernatzki*, The root paradigms of Chinese Buddhism. In: H. Beck/I. Quiles (edd.), Entwicklung zur Menschlichkeit durch Begegnung westlicher und östlicher Kultur [footn. 5], pp. 241-252; *Yang Jai-Hyuck*, Das Verständnis von 'Natur' und 'Praxis' bei Mao Tse-Tung im Hinblick auf die altchinesische Philosophie [The understanding of 'nature' and 'practice' in Mao Tse-Tung in regard of the philosophy in ancient China]. In: E. Schadel/U. Voigt (edd.), Sein-Erkennen-Handeln [footn. 6], pp. 89-97.

II,2. The sub-contrary opposition bewteen the African and the Asiatic area of culture

As may result from the data offered above, the African and the Asiatic spheres of culture apparently agree to each other in the following respect: They aren't dominated by an analytical rationality which gains distance from reality through abstraction. Rather they are laying emphasis on a intuitive consciousness of the "unity of the connection", of "harmony and balance of the contrasts". Within these common features, however, there seem to exist also significant differences between the large cultural areas of both continents. These differences can be represented by the concept of "sub-contrary opposition". So our attempt to "onto-logically comprehend" the geographical structure of mankind's culture gains still more profile.

In logic, two propositions are said to be sub-contrarily opposing each other if their positions regarding the same matter are at some distance: however, not at maximum distance (as in "contrary" opposition), but in the sense of a difference between *opposite directions* and thus *clear* distinctions. E.g.: "Some bodies *are* heavy" and: "Some bodies are *not* heavy". (Therefore propositions sub-contrarily opposing each other can both be true at the same time, but they cannot both be false at the same time.) The relationship of opposition between both propositions isn't expressed primarily by the quantity of the proposition ("*Some* bodies..."), but rather by the quality of the proposition ("... *are* heavy" resp. "... are *not* heavy"). In this sense, the sub-contrary opposition, too, always is the expression of a "quality" which can plainly be characterized.

"African" and "Asiatic" cultures both lay emphasis on "harmony" and "integral unity". But they do so in "qualitatively" opposing manners: African spirituality *out of the immediate impulse of the natural Being*; Asiatic spirituality *out of the detached tranquility and calmness of the consciousness*. Let's explain this again in regard of the threefold aspect of the relationship to nature, to man and to the Absolute and Divine.

African spirituality expresses itself as being-in-motion which basically is rhythmical: Music, dance and drama permeat the whole life and determine all regions and references of existence. The Being of material nature is experienced as thoroughly "rhythmical", as "rhythmical event". This being-in-motion is continuated by "eidetic identity" into the sphere of the intellectual. It gains its complete expression in the products of culture. *Asiatic* mind, on the other hand, shows a more contemplative attitude which can be deepened to a philosophical mysticism, as in Buddhism. The unity, harmony and balance with nature here consists in "standing-in-oneself" in the spirit of partnership against nature:

"letting it come" and "letting it happen". This is neither an "anti-thetical" grasping of nature (as in Europe) nor a "synthetical (or maybe more clearly: syn-ergetic) penetrating flow of the Being" of nature (as in Africa); rather "synthetical adjustment" to nature characterizes the Asiatic mind.

In *African* culture mind, so to speak, effuses into the material nature, joining its vibrations and entering into it, "incarnating" in it and completing it. In *Asiatic* culture mind transcends the material nature and tries to overcome it, to break free from it and any "material dependency and limitation", as in Hinduism[16].

Correspondingly, *African* culture discovers the unity of spiritual Being *in* and *together with* the plurality of the material beings, in their own *midst*, as immanent to them. In *Asiatic* culture, on the other hand, unity is searched for *beyond* and *above* the material beings, as transcendent to them. *"African harmony" of Being and consciousness* is derived from *Being*; it consists in the immediate vital complex of motion. *"Asiatic harmony" of Being and consciousness* is derived from *consciousness*; it consists in the tranquil, detached calmness of the mind.

In both cases mind doesn't primarily try to subdue nature scientifically-technologically, but rather to live in consonance with it. This *relation to nature* is continuated in the *relation to man*; hereby the typical differences between African and Asiatic spirituality may become still more evident. As mentioned above: While in *European-occidental* culture the human individual determines itself by creating sharp limits against the fellow man (through rational definition of one's own rights and competences, up to the danger of egocentric individualism). according to *African* understanding human individuality consists merely in its relationships to the fellow men, to the whole group and to nature, in "being there for them". In this sense, the actualization of human individuality is considered to be the highest value of life. According to *Asiatic* understanding, on the other hand, individuality is something which must be overcome, for it is

[16] Into this context a remark is fitting made by *Arnulf Rieber* during a discussion in our mutually organized cultural-philosophical research colloquium at Bamberg University in the summer term 1992: "The triangle of cultures - Europe, Africa, Asia": In African as well as in Asiatic cultural tradition there is the conviction that in nature, e.g. on mountains or on trees, spirits are dwelling (deities or souls of the ancestors). According to *African* understanding, the spirit is located in the centre of the tree; it forms the "heart" of the tree, its life in a deeper sense of the word. According to *Asiatic* understanding, the spirit is sending effects into the tree "from above"; it forms the "head" of the tree, dominating it. From the *African* perspective, the spirit is living in the midst of material nature; from the *Asiatic* perspective, it is tending towards domination, overcoming and liberation. (Of course, the expressions: "from above", "midst" resp. "head" and "heart" aren't primarily to be understood in a properly spatial sense, rather in a symbolical and ontological sense.)

limited because it is conditioned by the immersion of mind into matter, whereby mind suffers its spatial-temporal multiplication and a limitation of its unity. So in Asiatic spirituality the strife for unlimited unity and harmony tends to overcome nature and, through it, human individuality.

This different relation to the human individual is continuated, so to speak, beyond death. According to the understanding of *African* culture, the souls of the dead keep on living in the community of their families, supporting them, inspiring them, protecting them as their "good spirits". According to *Asiatic* understanding, e.g. in Hinduism, it means an evil, a sign of wrong attachments and still ungained freedom, when deceased souls keep on affecting the living persons in time and space. It fits into this scheme that in African culture bodies are *buried* (and so given back to the immediate unity with material nature), while in Hinduism they are *burnt* (in order to complete the overcoming of matter and the detachment from it).

A further interesting expression of the typical difference between African and Asiatic spirituality regarding the relation to the fellow man and to the community can be seen in the *different manners how culture is handed down*: In *Africa*, they prefer oral tradition; in *Asia*, they prefer written tradition. Through oral narration the generation handing down its tradition at present in a vivid way gets involved into the contents of culture which are handed down; the current generation keeps on shaping these contents, thus living on with them. The written word, on the other hand, in a certain way is closed and independent against the people handing down a tradition. Herein the detachedness and distance of the "general" spirit is documented in contrast to the many individuals in space and time which hand it down.

In the last and deepest instance, the differently accentuated understandings of unity and harmony in the areas of the African resp. of the Asiatic culture are represented in the *relation to the Absolute and Divine*. While in European mentality, as explained above, the difference and transcendence of divine Being against the limited and contingent world of space and time has been elaborated sharply by rationality, in the regions of the African and the Asiatic culture more emphasis is laid on mutual oneness, i.e. on the immanence of the Absolute and Divine. This is done in the utmost immediate way in *African* culture: Here the Divine is considered as the starting-point of the series of ancestors, whence the flow of life permanently is coming in. So the Divine is very close to mankind and nature, continuously acting in them in a creative way. Such a immediacy of vital immanence of the Divine is lacking in *Asiatic* spirituality. Here, due to the tendency mentioned above towards "overcoming matter by withdrawal to the inside", rather the spiritual distance (and con-frontation) gains special actualiza-

tion. One might call this an "immanence of transcendence *as* transcendence"[17]. So in Islam, which originated in West Asia, the absolutely One God indeed is transcendent to all multiplicity of the world events, but in such a way that these events seem to be detemined by Him totally; therefore an adequate distance granting free encounter and partnership scarcely can exist. Hinduism in South Asia knows a multitude of manifestations of the Divine in nature and history. Thus the unity of the Divine seems to be immersed into the multiplicity of the world without plainly mingling with it. Finally, in East Asia, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism don't conceive of the Absolute as transcendent Thou confronting world and mankind, but rather - in different manners - as immanent standard of Being. Hence the ethical habit of a specific "calmness" and "wisdom" arises.

These examples demonstrate: Talking about "African" resp. "Asiatic" culture can only refer to certain typical basic tendencies of these extensive areas of culture which spread over continents and which are subject to grave differentations in their concretions. So e.g. one has to speak about the spiritualities of West Asia, South Asia and East Asia, i.e. about a multitude of Asiatic cultures rather than about the one and only "Asiatic culture". However, belonging to the same continent doesn't mean an absolute historical contingency and essential irrelevancy, but - as we tried to show above - a being also ontologically related through the common rooting in spiritual "basic tendencies" typical to the continent; nevertheless, by the progress of technological culture (which originated in Europe) the continental borders grow more and more relative. Against all tendencies towards blurring and levelling intercultural distinctions, however, must be stressed: The prim-ordial spiritual similarities and differences of the world cultures offer essential possibilities of mutual stimulation and completion.

In order to prevent the *monistic* misunderstanding (which takes the cultural differences on one continent for nothing else than optional variations of one and only one basic theme of culture) as well as the also one-sided *pluralistic* misunderstanding (which denies any common contents of the different components) it would be best to speak about *gradual similarities* - which are not contingent, but essential. Interestingly the wide-spread inclination to mere "distinction" and to accentuation of differences originates from (maybe one-sided use of?) European science which always provokes the monistic counter-extreme[18].

[17] Cf. the further explanations by the *author*, World peace as dynamic unity of cultural contrarieties [footn. 13], pp. 40-42.

[18] An attempt to see the different and dissimilar on the background of the common and similar (e.g. the difference between West, South and East Asiatic culture as different modes of expression of specific Asiatic way of culture) was undertook by the *author*, entering

III. The ontological unity of the formation of nature and the structure of culture as triadic event

At first *methodological preliminary remarks* may be required. Subsequently, we don't want to attempt an *a priori proceeding by deduction*. This would force the data given by experience to obey a pre-conceived principle, e.g. a triadic pattern of explanation, thereby surely falsifying them. Rather we try to go the way of *a posteriori induction* (maybe better: *transcendental reduction*). This way starts from the data given by experience and helps us later to understand them more deeply as expression of a dialectical meaningful structure of Being which lays their basis[20].

Thus our starting-point is the connection of experience described above. According to it, culture results from a permanent encounter between nature and mind: Both form an *ontological unity*; they are proportional to each other and can be understood as a meaningful wholeness[21].

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[20] But even then we must not expect that all data given by experience can be "ontologically deduced". They can only approximatively be "elucidated onto-hermeneutically". To say it more exactly: The procedure follows a circular figure repeating itself again and again, i.e. a spiral movement: Departing from experience, we try to view its ("dialectical-trinitarian") basic source; in order to understand out of this source experience more "basically" (as more or less coherent connection of meaning). Hence a first, preliminary understanding arises, a pre-understanding of the data of experience. Hereby still more aspects of experience, which confronted us ununderstandably as problem before, can be taken into consideration and put into their proper place. Thus our view can turn back again and so on - in direction of an ever more "broad" and "basical" understanding of reality. In this way, the manifold and different "being of experience" should and can be elucidated in the "truth of the Being which lays its basis"; at the same time this truth is to be revealed mor clearly.- The foundation for this concept of knowledge is the Aristotelian differentiation bewteen the sensual as what is "the former *for us*" (the starting-point of our experience) and the basic source of meaning and Being which is de-tected hereby as what is "the former *by nature*" (wherein the inner constitution of the sensual is apprehended and where our strife for knowledge reaches a certain conclusion); cf. *Aristotle*, Anal. post. 1,2 [71b.34]; see on it *Horst Seidl*, Beiträge zu Aristoteles' Erkenntnislehre und Metaphysik [Contribution to Aristotle's theory of knowledge and metaphysics], Würzburg-Amsterdam 1984.

[21] Nature implies, so to speak, the "inviting" and "pro-voking" *possibility* which the mind grasps and *actualizes* through the work of culture, the receptive potency, into which mind can express and "objectivate" itself: Mind lays its claim on the possibilities of nature and ful-fills them, shaping them through its ideas. I.e.: By passing through nature (by taking into service and actualizing its possibilities) mind can gain more and more its own actuality; and in a certain correspondence: By "passing through the mind" (i.e. by its technological-cultural performance) nature gains more and more its own actuality, reaches an increased energetization of its material and vital potencies. So the work of culture means an actualization of

Within this ontological unity the relationship of mind and nature, as explained, seems to be differentiated according to the individual cultures: In *European-occidental* culture mind is - very clearly since the early modern times - orientated primarily towards the rational ordering and technological domination and "working up" of nature. Inasmuch as nature hereby merely is of interest as "value useful for man" and not respected as "value meaningful in itself", this leads to a partially aggressive and destructive habit. So mind behaves against nature here as *anti-thesis*.

On the other hand, in *Afro-Asiatic cultural tradition* mind primarily searches for harmony and unity, i.e. participation and integration. However, inasmuch as hereby not only the unity, but also the difference of mind and nature is revealed (for otherwise one could scarcely speak explicitely about *the two* being a unity), this means the habit of *synthesis*.

Synthesis originates from the coming together of "thesis" and "anti-thesis"; its original basis lays in the one as well as in the other. Now, in the concrete case one or the other of these partial aspects of the basic source can *predominate*. Depending on this, the character of the synthesis varies "*basically*". I.e. in our context: Inasmuch as the synthetical harmony flows more strongly from the "thesis", namely nature and the reference to nature, the type of the *African* culture is characterized. Because here unity and balance, as elaborated above, result immediately from vital-natural Being. In *Asiatic* culture, on the other hand, it results rather from the calmness by detachedness (and con-frontation) against nature; so the emergence of the synthesis here obviously is accentuated by the "antithesis".

Thus the concrete profile of an ontological-holistical interpretation of the unity of nature and culture shows itself in the sense of a triadic-dialectical concept of Being: *Nature* (as "Being in itself" preceeding every cultural working-up, laying the basis for it) is, as a "*thesis*", sharply confronted by *European-occidental culture* as an "*antithesis*". *African* and *Asiatic culture* represent two "basically different" types of "*synthesis*" and harmony between the human

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ontological possibilities of nature by mind as well as of ontological possibilites of mind by nature. Both correspond to each other essentially and so comply with the requirements of the concept "ontological unity". On the further elaboration of this connection cf. by *author*: Kulturphilosophie der Technik [footn. 5], esp. pp. 48-73: The positive meaning of technology in the context of world history. There we try, from the perspectives "technics as 'actualization of the possibilities' of nature", "technics as spiritual history of nature" (and as "natural history of mind") and "technics as unifying movement of mind and nature", to analyse the extent of the mutual, holistically comprehensive dynamis-energeia-relationship between nature and mind. This holds true especially for the modern culture which is thoroughly determined by technics.

mind and nature. Thus we can cast a glance on the possibility of a *creative interplay of the world cultures* which offers a chance and task: to become *permeable* for one another, to notice human onesidednesses and limitations and to tackle them in teamwork - by mutual complementarity disposed for a humaneness which is "culturally differentiated" as well as "universally integrated" and so vivid in the full sense of the word.

The mode of a dialectical intertwining and possible mutual fertilization of cultures described above in particular considers the important distinction grounded in experience: The relation between European and Afro-Asiatic culture is to be understood as *contrary* opposition; the relation between African and Asiatic culture, however, as *sub-contrary* opposition. For in the latter the members of the opposition are closer to each other: They are two modes of mediation and balance bewteen mind and nature which are disposed so that they oppose each other. Precisely through their mutual complementary relation they are able to "compensate" the European-occidental disposition and to bring it into proper proportion again - since it tends to grasp nature in active tension, to doimnate it and to make it serve man's purposes. (This at first brings about a "lack of balance", namely a "pre-ponderance" of mind in con-frontation to nature.) Vice versa, the "scientific-technical" dynamics of the occident can exert its influence on the orient and the "spiritual vivacity immediate to nature" of Africa, thus promoting the development of a "*still more active* calmness" resp. a "*still more purposeful* vivacity". Both influences, as mentioned above, can be enacted in a mutual fertile complementary relation.

Our dialectical-triadic attempt to understand the actual unity of nature and culture may in a way remind of the philosophical approach in *Hegel* However, Hegel's idealistic presuppositions aren't shared by us. Especially in calling nature "thesis" we still totally leave out of account whether nature is to be conceived of as position of an (absolute) mind or not; instead of this, we only mean the Being preceeding all spiritual working-up and culture, laying the basis for it (and in this sense: "immediate"). Just as little calling the occidental culture "antithesis to nature" intends to express already an "essential aggressivity", rather a con-frontation in order to determine the confronted rationally. This con-frontation may grow constructive by explicitely and decidedly turning towards nature; it is also exposdd to destructive alienation. But alienation takes place only inasmuch as nature is used as "mere means for optional purposes" - a danger and maybe also a temptation of perverting meaning which certainly to a large extent has become historical reality without thereby (as claimed by

dialectical idealism) doing a necessary and intelligible step towards harmony and peace[22].

Hegel's terminology which we used above (not without giving restricting explanations) represents a *modern-occidental* form of triadic understanding of reality. An *ancient-occidental* form can be found e.g. in *Plato's* doctrine of the "trichotomy of the soul"[23].

According to it, firstly a "vital desire-soul" is accentuated. It is the basis of the human Being and lives fundamentally in the abdomen. Contrarily "confronted" to it is the "mind-soul" to which the head as main part of the body is ascribed. Between the two the "courage-soul" mediates; it is situated in the breast and in the heart (as origin of "cordial" courage).

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[22] As topical "triadic interpretations of reality" which partially proceed by critical dialogue with Hegel, which partially and particularly also are inspired by the deeper onto-triadic thought tradition of the *medievel occident*, as e.g. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas or Bonaventura, in this context may be mentioned: *author*, Der Akt-Charakter des Seins. Eine spekulative Weiterführung der Seinslehre Thomas v. Aquins aus der Anregung durch das dialektische Prinzip Hegels [Being as act. A speculative continuation of the ontology of Thomas Aquinas, inspired by Hegel's dialectial principle], München 1965; *id.*, Ek-in-sistenz. Positionen und Transformationen der Existenzphilosophie. Eine Einführung in die Dynamik existentiellen Denkens [Ek-in-sistence. Positions and transformations of existential philosophy. An introduction into the dynamics of existential thinking], Frankf./M.-Bern-New York-Paris 1989 (esp. chap. 7,2: Die 'triadische' ek-insistentielle Bewegungsstruktur der Wirklichkeit [The 'triadic' ek-insistential motional structure of reality]). Here 1. the primordial Being-in-itself of reality is called 'in-sistence', 2. the Being-expressed (resp. Being-proceeded-from-itself) and Being-confronting-itself 'ek-sistence', and finally 3. the Being-returned-to-itself 're-in-sistence' (and also, as coming together of 1 and 2, 'con-sistence').

See further also *Arnulf Rieber*, Trinitätsanalogie und ganzheitlicher Seinsbegriff [Analogy of Trinity and holistic concept of Being]. In: E. Schadel (ed.), Actualitas omnium actuum [footn. 11], pp. 131-161; *Clemens Kaliba*, Die Welt als Gleichnis des dreienigen Gottes. Entwurf einer trinitarischen Ontologie [The world as likeness of the triune God. Sketch of a trinitarian ontology]. With a 'preface to the reprint' by H. Beck (Writings on Triadics and Ontodynamics. Vol. 4), ibid. 1991; *Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg*, Das Band zwischen Gott und Schöpfung. Entwurf einer analogia trinitatis [The bond between God and creation. Sketch of an analogy of trinity] (Writings on Triadics and Ontodynamics. Vol. 5), ibid. 1991; *Radoslav Kutra*, Die Schule des Sehens. Klischeefreie Vollendung triadischer Wirklichkeit [The school of vision. Non-stereotype completion of triadic reality] (Writings on Triadics and Ontodynamics. Vol. 6), ibid. 1994; *Erwin Schadel*, Musik als Trinitätssymbol. Einführung in die harmonikale Metaphysik [Music as symbol of trinity. Introduction into harmonical metaphysics] (Writings on Triadics and Ontodynamics. Vol. 8), ibid. 1995.

[23] Cf. e.g. *Thomas A. Szlezák*, Unsterblichkeit und Trichotomie der Seele im zehnten Buch der Politeia [Immortality and trichotomy of the soul in Politeia X]. In: Phronesis 21 (1976) 31-58.

In the context of this approach, the essential habit of *Europe* can be understood as being disposed to ascribe greatest importance for life to the head (with an inclination towards exclusive concentration on the head), while in *Afro-Asiatic* culture it is more originally the "heart" which marks the disposition of man and whence man lives. Here, the "heart" mediates between "abdomen" and "head": To continue out of the perspective opened above in a plastic manner: In *African* culture the heart is motivated more immediately and strongly out of the "abdomen"; in *Asiatic* culture more accentuatedly out of the "head".

Thus the cultural structure of mankind may be understood in certain correspondance and analogy to the ontological structure of man the individual, so to speak as "macro-anthropos". This very comparison makes it evident that to none of the cultures in its *original* humane value (if we disregard e.g. the factual perversions of meaning mentioned above) a lesser value has to be ascribed than to another one. Because for the entire whole of an organism (to which mankind's culture in its basic dispositions, as we tried to show, may be compared) all organs are inevitably necessary: exactly *by their diversity* they have to complete one another in position, structure and function.

The dialectical vision of reality in Hegel is influenced above all by the doctrine of the three hypostases in *Neo-Platonism*. Here the second member of the triad - modelling Hegel's "anti-thesis", in our view: the "con-frontation" - already clearly is conceived of as "consciousness" resp. "reason"; so e.g. in *Plotinus*[24].

He offers some interesting parallels to *African* and *Asiatic* conceptions - both philosophical and mythological - of a triadic basic structure of reality.

The *area of African culture* knows, e.g., an ancient Egyptian tradition. According to it, reality is based on three primordial deities: Ré ("Creator-God"), Ptah ("Word-God") and Amun ("Spirit-God"). The first one can be interpreted as archetypical reference to the primordial vital force (esp. the sun); the second

[24] According to this position, reality as "act-uality" moves in three hypostases, i.e modes of standing in itself: All kind of reality at first owns its basic standing-in-itself as "primordial unity". Thence it proceeds into the ob-jective and differentiating "reason" where it gains a second standing-in-itself. Finally it returns via the "soul", its third standing-in-itself, by passing through matter, back to the primordial unity. Cf. esp. *Plotin*, En. V,1 ("On the three original hypostases"); moreover: *H. Beck*, Triadische Götter-Ordnungen: klassisch-antiker und neuplatonischer Ansatz [Triadic configurations of deities: classical-ancient and Neo-Platonic approach]: In: Theologie und Philosophie 67 (1992, # 2) 230-245.

one as an equivalent reference to con-fronting consciousness (expressing itself in the word); the thrid one as reference to love and joy that connects all[25].

In the *area of Asiatic culture* we encounter at first the South Asiatic "Hindu Trinity" ("Trimurti") wherein the supreme Divine Being is represented: Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva[26]. In an even clearer way, for Indian thinking the deepest essence of reality articulates itself in the abstract philosophical formula: "Sat-Chit-Ananda", i.e. Being-consciousness-joy of love.

According to the philosophical tradition of East Asia, the wholeness of Being lives in the complementary contrariety of the powers (resp. directions of motion) Yang and Yin, which also can be interpreted in the sense of a triadic circular movement[27].

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[25] Cf. *Manfred Görg*, Mythos, Glaube und Geschichte. Die Bilder des christlichen Credo und ihre Wurzeln im alten Ägypten [Myth, faith and history. The pictures of the Christian creed and their roots in ancient Egypt], Düsseldorf [2]1993.

[26] Brahma is believed to be the "Creator-God", the unlimited primordial unity of Being whence the manifold and limited being emanates. Vishnu is the "Preserver-God" who carries and preserves the emanated manifold and limited being. Because his most important incarnations, as Ram, Buddha (according to Hindu understanding also he is an incarnation of Vishnu) and Krishna, were guiding teachers of mankind, it is not absurd to assume that he is, in his essence, deeply "word-like". Shiva, the "Destroyer-God", "destroys" the limitations (and also the perversions of meaning, the evil and the suffering, which are connected to limitation) of the emanated manifold and different, thus giving it back to the unlimited unity and harmony of the origin.- On this context cf. *H. v. Glasenapp*, Die Philosophie der Inder, eine Einführung in ihre Geschichte und ihre Lehren [The philosophy of the Indians. An introduction into its history and its doctrines], 2 vols., Salzburg 1953/56.

[27] In this perspective, "Yang" represents the "male" power of the heavens, proceeding from itself and expanding; "Yin" represents the "female" power of the earth, returning to itself and receptive. So a far-fetched parallelism between Yang and the pro-ceeding from "thesis" towards "antithesis" (resp. from "Being" towards "consciousness" and "word") can be drawn, as well as between Yin and the re-folding of the proceeded opposition into a "synthesis" of integral unity and fulfilling harmony.

This explanation of the philosophical and mythological concepts of triadic basic essence of reality, which differ typically from culture to culture, may be articulated less clearly in the respective traditions; it may also seem to be far from the perspectives of the individual scientific approaches. Our interpretation, however, suggests itself in the hermeneutic perspective of the given context. The more or less huge similarity resp. dissimilarity between the given examples even demonstrates the possible difference and multiplicity of the expressions of the basic unity of being human as well as of Being itself; vice versa it demonstrates the unity of the basis in the multiplicity of the phenomena.- An extensive preliminary work on the project of a triadic ontology of culture is contained in *E. Schadel*, Bibliotheca Trinitariorum. Internat. Bibliographie zur trinitarischen Literatur, Vol. 1-2 Munic-New York-London-Paris 1984/1988.

This hint at the transcultural and transcendental character of triadic thinking (and thus at the evidence of the issue itself!) can fundamentally confirm our attempt of a final onto-hermeneutical understanding of the unity of "natural formation and cultural strucutre" in its meaning and give it an even broader basis.

Now let's conclude by an outlook on a continuation of our project in the sense of a "*Analogia et Participatio Trinitatis*" as offered in a *Christian philosophical-theological perspective*[28]. This obviously is of special importance in our context, also because the founder of Christianity lived at the cultural intersection of Europe, Africa and Asia (although Christian theo-logy at first was developped more in the form of European-occidental conceptualization).

From this point of view, the Divine basic reality is to be conceived of as a tri-per-sonal unity in motion: Being in an unlimited way, it expresses in unlimited knowledge and consciousness of itself its essence as "inner word" (= "Logós"), thus con-fronting it as its totally co-essential "Thou". The space of encounter between the two which is constituted this way is filled with life by both of them breathing a common "spirit" in mutual acceptance and love, so transcending (i.e. not "blurring" or "extincting", but rahter "fulfilling" and "heighthening" their duality and contrariety, confirming their unity and harmony[29].

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[28] Cf. the four works of the *author*: Analogia Trinitatis - ein Schlüssel zu Strukturproblemen der heutigen Welt [Analogia Trinitatis - a key to structural problems of today's world]. In: Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie XXV (1980) 87-99; Kulturelle Begegnung und Bewegung zwischen Europa und Lateinamerika - gedeutet in der Perspektive einer 'Analogia Trinitatis'. Retrospektive Verstehbarkeitsimpulse interkultureller Verhältnisse und Beziehungen aus einem Ansatz christlicher Philosophie [Cultural encounter and movement between Europe and Latin America - interpreted in the perspective of an 'Analogia Trinitatis'. Impulses for retrospective understanding of intercultural relations and connections from an approach of Christian philosophy]. In: Politische Studien 40 (1989) 263-269 [*German version of a corresponding Spanish contribution to the II. Congreso Mundial de Filosofia Cristiana, Oct. 1986, Monterrey/México*]; Triadische Engel-Ordnungen: Frühchristlicher und mittelalterlicher Ansatz [Triadic orders of angels. Approaches in Early Christianity and in the Middle Ages]. In: Philosophie und Theologie 67 (1992, no. 3) 321-355; Freiheit und triadische Struktur des Seins - im Ausgang von Erich Przywara [footn. 2] 385-398.

[29] On the 'co-essentiality' between Logos and Divine Being cf.: "In the beginning there was the Word and the Word was with God and God was the Word" (Joh. 1,1); on the 'equal rank' and 'succession' of the three Divine hypostases resp. persons: "Baptize in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" (Matth. 28,19).

This means: The unlimited Divine Being pro-ceeds within itself totally "out of itself" (as self-expression in the Word) and "into itself" (as self-completion in the Spirit); thus it enacts a circular motion without any temporal or spatial limitation. The limited world - i.e. the unity of nature and culture - by Divine freedom is implied in the articulation of the unlimited

In our context which is coined by the philosophy of culture thus the following interpretation becomes plausible: *Occidental culture* in its *con-fronting logicity* participates in a special way in and points to the proceeding of the Logos in the Divine basic reality; regarding the partial alienation and the perversion of meaning of this "logicity" this happens, however, expressed in Christian terms, rather as a participation in the "crucified Logos". In contrast to this, the area of *Afro-Asiatic* culture in its different *spiritual* disposition appears to be embedded more deeply in the proceeding of the divine Spirit: *Asiatic* "spirituality of illumination" more clearly in the emanation of Spirit from the Divine *Logos*, *African* "spirituality of immediacy" more distinctly in the effluence of the Spirit from the Divine *Being*, inasmuch this preceeds Logos and Spirit. Such an attempt to interpret the world event in an onto-trinitarian way hints at the possibility of a fruitful dialogue between philosophy of culture and Christian theology wherein, however, not only European, but also African and Asiatic modes of thinking are to be involved[30].

Summing up, it may be said that the extensive continental areas of the earth, i.e. Europe - Africa - Asia, in a certain correspondence to the varying natural conditions, have brought forth different mental and cultural dispositions which are complementary to one another and can be understood more deeply in the perspective of a "triadic conception of reality". Here holistic thinking has an important task of philosophical and empirical research, whereby it could give important impulses and helpful orientations to intercultural action.

Word; therefore it participates in the "swinging"of the Divine Being which is moved in a trinitarian way. Hence the world bears a thorough trinitarian character based on its transcendent and at the same time immanent Divine foundation, hereby pointing to the trinitarian structure of this foundation as its "weak reflection"; vice versa understanding trinity can elucidate some aspects of the world. On this cf. *author*, Natürliche Theologie. Grundriß philosophischer Gotteserkenntnis [Natural theology. Outlines of philosophical knowledge of God], Munic-Salzburg ²1988, esp. pp. 192-205 [essence and personality: God's essence as personality],. 213s., 220s. and 224s.; *id.*, Der Akt-Charakter des Seins [footn. 22], pp. 190ss.

[30] Such a dialogue can receive many impulses from the works of *R. Panikkar*. E.g. this author sees a special relation bewteen Buddhism with its teaching of the "absolutely silent stillness" of Nirvana and the first of the three Divine persons which is "before" the Word; he also stresses the possible deeper understanding of Judaism, Christianity and Islam as Word-Religions by a reference to the second person of the Divine Trinity, the "Word"; finally, according to him, by aiming at "non-duality" (Advaita), at the overcoming of oppositions and at synthesis, Hinduism enacts a turn to the inside, to the "unity of the Holy Spirit". Cf. e.g. his writing: Trinität. Über das Zentrum menschlicher Erfahrung [Trinity. On the core of human experience], Munic 1993; see also the corresponding remark by *author*, World peace as dynamic unity of cultural contrarieties [footn. 13], p. 49, footn 28.

CREATIVITY TOWARDS PAX MUNDI

Venant Cauchy

I would like to begin my paper by quoting two sentences, one presumably from a great African thinker, St. Augustine, another which also impressed me greatly, from contemporary Africa, Senegal, but which may have its roots in the most remote recesses of African history. The first states simply about human conduct: *Ama et fac quod vis* — love and do what you will. *Love, true love,* love of what deserves to be loved, for its rationality, its goodness, its truth, cannot go astray, cannot tend towards evil or embrace ugliness, and any act which follows upon it or flows from such love cannot turn out to be ethically or humanly wrong. The other statement concerns personhood considered in its authenticity: *Consciousness of one's own dignity involves or presupposes consciousness of the dignity of the other.* Egotistic stances in other words reflect one's incapacity to be conscious, i.e. to be mindful, to be respectful of the dignity of other persons. Both statements apply to persons, but as such they also extend to groups, communities, nations and cultures inasmuch as collective virtues are characterized by a predominance, in the behaviours and relationships of communities, of those qualities of rationality, sensitivity and freedom which make the adult individual a fully developed human being, i.e. a person in the full sense of the word.

Now personhood sets off human individuals from other things in nature, the varieties of inert forms of matter, the infinite diversity of plant and animal species, by their capacity to visualize, out of their urge to satisfy or facilitate the satisfaction of human needs, works and objects, instruments, tools for definite practical ends or simply entities brought into being for themselves, for the fulfillment they bring to the human agent. Humans differ basically from the multitude of things and species which inhabit the world by their infinite capacity to shape the materials in their environment into new objects either for use towards other ends or for the satisfaction derived from beholding or contemplating them. Such is creativity as an outcome of our being human, that is, basically endowed with intelligence, sensitivity and liberty at work in the world.

Culture (of which civilization represents a certain stage) involves everything humankind has produced (through persons in society) over time: modes of communication (language), various forms of shelter, of seeking and preparing nourishment, the increasingly complex froms of social living from the family, to the clan or tribe, to the nation and civil society, resulting from evergrowing requirements as human capacities develop and become inherited through education. Some have thought more fitting to reduce the meaning of culture

to its higher forms, but I don't believe such a restriction is advisable, except in a very particular and limited sense. I think this is one of the major points which have come out of the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy held in Montreal in August of 1983 on the theme of "Philosophy and Culture." The basic distinction to be made in any idiom is that between nature and culture, culture being whatever emanates creatively from a nature endowed with reason, sensitivity and freedom, whether that be a linguistic code responding to the overbearing need of human beings to communicate with other human beings, or social institutions which serve to facilitate the ways in which human beings relate to one another or to a supreme being as in the various religions, or whatever humans produce in distinctively human modes...

It would be a grave misapprehension for the language to be abstracted from that which brings it about, from its finality as a human creation. It is more than a mere code to be viewed in separation from its function in social life. It involves a quality of relating meaning to and from others. Language gains its full meaning in its concrete optimal use as an indispensable means for persons to "communicate" among themselves. Otherwise it falls short of its function through conveying falsehood, half-truths or intentionally misleading information. It ceases to be what it is meant to be, just as a tool wrought for a precise purpose which it is incapable of accomplishing is simply not what it is intended to be. Given the manner in which diplomatic relations are carried out in our times, or the various tactics by which political parties acquire or maintain power, it becomes quite evident how abuses of language, even outright deceitfulness are in direct contradiction equally with the peace of the world (*pax mundi*) and with internal peace or peace within each nation or social entity — that tranquillity of order (*tranquillitas ordinis*) referred to by Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages.

Please allow me now to reflect with you on that most absurd form of behaviour we call war (which has more often than not in the past been a source of pride for the strong and victorious, a source of envy and resentment for the vanquished, nourishing the hope of victory in future wars etc. etc.), war where countless human beings have been humbled, maimed, trampled, killed (some hundred millions had died a decade ago in our own century), and we have been at it relentlessly since then. Many have quoted the sentence according to which since wars start in our heads, it is there that we must change if peace is to be achieved. It seems quite obvious that it is within us, within our cultures, nations, states that we must change to become liberated from this shamefully absurd form of brutality and live in peace, true peace, not a "pax romana" or a "pax americana" which is the epitome of senseless pride,

greed and lust for power. But as we say in French "il y a loin de la coupe aux lèvres" — It is not enough to say that we intend to change.

Violence has quite often been vaunted in the past as manifesting strength, even some kind of holy quality. The hordes of Gengis Khan overrunning much of the known world, even in our own times the warring armies of powerful nations or alliances at each other's throats, have been imagined to reflect power and sombre greatness — whereas the hatred which engulfed them , the tools of destruction they wielded so willingly, the weapons of horror they still wield, since the victors are still with us, reveal the sorry state of their hearts and souls. I personally believe that many attempts to justify wars and to make it into a worthy human pursuit despite all of its horrors lie in a misguided confusion between violence and the capacity to face up to objective evils such as pain, hardship, difficult or threatening situations. Aggression taken in its etymological sense means in essence *moving* or *advancing towards* that which opposes or threatens one's life or well-being (ad-gradior, ad-gradi = to walk towards...).

Ancient and medieval thinkers distinguished carefully two kinds of tendencies consequent upon cognition, that which tends towards agreeable things or activities, such as good food and drink and pleasant situations for example, and that which causes us to face difficult or painful situations or disagreeable objects for our overall benefit. Men and animals must have both types of inclinations to function in the natural world. I would define the second as a capacity to face up to difficulties despite their disagreeable or threatening quality. Anger (*ira* in latin) designates one of the main reactions or inclinations in this respect — and for this reason mediaeval thinkers called this capacity the "*appetitus irascibilis*" or "irascible appetite." The closest to this designation in our age would be the capacity for aggression or aggressiveness considered as a positive stance in a difficult environment.

One of the important lessons I at least have derived from the IInd World Congress on Violence and Human Coexistence which we organized in Montreal in July of 1992 was the need to distinguish between aggressiveness and violence. Otherwise violence becomes trivialized through being too easily confused with aggressiveness which can be perfectly legitimate and even necessary for the perservation of the individual. Either the very principles of nature, our innermost being is a direct source of deviant or distorted behaviour, or we must consider *violence* in its primary sense as behaviour or lack of behaviour which runs counter to moral imperatives. Indeed it may well be used in a metaphorical sense to designate whatever goes beyond normal bounds or limits such as a *violent* storm, a *violent* fever etc.,

but to my mind such expressions should be clearly identified as metaphorical, if only to mark the distinction between immorality and the morally permissible.

Such in my view is the nature of war whether it take place between opposing groups within a given state, between states or nations, or on a world scale such as the disastrous conflicts with which the world has been afflicted at least twice during the century which is coming to a close. Philosophers and other academics have spent much time and effort to explain or attempt to justify such outbursts of inhumanity. But I regret to say that they have tried largely to base their appraisal of war on a lack of sensitivity to the primacy of persons, to rights consequent upon their fundamental needs, to what I consider to be an inescapable assessment of social structures and functions as subordinate to the essential dignity of the persons who make up the state.

May I mention three such theoretical approaches to war. The first can be attributed to people such as Hobbes with his "*homo homini lupus*," to Freud and his miscounceptions about human desires and the nature of social relations (in *Civilization and its discontents* for example), to Hegel who views human history as evolving from a primitive state of unreason. Our own times have often followed along similar lines. Bertrand Russell for instance perceived decisive obstacles to world government in his book *Authority and the Individual* (Unwin 1965, p. 34) in the fact that social cohesion is founded on fear of external enemies: "A world state, if it were firmly established, he writes, would have no enemies to fear, and would therefore be in danger of breaking down through lack of cohesive force." Bergson himself in his great ethical treatise *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* views the very origin of war as embedded in human nature: "...the origin of war, he writes, is property, individual or collective, and as humanity is predestined to property by its very structure, war is natural. The warrior instinct is so strong that it is the first to appear when one scratches civilization to uncover nature." (p. 1216 [302]).

The second viewpoint I would like to present very briefly is that of Roger Caillois (a French sociologist and anthropologist) in l'*Homme et le sacré* and *Instinct et sociétés*. This thinker who was closely associated with UNESCO tends to look upon war as making up for social inertia, conservatism and the superficiality of appearance. War allows one to vent one's energy in "la fête," the feast or celebration, by which one detaches oneself from the dullness of society in its downward trend toward prosaic life. War thus becomes a paroxystic activity of collective life for which substitutes must be found. Caillois acknowledges the perverse nature of wars, but one feels that if in reality war substitutes for "la fête" (the festive

celebration) in the modern world, if it is necessary to counter in such ways the monotony and mediocrity of social life, peace is far from being a desirable ideal. It may appear rather as the epitome of dulness and boredom (see my chapter entitled "Trois points de vue sur la paix" in *Conceptions of Peace in the History of Philosophy*, Montréal : Ed. Montmorency, 1987, p. 113).

A third viewpoint, that of Kant in his celebrated opusculum *Toward perpetual peace. A Philosophical project* has perhaps had more influence because of the central position occupied by its author in contemporary thought. Alongside a number of principles regulating relations among nations, which no one can quarrel with, Kant sets forth a conception of nature as imposing its will upon us whether or not we agree (*fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt*, p, 69). In a Hobbesian sense, nature, as a kind of superordinate entity, contrives to impose peace upon persons, not by virtue of persons apprehending an optimal order in terms of which intelligence, sensitivity and liberty function in each individual to produce the highest level of creative harmony, but by countervailing egotistic forces inclining every which way but cancelling themselves out in the social whole. Allow me to quote at length a pertinent passage from Kant:

> Here Nature comes to the aid, Kant writes, —by means of precisely those egotistic inclinations— of the general will based on reason, which everyone venerates, but which is powerless in practice, so that a good organization of the state suffices (which is surely within the possibilities of men) to direct the ones against the others the forces of those inclinations, in such a manner that their destructive effects are neutralized or cancelled out, and that the result, for Reason (with a capital R) is that everything works out as if those forces [negative forces, that is] did not exist, and that thus man, though not being good morally, is nevertheless forced to be a good citizen.

Thus the problem of social hostility and of war does not depend on the individuals who make up society. The problem for Kant, here at least, is not so much to make individuals morally good, but to constitute the social fabric and to manipulate its components in such a way that order is made to emerge from egotism and hostility. And he goes on to write

> The problem of the formation of the state — harsh as this may seem to the hearer — is not insoluble even for a society of demons...

* * *

Let us now turn for a few moments to other perspectives which seem to me infinitely richer and more fruitful in the search for solutions to the social evils which beset us.

In the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, which studies human actions and the good of man, in terms of which actions are deemed good, Aristotle adopts a radically different approach from that of Kant. The good of the sate or the city does not diverge from that of the person, since the highest form of human personal life can be achieved in the state and is therefore political in the most profound sense of that term:

> For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, Aristotle writes, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve ... These, then, are the ends at which our enquiry aims, since it is political science, in one sense of that term.
>
> (Nic. Eth., I, 2)

The epitome of personal perfection consists in the presence within a person of a quality which, Aristotle writes, "is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living", *friendship*. Friendship in the highest ethical sense is regard for other persons, not merely with a view to their utility or to the pleasure they provide us with, but primarily in and for themselves. It involves (εὐνοία) *thinking well* of our friends, and (ὁμονοία) *being of one mind* with our friends. Each of us needs society to come into the world, to become complete human persons able to communicate fully and creatively according to our capacities, to live to the fullest extent and extend our humanity into the future through our children and through those we have helped to grow culturally and spiritually. Friendship involves basically a rational sensitivity to other persons. It is a rational choice of living together (ἡ τοῦ συζῆν προαιρέσις). Aristotle devotes a large portion of his Ethics to φιλία or friendship i.e. books VIII and IX of his *Nicomachean Ethics*.

At the basis of society there is a need for others since we all have to be born i.e. brought into being by others; then we need others to help us develop fully, and to become, as persons, mindful of others and creative. The same requirements apply to relationships among societies or states. The human being is essentially a "political animal," an animal who chooses fundamentally to live with others (συζῆν). Voltaire had noted in his *Dictionnaire philosophique* the importance many ancient thinkers had bestowed upon friendship in their

ethics and political science, but he thought this may be due to the modern spirit being "too dry in everything".

I will not attempt to pass judgment on how the Ancients would have reacted if they had been faced with the problems of our own day. I think we can agree that since the beginning of the modern era, we have made quite a mess of things in many areas. Of course there are many more of us to wreak havoc on the resources of the world. But we must admit that the individualism we have developed, the egotism, the lust for power seminally present in some form or other in the philosophies of the founders of modernity, Francis Bacon and René Descartes, have fostered countless disciples in our own times.

The idea is not to avoid any power or ownership of resources. But it becomes quite evident that accumulation of property (material goods, money etc.) and securing power over others have become ends in themselves for a great many people in many parts of the world, thus depriving a large majority of men and women of what they need to satisfy their most basic needs and to develop a sense of their own personal dignity. Power is organized in such irrational, senseless ways that many are incapable of freely determining for themselves how and where they will live.

Reflection on the state of the world today has brought many people to enquire into the reasons and causes behind our predicaments and to seek solutions. In concluding I would like to read a few paragraphs from a document entitled: *Platform for a Responsible and solidary world.* The extracts bear on a general diagnosis of the present situation and on the principles to be applied in working out practical solutions.

> If our societies continue much longer to function and develop in the way they do, humankind will destroy itself...
>
> In today's world, basic unsatisfied needs and squandered, destroyed resources exist alongside untapped potentials for work and creativity.
>
> Such a situation is unacceptable.
>
> We suffer from three major imbalances: between North and South on our planet, between rich and poor within each society and between human beings and nature.

I believe a fourth imbalance should be added: that between men and women or the masculine and feminine components of our shared humanity. The full affirmation and participation of women as joint distinctive partners in protecting and developing the world must be

recognized. The "feminine" is the most immediately and closely involved in the generation and nurturing of human life. The lesser, subordinate role it has been allowed to play may well be responsible for the state of turmoil and disarray in which we find ourselves globally today. In a real sense this imbalance may well be seminal or causative with respect to the other three...

> The fact is that these crises have common causes. The world has evolved very quickly in the last two centuries. The "modernity" invented in the West has spread to the four corners of the globe. Most countries are experiencing a spiritual and moral crisis: we have been unable to channel our incredible capacities for understanding, enterprise and creation to benefit all people. These three [four in my view] crises point to the effects of current forms of scientific and technological development, to greater divisions of labour, to expanding markets and to the endless, growing flow of goods and money: in short, factors which constitue "modern Western civilization" or "modernity" , as some call it. In the minds of the promoters of this "modernity", such factors were supposed to spur human progress and ensure prosperity, peace, security, happiness and freedom for all people. While they have in some way contributed to this for a part of mankind, they have simultaneously generated poverty, wars, insecurity, collapse, oppression and, lastly, the three crises mentioned above.

Among principles briefly described in the Platform with a view to correcting the various imbalances are the principles of protection, humanity, responsibility, moderation, prudence, diversity and friendship.

I would feel remiss here if I did not commend the efforts of Professors Mourad Wahba and Mona Abousenna, the organizers of this Colloquium on *Creativity and Pax Mundi*, in setting up the *Cairo Group* to reflect on the diagnoses and solutions set forth by the *Platform for a Responsible and Solidary World.* If you should wish to take part in the Alliance which is slowly taking shape throughout the world, I would be happy indeed to provide you with the information you may require and eventually to welcome you most heartily in our network of concerned academics...

CREATIVITY, PAX MUNDI AND GANDHI

Ramjee Singh

One of the most important cause of the crisis of the western civilization has been the loss of creativity. Nobody can deny that the West has achieved a high watermark in the development of scientific knowledge and material advancement but today it has reached a blind alley. We need not stop progress of science but it must have a guide. Science in itself is a-moral. so it requires values. We have creative forces in science, technology and economics and politics and architecture, cinematography and music but since they are not rooted in spirituality, they are marked by morosity, cynicism and the lack of faith. America has shown a creative genius but having no direction, it has resulted in the development and perfection of atomic bomb. The West in general have shown a sustained regard for federalism and democracy but again without high ethical and spiritual values, it has resulted in becoming the 'policeman of the world' and custodian of economic empire through the slogan of globalism. So Einstein had to admit: "science is lame without religion and religion is blind without science". Whitehead has also rightly observed that "The future of civilization depends on the degree to which we can balance forces of science and religion". Bertrand Russell admits: "We cannot give scientific justification for the goals that we might pursue, or ethical values that we adopt." No scientific reason can be given why it is bad to inflict wanton cruelty on one's fellows and establish own empire and exploit the poorer people.

I think apart from the force of formal logic, dilectical logic and symbolic logic, we have to find out a logic that works in the inner world. which is a flat negation of all that is immediate in existence. Sorokin says: "Altruism is a special kind of creativeness in the field of goodness, entailing principally ethical values in distinction from the cognitive values of the truth realised by science, philosophy etc."

Gandhi whether dignosing the crisis of modern civilzation is pleaded for moral and spiritual test of civilization. Einstein also said: "The most important human endeavour is the striving for the morality in our action." Whether it is science or technology, religion or politics the test should be the happiness of the man. Happiness does not consist in plenty or luxury. Toynbee has shown that ease and luxury has been most fatal foes of 27 civilizations. John Galbraith's warning against the mad rush for the industrialisation is clear. The root cause of strife and war is within us and in our desire to have unbridled material comforts at the costs of others. Hence, creativity is rooted in morality and spirituality which is more internal than external.

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Crisis of Knowledge and Loss of Creativity:

One of the important causes of crisis in Western Civilization is the loss of creativity. Nobody can deny that the West has achieved a high water-mark in the development of scientific knowledge and material advancement but inspite of all these achievements, the decline of the West has deeply shaken its innate sense of superiority as the natural leader of the world and the source of all intellect and progress. In Spengler's characteristics of the last phase of 'civilization', disappearance of creativeness forms an important feature. No new great creations appear, either in art or in religion, or in politics. Life becomes intellectualised and commercialised. Though many changes, variations and mixtures of forms may still appear, but no fundamentally new forms appear any more. " All that remains is the struggle for mere power, for animal advantage per see"1. This lack of creativeness is the characteristic of our time. "What is practised as art today is impotence and falsehood... We go through all the exhibitions, the concerts, the theatres and find only industrious cobblers and noisy fools, who delight to produce something for the market."2. According to Toynbee, the core of the breakdown of civilizations is that the creative minority can no longer bring up sufficient creative force to meet the challenge of the moment. The source of acion in each sociey ress wih the creaive minoriy since the mass is incapable of mentally and spiriually living through he same creative experience, hence here is general accepance or imitation of, as Toynbee calls, mimesis.

We can trace creative forces in European politics in the idea of some form of unification-Benelux Economic Union, Western Union, concluded between France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries in 1948, creation of the Council of Europe, the plan for a European Defense Community (NATO) but the idea of a united Europe would be of

little value if it were brought about merely by pressure from the U.S.A. However, the constant activity toward unification is the clear proof of the urge of Europe for greater unity. In the field of Economy, we find creative forces in European Economy with formation of a Common European Market, European Recovery Plan, European Payment Union and the Schuman Plan. All these have achieved integration and the mass production needed. In the field of architecture, an entirely new style has sprung up from a maze of hitherto uncoordinated lines and imitative themes, the straight line and the principle of functionalism emerged as the representative style of our time. In the film of Cinematography and music they have ahieved great success inspite of obvious difficulties.

Similarly, we can find some creative force in American technology. A nation with hardly 7% of the world's population produces about one third of all goods and services is an achievement of human creative power. In politics, both domestic (federal system and switch from bourgeois to mass democrcy) and foreign (resisting aggression in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, etc); America haas given ample proof of that capacity to discern great issues and audacity to deal with them which have always characterised great nations and great civilizations at the peak of their vitality. Except in the fields of film and architecture, America has not made significant contribution in the field of music, drama or literature. Ofcourse, it has shown startling progress in the field of science &medicine in chemical science, in biology, psychology and in social sciences.

Both Europe and America have no doubt amply proven our century to be one of the most prolific in scientific achievements but since they are rooted in materialistic value of life, there is growing morosity, cynicism and the lack of faith. The West has shown a creative genius but having no direction, it has resulted in exploitation of the

worst kind, political and cultural imperialism and arrogance and the perfection in the business of arms and ammunitions including clandestine sale of dangerous components of making nuclear bombs. They have no doubt shown a great concern for federation, democracy and human rights but again, it has resulted in perpetuating their hegemony and exploitation. This is because, democracy and the problem of human rights are instruments to consolidate their roots and browbeat the third world countries. The U.S.A. has assumed the role of self-appointed policeman of the world and also the custodian of economic empire through the outfits of I.M.F., World Bank, and W.T.O. The U.S.A. had stolen the signboard of U.N. and it has made the world body unrepresentative by permanency of five seats. It is rank hypocrisy to keep the treasure of atomic stockpile and ask the atomic have-nots to observe atomic fasts. Hence, the West is incapable of seizing up the moral and spiritual leadership either for World Peace or for a United World. The world has too strongly the impression that the Western leadership limits itself to grants of material aid and that too for improving their own economy. It is neither charity nor assistance but pure business if not sophisticated exploitation.

Nothing is as killing to initiative as the habit of reverting to others for economic or financial assistance. It was the political genius of Alexander the great to establish his imperial supersystem and the autonomy of the Greek polis. Hence it will the almost superhuman task and test of Western statesmanship in a modern world to strike the right balance between world-guidance and the respect of otherswith the respect of their independence. If the West reinvigorate their fundamental moral and spiritual values embedded in the Greek and Judo-Christian Culture, they can meet the challenges of the present crisis. We need a civilization-wide-peace and a civilization-wide world. If the West has to survive as the leader of the World, instead of raising the military might and its economic imperialism, it has to raise the standards of the millions who still exist in the basest poverty and squalor by practising maximum austerity and self-control. This will enkindle the creative spirit of the West which had earlier been found in Beethoven's symphonies, motivated Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln

to create respect for the individual freedom, erected Notre Dam, Rockteller Centres for philanthrophy etc.

The West, in its glamour of achievements forgot to explore the secrets of the inner world as the contemporary western civilization is still rooted in Cartesian dualistic metaphysics of subject-object dualism. In its pride of science, they have come to despise and reject intuitive and instinctual perceptions that have come here to fore animated and given perspective and hope and meaning to human existence. For creativity, we need a new instrument of thought and a perception of the " unbroken wholeness" in a non-dual frame which can understand life directly and in a concrete manner rather than in the abstruct, linear terms. The subject-object dualistic mode of intellectual knowledge has its own limitations. It cannot understand the deeper level of mind-brain interaction. Max Born also thinks that "clever, rational ways of thinking are not enough"3 It has no cure for psychology imbalances and loss of creativity." The world-view implied by modern physicist", as Fritz of Capra says" is inconsistent with our society, which does not reflect the harmonious interrelatedness we observe in nature."4. The present dualistic knowledge mechanism to bifurcate the 'seer' and the 'seen' is mutiliation of knowledge.5. This is only one-sided and partial knowledge and which leads to an " argument between nature and man."6. Dualistic epistemology provides a divided world of subject and object. But as Schrodinger says"Subject and object are only one. The barrier between them cannot be said to have broken down as a result of recent experience in physical sciences, for this barrier does not exist."7. We need an understanding which is the immediate; non-dual, and holistic. This is intuition, which is not against reason but beyond reason and is the fulfilment of all scientific and intellectual knowledge or the logic of creativity.

2. Logic of Non-abolutism:- Aristotelian logic is formal dualistic and absolutistic, hence it is most inadeouate to grasp the true nature of reality. Since it is based on the principle of Identity and Non-

contradiction, it is either true or false. According to this logic, "there are no two ways about it," "you must be either one thing or the other." This leads to the typical disjunctive attitude. Disjunction must disjoin completely because alternatives are alternatives only with reference to one subject and hence both the alternatives can be accepted at the same time. Bradley says that the fallacy of false alternative is due to our "slovenly habits."8. The Pragmatist complain that 'any purely formalistic 'either... or' formulation of contrarast eliminates reference to any universe of discourse. The form either-one-or the other-but-not both based on the principle of Excluded Middle is meaningless in view of its incompatibility to existence in transition. So the Mathematical logicians think that it is a "mistake to interpret the "either...or " as execlusive. In other words, "or" does not exclude both"9.

The World is sharply divided in multiple opposite camps. There is an "either... or "in world politics. " If a person does not agree with you, it is wicked; if a country does not agree with your country,it is wicked; there is no half-way."10. Thus neutrality has become a crime and tolerance a vice. Today one man or one group or one country fights with other, because their views differ. But views are bound to differ, because we are guided by different conditions. Hence, it is wrong to think oneself absolutely right and rest others absolutely wrong. Such attitude or outlook is imperialism in thought. Peace, therefore demands a new logic, a new outlook, a new asceticism and a new civilization. This is the Philosophy of "neither ... nor" which is simply an extension of the Gandhian principle of non-violence into the intellectual field. This non-absolutistic approach is "an endevour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted." 11. Even C.E.M. Joad opines that we must have a synoptic view of the universe. 12. In absolute sense, a thing is neither real nor unreal,

neither permanent nor evanscent but both. Hence formal two valued logic is inadequate. On the other hand, non-absolutistic epistemology avoids vicious intellectualism and the fallacy of exclusive particularity. Such a dynamics of thinking is based on catholicism and regard for truth seen from different angles. Intellectualistic abstractionism has to be given up and we should try to dehumanise the ideal and realise the real. The reality is not a rounded ready made whole or an abstract unity of many definite or determinate aspects. The multi-valued logic shows all possible rides of a thing and thus does not postulate about a thing in any fixed way. A thing is neither real nor unreal, neither eternal nor non-eternal, neither static nor mobile, neither small nor big in the absolute sense but has dual nature. Two valued logic seems to be unreal if there is loyalty to experience.

Non-absolutism is the ideology of a new civilization of peace and non-violence. It is not an intellectual utopia but a concrete moral guide and a social stabiliser. The all or non-approach has brought us on the brink of total annihilation, hence the non-absolutistic approach in thought, word and deed is the only way before us.

The Gandhian Approach to World Peace:- Peace, as Gandhi envisaged it, is far more than an absence of war and violence.13. It is a state of positive and constructive world-view and world-order, where individuals, groups and nations eshew to dominate or exploit each other and live in cooperation and mutual aid. This means that peace needs a new life-style and a new culture. However, such a philosophy of civilization of peace does not work in a vacuum. Therefore, Gandhi, enunciates both an epistemology of peace and non-violence as well as formulates a Sociology of Peace. Unlike " others, he starts with technology because technology and ideology largely go together. The mode of technology determines development, defence and democracy, in short, our whole theory of life. E.F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful is already a protest against the present development model and blind worship of bigness. The Club of Rome thesis- The Limits of Growth. 14.

is a warning against depletion of non-renewable resources,15 so is danger signal given by the Blueprint for Survival. Fritz of Capra warns us of dangers of "environmental pollution, continuing proliferation, and the liklihood of global extinction.16. But the root problem lies in our infinite greed and consumerism. Ever-growing material standard of life can only be achieved through multiplication of machinery and cruel exploitation of natural resources. Besides, concentration of production in a few hands create pockets of prosperity leading to hierarchical mode of social organisation and alienation of the population from its own labour. Community life breaks down and quality of life deteriorates. Inequality grows so much that U.S.A. with a population of 6% of world population consumes 30% to 50% of world's resources. Technological civilization creates confrontation, not between the employers and employees but also between capitalist countries for market. Even socialisation of industries is no cure for industrialisation, as exploitation was rooted in machine technology itself. Then technology determines the model of development as well as the paradigm of defence. Thanks to the development technology we have perfected the weapons of man-annihilation. If malignant hands manipulate the gifts of Science, the Frankteen's monster of super-technology will swallow up Homo Sapiens and burnup civilization. Hence technology has "become a value-choice between Dawn and Doom, when nuclear power is in issue."17 The world spends 600 billion dollars every year on military budget while millions of humanity continue to starve and suffer. The world military machine usurps research and development money (about 135 billion dollars) and engage 50 million people in military support and production. More than 60,000 atomic missiles and bombs have by now been piled up in the bunkers of the industrialized societies amounting to an average of three tons of conventional explosives per world citizen.18 Even if nuclear war does not take place, the stock-pile will cause havocs: "By the time 2000A.D., there will be less water available, less fertile land, less clean air, less wilderness. One fifth of the sapien will probably be extinct... the gap between the affluent and the hungry is expected to widen."19 Hence Professor Toynbee rightly said: "If we do not abolish

war, war is going to abolish us." Einsteen's warning is dreadfully suggestive." I do not about the Third World War but in the Fourth World War they will fight with sticks and stones." Infact, war has lost its dynamics. Today, there is the only alternative to atom, and that is Ahimsa (Non-violence). Gorbachev had made declaration of unilateral measures to prevent militarization of space. Only unilateralism can remove the obstacles in the path of disarmament. The concept of national security is outdated. It is now related to the global context. Gandhi had declared about unilateralism with the greatest emphasis at his command:" Whether one or many, I must declare my faith that it is better for India to discard violence altogether, even for defending her borders. For India to enter into the race of armaments is to court suicide. With the loss of India to non-violence, the last hope of the world will be gone".19 Economically, armament race is disastrous, strategically it is futile, politically it is like a blind alley of a very narrow and chauvinistic viewpoint. Legally or morally, it is a crime against humanity. Unilaterism, if it fails, might risk the lives of an entire nation, but the present policy of nuclearism risks the lives of all humanity and dooms future generations. If unilateral steps are taken, moral, social and economic strength of a nation will protect it from its adversaries more than nuclear weapons or nuclear alliances.20 Gandhi had made plenty of indications towards unilateral non-violent national defence in his writings--". If I were a Czech?"21 How to combat Hitlerism? 22 "Appeal to Every Japnese."23 and so on.

Like the structure of defence, technology has also effected our politics and its democratic fabric. Political leaders "recognise violence as the foundation of realistic politics."24 Modern technology necessarily brings in centralisation which implies concentration of power. Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Centralisation adds to the complexity of life which is a distruction in all creative moral endevour. It damages initiative, resourcefulness courage and creativeness and diminishes opportunities of self-government.So the more of centralisation, the less of democracy.25 Centralisation cannot be sustained and defended without adequate force.26 So to root out violence in the structure of politics, Gandhi had a vision of self-sufficient and self-managed village republics

serving as the grassroot democracy as an alternative to Centralised Party system and Parliamentary democracy. Even in his Last Testament, he had given a clear hint about the ascendancy of the civil power over the military power.

Gandhian concept of Pax Mundi is neither Utopian nor simply ethico-spiritual but also structural and holistic. Unesco's declaration of peace-making that "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be constructed" is significant and fundamental but structural aspects needs to be highlighted. Minds of men donot work in a vacuum. They are conditioned by structure of society. Unless our socio-economic and political system is re-oriented towards peace, our mind cannot grasp it properly. Even our societal framework is determined by our technological model. These days we talk about dependence-theory without realising that Gandhi had described the international dialectics of industrial development long before the model of Centre versus periphery was introduced. The forsight of Gandhi can be assessed in his warning against mad rush for industrialism: " God forbid that India should ever take industrialism after the manner of the West. The economic imperialism of a single island (U.K.) is today keeping the world in chains. If the entire nation of 300 (now 900) millions took to similar economic exploitation, it would strip the world bare like locusts." 27 Max Weber reminds us that we must develop a universal development concept. He says: "Good fortune thus wants to be legitimate fortune."28 Gandhi therefore said:" You cannot build non-violence on factory civilization." 29 Rural economy eschews exploitaton. Centralisation as a system is inconsistent with non-violent structure of society.30 Gandhi was convinced that the "mania for mass-production is responsible for the world crisis." No scheme of global peace can prove lasting unless it is linked to the creation of an equitable world economic order. Similarly, one of the great impediments in the creation of international understanding and peace is our sacrosanct faith in the doctrine of "national sovereignty".

Gandhi's dialectical approach to sovereignty is useful by which the role of sovereignty can be reduced but which does not violate principles of equality and justice. Infact, the ideal of "one world" or " World Govt." is the natural Gandhian ideal but so far it is not achieved, Gandhi advocated" to think globally and act locally". The ideal of global village is a legitimate step towards overcoming aggressive nationalism. We have also to develop education for peace. In the total crisis of the world, education has its full share. Unfortunately, we have inherited a philosophy of struggle for Existence, which is often portrayed as a battle between the Creature and the Nature neglicting man and his tendency to learn the laws of harmony of himnself with the universe. Because of increasing world-tensions threatening the very survival of man itself, peace-education has become important.

Conclusion :-

True, Violence has lost its dynamics in this thermo-nuclear age but "the hold of violence is as great that even though violence has failed a thousand times, we still put faith in its capacity to succeed."32 Perhaps it is rooted in our mental dispositions. It might be that man has inherited from the animals the instincts of aggression, hate and zealousy.33 He still retain many things that he possessed before man became man. We need a mind which is free from its own conditioning. Hence during the very ancient time, there had been provison for the study of military science but so far the science of peace is concerned, it was left only to the religious saints and seers. Today, we badly need a science of peace and non-violence in all our educational carriculum and research. We have spent tremendous amount of time and resources to explore the "science of violence," now it is high time to turn our attention towards the "power of non-violence." The only alternative to non-violence is non-existence. Hence, what is needed is an intellectual revolution. If we can discard

absolutistic style of our thinking, there is hardly any scope for religious fundamentalism, national chauvinism, or even ideological fanaticism. But ideology of Pax Mundi presupposes a Pax Mundi in the field of our societal structure also. If bloodshed and murder is violence, exploitation is also violence. A society free from inequality and exploitation can pave the way for Pax Mundi.

... ...

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LOGIC OF PAX MUNDI

Mourad Wahba

At a press conference in London on 9 July, 1955 B. Russel presented an appeal for defence of humanity's right to exist, subsequently known as the Einstein-Russel manifesto. The manifesto was signed by the greatest scientists of the world. The manifesto reads:

In the tragic situation which confronts humanity we feel that scientists should assemble in a conference to appraise the perils that have arisen as a result of the development of mass destruction and to discuss a resolution in the spirit of the appended draft.

We are speaking on this occasion not as members of this or that nation, continent or creed, but as human beings, members of the species man, whose continued existence is in doubt."

From the above mentioned manifesto there are two problematics that need to be tackled. The first problematic is involved in science being responsible for the would be mass destruction and the necessity of a revolution to avoid this mass destruction.

Now the question is: Is a revolution a solution?

The second problematic is implied in the scientist as being committed to a creed or to a nation and as being a member of the species Man.

Now the question is:
If the scientist is not related to a creed or to a nation to what is he related as a species man?

At the opening of the first World Peace Congress in Paris in 1945, Frederic Joliot -Curie said: We are met here not to demand but to impose peace on the war mongers."

Now the question is: Could peace be imposed?

Let me now extract the notions implied in these three questions: revolution, species man and peace.

Let me now paraphrase these notions as follows:

A revolution is practiced by the species man for the sake of imposing peace.

Then the question is:

How can the species man carries out a revolution to realize peace?

But answering this question one has to ask three more questions?

Who is the specious man?

What is a revolution?

What kind of peace?

To my own viewpoint a revolution is a radical change replacing a pro quo instead of the status quo. The pro quo is a futuristic vision that has been created by reason. Consequently, reason is creative. And if reason is creative then its logic should adopt creativity as its pivotal concept and in this sense we could establish a new logic that is, logic of creativity and then it is our task to identify its categories which are four in number: abstraction, relation, purpose, and time.

Who is the species man?
He is distinguished by reason..
But how does reason function?

Reason does not perceive facts because there are no facts per se, but facts as perceived. Thus reason, from the beginning interprets facts. But his interpretation is not confined only to the theoretical level but it is related also to practice due to our definition of creativity as the ability of reason to establish new relations for the purpose of changing reality. Therefore, reason in the light of interpretation and creativity, is the faculty of practico

transcendental interpretation as opposed to the passive speculative feature immanent in both the Cartesian on one hand and Lockean and Human systems on the other hand. Descartes interpreted the correspondence between innate ideas and reality in the static and non evolutionary concept of man. Locke and Hume observed in the factors constitutive of the origin of the ideas the maximum part played by experience, with, in addition, or minimum part played by the organizing factor Locke referred to by the phrase "operations of our mind" known by reflection, and Hume reduced it to the association of ideas. Kant could have completely surpassed Descartes, Locke and Hume if they had developed the constitutive characteristic of reason. He was satisfied with this characteristic at the start and not through the whole system. And this defect is due to the priori form of the sensibility and understanding which is limited to organizing the phenomenal reality.

Thus the species man is a self reliant master of his life against any kind of despotism or dogmatism. Consequently, his position in the world is no longer to depend on external authority. Thus, his struggle in the nature and with social systems was to be governed by his reason as being the faculty of the practico transcendental interpretation.

Within this context one could ask: What kind of peace counld be realized?

Could it be stated that peace is the negation of war?

If this is so one has to ask: What is war?

War is based completely on the concept of the "enemy". Thus, if this concept is negated war will be negated too.

But what is the origin of this concept? It is related to the concept of the sacred taboo, and if this sacred is touched enmity emerges.

Now, the question is:

What is the origin of the sacred taboo?

It is a relativized absolute . But in his relativity the absolute becomes limited whereas he is, by his very nature, limitless and this leads to new creation, that is, the creation of another absolute and this, in his turn, leads to an enmity between the two absolutes, and so the absolute struggle emerges and this is the origin of war.

Thus, if we want to eliminate war we have to eliminate the absolute struggle, or strictly speaking, to eliminate the relativization of the absolute.

How?

The concept of the absolute is related to the concept of the absolute truth. Thus, the question is:

Can the species man grasp the absolute truth?

Here Kant could be our guide in his distinction between grasping the absolute truth and seeking to grasp it.

Grasping the absolute truth leads to dogmatism whereas seeking to grasp it prevents us from falling into dogmatism.

Now the question is:

Who is responsible for the creation of dogmatism?

The religious authority backed by a certain kind of theology. And the real function of theology is to prevent the believers from any deviation concerning its dogma, and if this deviation happens the believer is accused of being heretic. Then, any new interpretation is forbidden and if this newness is the core of the logic of creativity, then theology refutes this logic.

Now the question is:

What is the logic of creativity?

Spearman's book entitled "Creative Mind" (1930) could be

considered the first book that tried to establish the logic of creativity based on three principles. The first principle is that of apprehension of experience, that is, knowing one's own experience which converts the feelings into consciousness of feelings. But the defect of this principle is that it prevents the self from transcending itself; it affirms nothing more than the subjective experience.

The second is the principle of relations. When two ro more items are given, a person may perceive them as related in various ways. Spearman is doubtful about regarding this principle as creative, for it only copies what had already existed.

The third is the principle of correlates. When any item and a relation to it are present in the mind, then the mind can generate in itself another item so related. Spearman says that this principle is the most inherently creative, and he mentions the famous test of opposites. Words are read aloud and to each of them the subject has to respond with its opposite. But, in my opinion, this principle is nothing more than mere remembering of past experience.

But in my own opinion, these three principles of creativity can be reduced to the principle of sense data which is the fundamental principle of Logical Positivism and which does not however justify creativity, for creativity cannot be limited to sense data. History of science confirms my own point of view. As an example, consider the development of the theory of relativity. Before Einstein, the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time had pervaded both the theory and the practice of physics for several centuries. Then came Einstein and questioned the fundamental nature of Newtonian ideas. In this way, a confusion was introduced into the infrastructure. To be free of this confusion Einstein was able to tackle this underlying infrastructure in a radically new light. And this is one form of creativity that is based on doubt against dogmatism or the absolute truth that prevailed within the Newtonian physics.

Another form of creativity is that which comes out of a concealed contradiction that is embedded in the existing theories. As an example, the postulate of parallels. This postulate states that through a given point there

is one and only one parallel to a given straight line. At first glance, this postulate appears to be self-evident. There is, however, a contradiction within it because it contains a statement about infinity; the assertion that the two lines do not intersect within a finite distance transcends Euclid's definition of the straight line as the shortest distance between two of its points, and this means that the straight line should have a finite length.

The history of mathematics tells us that excellent mathematicians from Proclus to Gauss have tried, in vain, to solve this problematic and a new turn was given when it was stated that this axiom could be disposed through the creation of non-Euclidean geometry.

From the above mentioned contradictions one can conclude consequently that revealing a contradiction leads to the creation of a new theory. Thus, formal logic is not fit for generating creativity because it is based on the non-contradiction principle which has been transformed into an absolute truth. In this sense, if a scientific theory is claimed as true, then thinking based on the possibility of its contradiction is inadmissible. And the reason for this inadmissibility derives from the ontological form of Aristotle's logic, being based on the "essence" or strictly speaking on what is permanent and unchangeable.

As a remedy for the defect of formal logic, dialectical logic, formulated by Hegel is based on the principle of contradiction. But this principle was used within the concept of the Absolute. Thus its end is similar to formal logic, though they are different in principle. In this sense, both formal and dialectical are related to the absolute truth, whereas the history of science proves that it is inadmissible to proclaim any absolute truth.

Thus, the question is:

Is it legitimate to establish a substantial relation between reason and truth?

My answer is in the negative for the following two reasons:

1. If it is illegitimate to state that reason can grasp the absolute truth, we have no right to deduce from this that reason can

grasp the relative truth, because truth by its very nature should be absolute and not relative. And as the absolute truth is a dogmatic truth the ancient Greek sceptics, in order to eliminate the dogmatic truth, they adopted the following principle: "To every argument an equal argument is opposed and it is in consequence of this principle that we are brought to a point where we cease to dogmatize." In this sense dogmatism is related organically to the concept of truth. So, if we decide to eliminate dogmatism we have to discard the concept of truth.

Now, the question is:
What is the alternative?

In the preface to the "Philosophy of right" Hegel says "To comprehend what is --this is the task of philosophy --- To recognize reason is the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us with the actual."[1]

Thus, according to Hegel reason is applied within the horizontal relation of man to reality, whereas the real relation of man to reality is the vertical, that is, man's capability of transcending reality for the purpose of transforming it, and transformation, in this case means creating new relations. Thus reason is related to creativity to the extend that we could say that reason is creative by its very nature.

Now, what is the logic of creativity?

Its definition is based on the definition of creativity which is the ability of reason to establish new relations for the purpose of changing reality or strictly speaking, changing the status quo through the pro quo. The pro quo is futuristic vision. Thus the future is embedded in creativity and it has its priority over the other two moments, namely, the present and the past. This means that we mover from the future of time and not from the past. And the future is related to the purpose. Thus, the act is purposive and its end is presented in the future. Consequently that act is futuristic. And because it is so, then it is a symbol of negation since it refuses the status quo, and it is also a symbol of affirmation since it incarnates the pro quo, which

is the cause of changing the existing reality. This means that the cause is presented in the future. Thus, it cannot be realized but it is, on its way to be realized. Consequently, freedom is embedded in the future, and immanent in creativity. Therefore, what limits freedom limits creativity. And cultural taboos limit freedom because they are the cause of the absolutization of culture. In this case, there is a contradiction between the absolutized culture (dogma) and creativity.

Now the question is:

What is the relation between the logic of creativity and pax Mundi?

But why Pax Mundi in particular? Because the world is threatened by what came to be known as "Star Wars" (The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) which has been launched in the eighties during the Reagan administration and supported by the Christian fundamentalist headed by the moral majority to master space superiority.

Here we face a new problematic from within the scientific technological revolution. In fact, this revolution emerged as an outcome of the enlightenment, whereas this same revolution is being used to annihilate the world. Consequently Pax Mundi is a must.

But how could we tackle Pax Mundi?

My answer is as follows:

Not through the definition of man as social or political animal but as creative animal, because the first definition limits the scope of creativity due to the social and political control that is mixed up with cultural taboos that generate the concept of the enemy. Consequently from the first definition we can deduce that war is a must whereas from he second one we can deduce that war is negated.

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CREATIVITY IN EDUCATION AND PAX MUNDI

Mona Abousenna

In a remarkable comment after the explosion of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Einstein said: "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good or evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophe."

From this comment I would like to emphasize two concepts: "modes of thinking" and "unparalleled catastrophe." And I proceed by elaborating the second concept as a pretext to identifying the first one.

What is meant by "unparalleled catastrophe" within the international spreading and production of atomic bombs?

I think the answer should be: annihilation not only of two cities, but of all cities. That is to say, of all the inhabitants of the world and thus, the would be atomic war will end the world and consequently, humankind has to be involved in seeking new modes of thinking that could help in uprooting the roots. Thus, our duty is to discover these roots, or more strictly, the roots of the "modes of thinking" which generate such catastrophe.

How? As long as it is a matter of modes of thinking, we have to find them from within and not from without in the sense that it is a matter of method of thinking. But first we have to define the terms method:

What is meant by "unparalleled catastrophe" within the international spreading and production of atomic bombs?

In order to define "the meaning of "modes of thinking" more precisely, it is preferable to use the term "method" of thinking.

According to the Macmillan Encyclopaedia of Philosophy the term "method" is:

> ...strictly speaking, "following a way" (from the Greek Heta, "along" and "way") refers to the specifications of steps which must be taken in a given order to achieve a given end. The nature of the steps and the details of their specification depend on the end sought and on the variety of ways of achieving it. The vary according to whether its end is taken to be 'the conquest of the nature, for instance, or the discovery of truth and in the light of different theories about the relation between these ends and man's primitive condition of impotance and ignorance.[1]

Hence, method designates order as opposed to the haphazard. To justify this order, or method, a certain system or procedure should be designed to achieve specific goals efficiently. What the Greeks called "techne", an art based on knowledge, is the rationalization of method by science. The scientific method adopted by experimental science, starts with the process of experiment, that is, of trial and error. Trial and error apart from scientific method, is a way of learning by adaptation to the environment through acquired habits, whereby "future activities are modified in the sense of repeating the successful and avoiding the unsuccessful kind of act under similar circumstances in the future".[2] Hence, trial and error is the method of adaptation to the environment by relying on the physical perception of sense data which are stored in our memory and constitute the corpus of our experience and knowledge of the external world. The method of trial and error, thus, assumes a horizontal relation to the external world and relies solely on memory, that is, the remembering of the stored knowledge acquired through past experience. Such method deliberately disregards an essential dimension of the human being, namely, reason which controls and regulates our sensory experience and our memory and hence our learning by experience. But insisting on learning through a piecemeal method that relies solely on sense data will confine the human mind to the level of common-sense. In this way transcendence will be annihilated by the immediate objects of sense.

In contrast, creativity involves a mental process whereby humankind cognates the external world with the purpose of changing and controlling it. Hence, creativity, as a vertical relation between humans and the environment, runs counter to the theory of adaptation, since it perceives the human being as a non-adaptive creature through the category of transcendence. However, adaptation becomes only an ideal pursuit under one condition, namely when the environment is an ideal one. Such absurd precondition provides a misleading conception for life itself, where man's work consists mainly in changing and developing the material environment to suit his own purposes and in creating a cultural environment to sustain him in his evolution. Since evolution is generally the result of non adaptation, hence creativity and its products are incompatible with adaptation.

According to T.P. Nunn, creativity is what characterizes the human being:

> In the case of man, ..., the creative character of the psychical activities scarcely needs illustration; the whole fabric of the civilisation he has built up bears witness to it. Social organisation, laws and government, the arts and sciences, have all sprung from a restless creative power which, even in the dullest of mankind, adds to the world something that would not be there if that power had not been exercised.[3]

Hence, civilisation is a proof that creativity is a transcendence of, and not an adaptation to, the environment. In a report by the Club of Rome on the project entitled "No Limits to Learning", published in 1979, a proposal of a creative learning process is suggested. Adaptation is rejected for the sake of what the report calls "anticipation":

> But the view of learning as adaptation has its shortcomings. In contrast to anticipatory learning, adaptive learning de-emphasizes human initiative. It implies a passive adjustment to external pressure.... While all other creatures are forced to permanently adapt themselves genetically (i.e. by trial and error) to the changing environment, humanity has begun to adapt the outside world to its own needs. By creating

societies, individuals are gradually freeing themselves (through food production, medicine, technology, etc.) from the threats of nature.[4]

Anticipation, on the other hand, "is the ability to deal with the future, to foresee coming events as well as to evaluate the medium-term and long-range consequences of current decisions and actions".[5]

Consequently, it appears from the foregoing arguments that adaptation is against method. For adaptation means that pursuit of knowledge for practical ends more or less by a process which aims at acquiring habits. Hence, adaptation overlooks the scientific method of reasoning which relies upon logical proof.

The next two questions then are: First, what is the method of creativity? Second, How does it help in uprooting the cause of "imprecedented catastrophe" by altering the modes of thinking through education?

The answer is inherent in the nature of the human mind itself, which is by its very nature dialectical. The act of cognizing the world involves a dialectical process based on a dialectical relation between the abstract and the concrete. The particular, concrete objects which are perceived by the senses are synthesized. Hence, we could say that the human mind is, by nature, dialectical in the sense of perceiving and responding to the outside world in terms of what is contradictory, that is, by locating contradictions and attempting to solve them. However, this natural disposition is soon lost or becomes distorted by means of early socialization within the family and school education which foster and institutionalizes cultural taboos. Instead of recognizing contradictions and enhancing the child's ability to understand and solve them as being the motive of development and evolution, children are forced to think in terms of absolute, non-contradictory categories and concepts which are usually of moral nature, such as the categories of good and evil, right and wrong.

Creativity as defined by Mourad Wahba is "the ability of reason to establish new relations for the sake of changing reality."[6] In this sense creativity, involves finding and formulating new relations between old

objects and conditions involving values and social customs dominated by cultural taboos. This creative process as such is a process of eliminating the cultural taboos by means of critical thinking, is the process of change, development , and evolution in time of crises. This means that crises are soluble only creatively, i.e. by thorough alterations of our inner life and the outer forms in which life finds expression. Every creative act, in its maximum, overpowers the established by moving beyond it, and in its minimum is reorganization of the established order through consciousness.

At the core of creativity consciousness is the concept of purpose as outlined by Marx's example of the bee: "At the end of every labour process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer in its commencement".[7] This view places "design" and purpose" at the core of the activity of creativity, which motivates human production in the process of changing and controlling the outside world for human needs.

If education responds to human needs, the most primary among which is the need for knowledge in the sense of understanding the world with the purpose of transforming it, it should adopt a theory and a method that would enhance the students' natural inclination to logical thinking by promoting the category of relation. For instance, the students should be trained to look for logical, albeit real and not mythical, connections between cause and effect in phenomena surrounding them, with the help of a scientific method. Through the discovery of such relations, students become truly scientific social beings. That is, their social identity acquires a scientific nature, so that they can comprehend the essence of their social identity and social problems on a scientific basis.

If dialectical logic is adopted as the basis of the method of creativity, this would result in a critical approach in the education system. The purpose of which is to promote the students critical thinking.

Critical thinking is anti-dogmatic since any dogmatism that obstinately insisted on the knowledge already attained and mastered would therefore always reject any new knowledge, from the outset on the sole ground that it contradicted the old. Critical thinking also seeks to uncover the roots of everything. And since the myth forms a basic feature of knowledge, ancient,

and modern, a rational analysis of the roots of the myth would be a practice of the critical mode of thinking. This means that the myth should not be tackled as a myth per se, but emphasis should be laid on the symbolic features of the myth denoting something else beyond the myth itself.

Here the Cartesian method would be of specific significance in the surpassing of dogmatism which relies on old unchallenged concepts.

Now the question is: How can we eliminate dogmatism?

In my opinion, the answer could be in de-dogmatization, as a necessary step following de-mythologization, which aims at relativizing the absolute modes of thinking. And the realisation of this aim demands revision of the theological mode of thinking which tends to the absolutization of faith. And since we have plurality of faiths, the struggle, or strictly speaking, war is a must. And since war, in modern, times has to use atomic weapons pax mundi is threatened to the extent that humanity comes to its catastrophic end.

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